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Canada 
Abstract 
In the United States of America, the field of environmental justice has become an 
important consideration in land use planning and natural resource management decisions 
regarding the protection of minorities. Within Canada, however, the field of 
environmental justice is not part of the legislative or policy regime used in environmental 
decision making. The focus of this study was to incorporate environmental justice into a 
situation in Canada involving a First Nation and a land and natural resource conflict. A 
phenomenology study design and a content analysis of the existing data were used to 
develop and apply the equality framework to a recent land use conflict between West 
Moberly First Nations and the Provincial Government of British Columbia. The results 
demonstrated that environmental justice can be incorporated into a Canadian context. 
When applied to the land use conflict, the equality framework demonstrated that the 
decisions made by the government to permit a coal mining company to destroy the 
critical habitat of a threatened herd of caribou were tantamount to an environmental 
injustice for the First Nation. The study concludes by discussing the differences of 
environmental justice as developed America in comparison to Canada, the challenges that 
associated with incorporation, and potential future applications and frameworks. 
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Preface: "Too close to creek" 
Before I submitted a research proposal to my Thesis Committee, Dr. Annie Booth (my 
Thesis Supervisor) provided me with invaluable advice: work and live with a First Nation 
before conducting scientific research that relates to them. This advice sent me on a 
journey that has substantially changed the way I think and view environmental matters. 
Taking heed of this advice, I spent a summer working for and living in the 
traditional territory of Nak'azdli First Nation. While there, an Elder taught me a lesson 
that I will never forget: some things cannot be measured. This is where "Too close to 
creek" comes from. It took me well over a month, and in addition to guidance and 
assistance of another community, for me to fully appreciate the breadth and holistic 
nature of the Elders' traditional knowledge. That lesson guides me to this day. 
In similar fashion, my education continued when I started working for West 
Moberly First Nations nearly six years ago as their Senior Environmental Planner / Land 
Use Manager. It is difficult to put into words what I have learned to date, both 
academically and spiritually, from community members of all ages. Their cultural 
resolve to protect the inherent rights of the land and wildlife, in particular the threatened 
Wah stzee (caribou) within their territory, is inspirational. It is for that reason, and the 
advice I received from Wendy Aasen (Thesis Committee Member) in terms of selecting 
an example that I care about, that I decided to use the community's struggle as a focal 
point of my thesis. Although it was not until after I attended the trial that was heard by 
the British Columbia Supreme Court, where I witnessed the Crown making arguments 
that were less grounded in a sense of justice for both the environment and First Nations 
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and more so on short-term thinking and economically focused, that I made the decision to 
use the community's experience as a means to illustrate the application of an 
environmental justice framework in a Canadian context. Such an experience was 
profound; every British Columbian ought to be aware of what their government actually 
thought about people, health, and the environment. I truly hope that this thesis will 
provide context for some and be a voice for those, such as the members of West Moberly, 
that are struggling to protect the environment for future generations. 
While my journey began roughly 10 years ago, what I have and continue to learn 
from First Nations will be with me forever. As one community taught me, 'with 
everything there's a beginning that leads you to an end, which is merely another 
beginning. That is consistent with a First Nations' way of thinking and living in a circle'. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
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1.0 When Cultures Collide 
Environmental justice within Canada, in particular regarding to First Nations, is poorly 
studied. This is a significant issue because, in northern areas throughout Canada, First 
Nations are confronted with problems relating to the exploitation of land and natural 
resource in their respective territories and the results of such development (Hairing, 
1998; Anderson and Bone, 2003). Ranging from the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 
in the 1970s (Berger, 1988) to the many hydroelectric dams in northern Quebec (Grim, 
2001) and the competition over access to and allocations of ocean resources (Sharma, 
1998), industrial operations in the territories of First Nations have been the basis of 
various land use conflicts with the Crown, which have led to a plethora of legal 
challenges.' 
British Columbia (BC) is not immune to these issues. Not only are such problems 
exacerbated for many northern First Nations generally, but the recent downturn in the 
provincial economy (e.g. displaced forestry workers) has resulted in the BC government 
focusing its attention on furthering the exploitation of natural resources within its 
territories, in particular making available coal and mineral resources for the mining 
' Since Europeans arrived on the shores of what is now referred to as North America, legal challenges have 
come to represent the relationship between the Crown (in both its federal and provincial forms) and First 
Nations regarding land and natural resources. The following are examples of the legal cases that have 
occurred over the years: St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888); Guerin v. The 
Queen (1984); R. v. Nikal (1989); R. v. Sioui (1990); R. v. Horesman (1990); Mitchell v. Peguis Indian 
Band (1990); R. v. Sparrow (1990); R. v. Adams (1996); R. v. Badger (1996); R. v. Cote (1996); R. v. 
Gladstone (1996); 7?. v. Van de Peet (1996); Delgamuukw vs. British Columbia (1997); Halfway River First 
Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) (1999); R. v. Marshall (No.2) (1999); R. v. Sundown 
(1999); Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (2004); Mikisew Cree First Nation v. 
Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) (2005); Hupacasath First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of 
Forests) (2006); Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia (2007); Klahoose First Nation v. Sunshine Coast 
Forest District (District Manager) (2008); Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation (2010); West 
Moberly First Nations vs. British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines) (2010). 
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industry (Bazowski, 2008). While the mining industry is reported to have a positive 
effect on the provincial economy and the quality of life for British Columbians (Mining 
Report, 2007; Bazowski, 2008), recent reports have suggested otherwise for First Nations 
in northern regions of the province. For instance, in a report released by Amnesty 
International, the organization outlined what it believed to be human rights infractions on 
the part of Canada regarding the exploitation of natural resources (e.g. mining) and First 
Nations (CBC News, 2010). Another report, which was released by The International 
Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University (the "Harvard Study") in 2010, entitled 
"Bearing the Burden: The Effects of Mining on First Nations in British Columbia" (The 
International Human Rights Clinic, 2010), focused more specifically on mining and 
impacts on First Nations located in northern areas of British Columbia. The findings of 
the Harvard Study are summarized as follows: 
"Mining provides important revenue for the province... It also, however, 
frequently interferes with First Nations' use of their traditional lands and 
significantly harms the environment to which their culture is inextricably 
linked" (pg. 1). 
"The situation is particularly troublesome given that international and 
Canadian law require special protection for First Nations. Canada [and, by 
default, the provinces] is party to international human rights and 
environmental treaties that recognize the unique connection between 
indigenous peoples and the land. First Nations have the right to self-
determination, which includes the right to decide how their traditional lands 
and resources are used. Treaty law not only enumerates these rights but also 
obligates Canada to ensure First Nations are able to enjoy them" (pgs. 2-3). 
"...constitutional standards thus provide a framework for the protection of 
First Nations that calls for heightened scrutiny of projects affecting these 
indigenous peoples and the incorporation of aboriginal rights into domestic 
mining law. The standards are designed to give First Nations a voice in the 
decision-making through consultation and an assurance that the environment 
with which they are linked are healthy. B.C. mining laws on their face and in 
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their implementation, however, fail to guarantee either" (pg. 3). 
The Harvard Study was key in bringing to light the conflicts between mining 
activities and cultural land use activities from a First Nations' perspective, and perhaps 
more telling, the view of BC on such a perspective. In response to the critical analysis by 
the International Human Rights Clinic, The Honourable Randy Hawes (BC's Minister for 
the State of Mining) was reported to have outright dismissed not only the report itself but 
also the call from several First Nation political entities for BC to listen to the findings 
(The Globe and Mail, June 16, 2010). The Canadian Press reported on the views of 
Minister Hawes regarding not only the Harvard Study, but also mining and the cultures of 
First Nations: 
'"To be blunt, I think the report is hogwash,' said Mr. Hawes, questioning 
why Harvard doesn't look in its own backyard or concentrate elsewhere in the 
world where there are egregious impacts on indigenous people. Mr. Hawes 
called the report, released last week, a 'completely flawed document'. 
The minister of state for mining argued that the province is making 'great 
strides' with First Nations, having recently introduced revenue sharing on 
mining projects and major expansions. He also noted that mines provide 
revenue that pays for services like health and roads that benefit all British 
Columbians, including Aboriginal citizens. 
While he noted that some First Nations reject mining for a more traditional 
lifestyle, he also said traditional ways are linked to lower birth weights, 
higher birth rate deaths and lower life spans. The way to improve those 
outcomes is to share in the wealth and jobs that come from mining, he said. 
It's not the first time First Nations have called for mining reform. However, 
Mr. Hawes said the government is not interested in changing its more-than-
100-year-old free-entry system, which also allows companies to stake tenures 
online." (The Globe and Mail, June 16, 2010) 
The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, which Takla Lake First Nation belongs to as 
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an overarching organization, expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of Minister for 
the State of Mining regarding the Harvard Study and their culture. In its press release, 
the Vice Chief noted that the Minister's statements "are extremely ignorant and 
misinformed" and "make things worse" in many respects (Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 
June 17, 2010). The Vice Chief concluded that the minister 'should apologize and then 
resign'. Similarly, the Chief of West Moberly First Nations (hereinafter referred to as 
"West Moberly") released a response to Minister Hawes' comments reported by The 
Canadian Press the previous week. It reads: 
"I'm sickened... It's very disappointing to hear a politician in our day and age 
espouse such ignorance towards our cultural way of life... [most disturbing] 
is the discriminatory attitude that underscores the comment. Canada has laws 
in place that protect everyone from the evil of discrimination by the 
government. Minister Hawes should be promoting human dignity, not fueling 
stereotypes that marginalize and devalue our cultures..." 
"The Harvard study is not flawed as Minister Hawes would have you believe. 
If anything, it's the tip of the iceberg. We have pictures of mining companies 
using a bulldozer to plough through a fish-bearing stream, coal draining into 
sensitive wetlands, and illegal clear-cuts. Making matters worse is that BC 
did not fine those companies one single dollar for breaking provincial and 
federal laws..." 
"I want to make it very clear that my community fully supports and sincerely 
respects Takla First Nation for their leadership in bringing to light the true 
nature of mining and its negative effects on northern First Nation 
communities. BC needs to work with First Nations, not bully and ridicule 
communities for offering their views." (Marketwire, June 24, 2010). 
Further to his comments relating to the perceived attack by the BC government on 
another First Nation, the Chief of West Moberly noted the following regarding a struggle 
his community is currently facing regarding culture, caribou, and a proposed coal mine 
project in his Nation's territory: 
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"I came to the realization of why it is such a personal thing with me as to why 
to fight for these few caribou. I see the way everyone is treating and talking 
about these caribou is the way they treat and talk to you [the West Moberly 
First Nations Council], like we don't matter. These caribou are like us, 
struggling for their mere survival and existence By fighting and protecting 
these caribou and their habitat we are fighting for ourselves" (cited in Booth 
and Skelton, forthcoming) 
The actions of BC regarding the concerns expressed by First Nations pertaining to 
mining, in particular the comments of Minister Hawes that appear to underscore the 
problem, were considered by the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) to be troubling. 
As a result, the UBCIC wrote a letter to then-Premier Gordon Campbell calling for 
mining reform based upon the province's commitment to a "government to government 
New Relationship with First Nations in BC based on respect, recognition, and 
accommodation of Aboriginal Title and Rights" (Grand Chief Stewart Philips et al, 
2010) Further, the UBCIC requested then-Premier Campbell to "accept the resignation 
of Junior Minister Hawes" because of his promotion of "racist stereotypes about First 
Nations culture" To date, however, Minister Hawes remains as the Minister for the State 
of Mining and the overall concerns of First Nations remains substantively unaddressed 
1.1 Environmental Justice and First Nations in Canada 
The problems confronted by First Nations in northern British Columbia are similar to 
what minorities in the United States of America experienced during the rise of the civil 
2
 While "during" is noted, by no means is this to suggest that all of the problems confronted by the 
minorities in America have been adequately addressed, either procedurally or substantively The social 
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rights movement. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the civil rights movement had 
effectively transitioned into the environmental movement, with minority communities 
raising concerns regarding problematic land use planning which placed the health of their 
communities at risk. Since this time, activists as well as scholars have demonstrated that 
locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) are situated in areas predominately used by low-
income and minority populations more so than in areas used by non-minorities (see, e.g.: 
Bullard, 1993a; Bullard, 1994; Bryant, 1995; Shrader-Frechette, 1996; Rechtschaffen and 
Guana, 2003). Studies have also demonstrated that these groups not only shoulder a 
disproportionate burden of environmental hazards and risks from LULUs, but also are not 
provided with an equal opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes (Mutz 
et al., 2002). American Indian tribes, for example, are often faced with the difficult 
decision of logging cultural areas or sensitive wildlife habitat in order to provide 
economic opportunity for members (Shrader-Frechette, 1996). Such instances place the 
future health of their culture at risk because, according to Harris and Harper (2010), 
natural resources are the basis for a cultural identity and spirituality that is as much a 
physiological safeguard as a psychological support network for ecological knowledge. In 
view of this, the field of land use planning and natural resources management in America 
has incorporated into its decision-making processes (at the federal level) an 
environmental justice lens. It is used to examine a potential decision with respect to 
whether it will result in an environmental injustice, and if so, to remedy the situation in 
order to avoid an adverse outcome. 
science literature is replete with studies that strongly indicate that many environmental problems still exist 
for minorities in America. 
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Notwithstanding its origins, the concept of environmental has also been the focal 
point of research projects and interests at the international level (Meletis and Campbell, 
2009).3 Most notable is its application in the United Kingdom. Reed and George (2011) 
note that, while over half of such research is conducted in America, approximately 20% 
has likely occurred in European countries. They point out that in addition to its use in 
American and the United Kingdom, other counties (such as Canada) do in fact study such 
matters on an annual basis. 
In comparison to America and elsewhere around the world however, 
environmental justice in Canada is more or less unknown and unused by decision makers 
in processes relating to land use planning and natural resource management. While some 
research has been produced over the years, as noted by Haluza-Delay et al. (2009), there 
is a paucity of data for the most part (also see: Draper and Mitchell, 2001; Gosine, 2003; 
Teelucksingh, 2007). They also point out that most of the urban-based environmental 
justice research, which is akin to the work done in America, centres around the southern 
Ontario area and to a lesser extent Vancouver, BC. This is troublesome, since First 
Nations as a subpopulation in Canada are at the lower end of nearly ever social, 
economic, and health indicator. First Nations, Haluza-Delay et al. write, are therefore 
"the most racially marginalized peoples" (pg. 11) in the country and 
"...are faced with systemic environmental injustice in terms of treaty and 
land claim processes; the situating of energy projects on or near their 
traditional territories; air, water, and land pollution; deplorable drinking-water 
quality issues... resource extraction by outsiders on unceded territories by 
government-sanctioned contracts...; the lack of ready and affordable access 
to economic development where they live; poor quality of life conditions, 
including access to education and health care; the failure by the Canadian 
3
 Also see, as cited in Meletis and Campbell (2009), the following: Adeola, 2000; Belkhir and Adeola, 
1997; Carruthers, 2008; Kuletz, 2002; McDonald, 2002; Pellow and Brulle, 2005. 
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state to recognize underlying and inalienable Aboriginal title and rights; and 
the unwillingness of the Canadian state to right historical wrongs to First 
Peoples" (pg. 12). 
Since the majority of environmental justice studies conducted to date are based on 
the melting-pot ideology of the United States, few have considered the cultural make-up 
and mosaic ideology unique to Canada. This is limiting, as Reed and George (2001) 
suggest that "environmental justice as a research theme remains at its core an American 
concept", creating a "disconnection between theory and practice" (pg. 4). When the 
rights of individuals and cultural groups in Canada are taken into account, then a 
significantly different context emerges from which to conceptualize environmental 
justice. For Canadians in general, scholars have contended that the Constitution Act, 
1982 is the most likely avenue by which substantial environmental rights will be 
acknowledged and protected, which is a similar approach that underpinned the beginning 
of the environmental justice movement in America (discussed in Chapter Two). This is 
based upon the belief that Canada's highest court, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), 
is more open than most courts when it comes hearing and upholding environmental 
values (Demarco, 2007); for example, the SCC has recognized that Canadian citizens 
have the "right to a safe environment" {British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products 
Ltd., 2004: para. 7). Thus, many have pointed specifically to the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the "Charter''''), which is contained within Canada's Constitution, in particular 
section 7, as the legal mechanism that likely provides an avenue to have substantive 
environmental rights recognized and protected (Gage, 2003; Collins and Murtha, 2010). 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee also suggested the use of section 7 of the 
Charter in cases involving environmental matters (Collins, 2009), as it provides all 
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Canadians with "the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice" (Human 
Rights Committee, 1990: para 7). 
The use of the Charter to obtain substantive environmental rights, however, has not 
been significantly tested in the courts and in that way remains ambiguous to a large 
extent. This includes the use of seeking redress via section 7 as well. While the courts 
have accepted the correlation between environmental harm and the rights secured by 
"everyone" under section 7 and thus permitted such arguments in court, the cases brought 
forward to date have resulted in decisions that have not been in the favour of the 
individual or community (see, e.g.: Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, 1985; Manicom 
v. Oxford County, 1985; Energy Probe v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989; Coalition for 
a Charter Challenge v. Metropolitan Authority, 1993; Locke v. Calgary, 1993; and, 
Millership v. British Columbia, 2003). The basis for these failures varies: arguments fell 
outside the scope or did not satisfy the procedural elements of the section 7, with the 
latter two failing due to a lack of scientific evidence presented to the courts. 
Unfortunately, the Government of Canada has decided not to address the uncertainty that 
exists. Case in point, when asked to clarify the matter (Boyd, 2006) the federal 
government stated that it will not provide "a legal interpretation of s. 7 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms" as such a view is subject to "solicitor-client privilege", and the 
"Department of Justice does not provide legal advice to the public" (Ambrose, 2006). 
Collins (2009) notes that, while cases based on claims of a violation of section 7 
have been unsuccessful to date and it is unlikely to be elucidated by the Government of 
Canada, there are other constitutional remedies available for Canadians that are 
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considered a minority either at the individual or group level, such as First Nations. For 
instance, the use of section 15 (the equality clause) is more developed in terms of 
addressing impacts to minorities resulting from a government decision (Hogg, 2004) and 
includes a structural approach to test claims of inequality (Law, 1999). Collins (2009) 
points to this constitutional provision as another possible avenue by which certain 
Canadian citizens may rely upon to seek redress. The use of the equality clause in 
environmental matters, she writes, comes into play when a government action adversely 
affects a minority more so than non-minorities; in cases "where government conduct 
results in the disproportionate exposure of a disadvantage group to environmental 
hazards, the s. 15 equality guarantee is violated" (pg. 43). 
To date, however, the use of section 15(1) as the basis to a framework has not been 
applied in a Canadian setting to a land and/or natural resource problem confronted by a 
First Nation in the context of environmental justice. This thesis contributes to the theory 
and practice of environmental justice as a discipline, and more importantly to its 
application within a Canadian context that centres on the injustices confronted by First 
Nations, by addressing the fact that it is largely considered an "American concept". 
1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 Research Design 
The design for this qualitative research study is based upon phenomenology. This 
approach was chosen because it takes into account the views of people in relation to their 
experiences regarding a phenomenon (Creswell, 1998; Babbie, 2002), which is necessary 
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in the analysis of human rights in Canada (Law, 1999). It is also suited to the study of a 
concept from an interdisciplinary perspective, an important aspect when different 
philosophical approaches may be considered. Phenomenology also allows the 
experiences of the researcher in relation to the subject matter (noted in the Preface) to be 
described. Finally, it focuses on the description of experiences from a population of 
people that are collected and categorized to ensure scientific validity (Creswell, 1998). 
Here the focus is on the point of view held by those that experienced the phenomenon as 
the centre of the study (Singleton et al., 1993). In addition, the design is appropriate for a 
study when the research is concentrating on "how" people experience the situation 
(Creswell, 1998). 
This thesis' design consists of an examination of the phenomenon experienced by 
West Moberly, specifically, a land use conflict between the First Nation and the 
Provincial Government of BC within the context of an environmental justice framework. 
Central to this conflict is the destruction of critical habitat relied upon by a threatened 
herd of caribou and coal mining activities planned by First Coal Corporation, which is a 
private company. The phenomenon experienced by the First Nation is significant from 
an environmental justice perspective because, as the Chief of West Moberly notes above, 
it represents a community-based struggle to protect not only the last 11 animals of the 
Burnt Pine caribou herd, but also the protection and continuation of West Moberly's 
distinct culture. 
The decision to use a phenomenology design in the place of a 'case study design' 
is due to the role of the phenomenon experienced by West Moberly in the thesis. A case 
study design is appropriate when a researcher wishes to investigate a situation in an "in-
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depth" manner whereas a phenomenology design is appropriate when capturing the 
"essence" of the situation is the focus of the investigation (Creswell, 1998), the latter 
design was used because the community's experiences were investigated as a means to 
illustrate the application of a Canadian-based environmental justice framework. To do 
so, the "essence" of the situation was required rather than an "in-depth" investigation as 
the experiences were not the basis of the thesis but were rather a means to illustrate the 
framework, and by doing so, providing an avenue to hear the voice of the community. 
1.2.2 Research Goal and Questions 
The goal of this thesis is to develop a framework for the use of environmental justice as a 
means for a First Nation in Canada, such as West Moberly, to articulate their concerns 
regarding the appropriateness of land use planning and natural resource management 
decisions in their territories. The thesis' core question is this: how can American derived 
environmental justice be incorporated into an environmental decision-making event in 
Canada? In order to address the aforementioned question the following four sub-
questions are posed: 
1. What is American environmental justice in relation to land and natural resources? 
2. What is equality in a Canadian context for First Nations and how can 
environmental justice be incorporated into a framework relating to land and 
natural resources? 
3. What are some additional applications and frameworks of an environmental 
justice analysis in Canada regarding land and natural resources? 
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The sub-questions are ordered in a sequence that guides the research methods towards 
addressing the research goal. The questions are also articulated in such a manner as to be 
exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory in their disposition. This provides additional 
insight into the problem and thus increases the validity of the findings (Majchrzak, 1984). 
1.2.3 Methods 
The methods used to develop a Canadian environmental justice framework and to 
determine the environmental justice of the phenomenon experienced by West Moberly 
are a focused analysis of secondary data (also referred to as existing data: see Singleton, 
et al., 1993) and a content analysis of such data. 
A focused synthesis approach was used as it increases the range of sources 
available to collect data, including published materials, personal narratives, unpublished 
documents, and personal past experience of the researcher, as well as a variety of other 
sources (Majchrzak, 1984). The approach is practical to use given that it has been 
applied to previous policy research relating to the affects of natural resource exploitation 
on marginalized people (Burton, 1979). The method of using existing data is also 
appropriate when conducting an analysis of numerous sources of literature over an 
extended period of time (Singleton et al, 1993), some of which are derived from different 
fields of research that have historically not been synonymous with one another in a 
Canadian context. Three sources of existing data (Singleton et al, 1993) have been used 
in this study: 
• Data archives, including academic publications; 
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• Legal documents, including case law and publicly available information from 
trials; and, 
• Public and official documents, including those used for and relating to the 
government decision-making processes. 
The focused analysis was thus used to collect and review the literature required to 
answer the research questions. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and 3 therefore 
serves a dual purpose. It is both a review of the literature (a conventional requirement in 
a thesis) and the collection of data from which the framework was developed and then 
applied to the illustrative example (an nonconventional approach in a thesis). These data 
are used to provide a structural framework to develop a theory for including 
environmental justice into a Canadian context. The focused analysis was also used to 
collect and review the secondary data pertaining to West Moberly's struggle to protect 
the Burnt Pine caribou herd. 
A content analysis of the existing data was performed as it is an appropriate 
method to study the interactions between parties, in particular answering the question 
"what effect" did it have (Babbie, 2002). Babbie (2002) points to two means by which 
data may be categorized. The first is the unit of analysis. In this study, the unit of 
analysis is the existing data relating to environmental justice (developed in America) and 
equality (developed in Canada). To answer the first and second sub-questions of the 
thesis, "[tjhemes" and "concepts" were derived from the data (Babbie, 2002: pg. 287) and 
then categorized to develop the framework (Chapter Two and Chapter Three). The 
second means is the unit of observation. The land use conflict between West Moberly 
and BC regarding coal mining and caribou was used as the main unit of observation. 
Data was collected, analysed, and then categorized based on the structure and 
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requirements of the framework (Chapter Four), which is: (1) triggers and parameters; (2) 
perceptions and context; and, (3) nature and extent of burden. 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter One, as evident from the above, introduces the thesis topic, research goal, and 
provides the methods that were used to address the research question. The second 
chapter reviews the literature regarding environmental justice in the United States of 
America and discusses the components that have emerged as a means to frame the 
disproportionate impact of activities to minorities. Chapter Three discusses the 
development of equality in Canada and presents an equality-based framework that 
enables the principles of environmental justice to be incorporated into a Canadian 
context. The fourth chapter includes the an application of the environmental justice 
analysis framework to the situation of West Moberly and its fight to protect their culture 
through protecting a threatened herd of caribou from a coal mine proposed within their 
territory. The final chapter concludes the thesis by reviewing the findings and provides 
additional examples of future applications and frameworks of environmental justice 
within a Canadian context. 
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Chapter Two: Environmental Justice 
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2.0 Introduction 
The environmental justice movement is influenced by numerous fields of study. While 
the literature has developed considerably over the years, with its underpinnings grounded 
in the relationship between environmental burdens and the minority communities that 
shoulder them, two of the more prominent fields are human rights and environmentalism. 
This chapter introduces the main themes that underscores environmental justice and what 
separated it from modern environmentalism, and discusses several key components of an 
environmental justice analysis. The concluding section reviews the principles and 
definitions derived from the literature and introduces five frameworks that may be used 
to frame the disproportion impact experienced by minorities. 
2.1 Environmental Justice: A New Variable for Environmentalism 
Much of the environmental discourse during the late 1930s and through to the 1960s 
revolved around various issues such as air and water pollution, adverse effects from 
chemicals on birds, and the depletion of natural resources. As a result, individuals began 
to question the existing policies and practices that had long been regarded as the norm. 
With the debate growing and the agenda becoming more narrowly focused as particular 
issues were indentified, an example of which was the environmental management (and 
perhaps mismanagement) of public forests in America, a distrust for the existing system 
came to the surface. In the early 1970s, the modern environmental movement emerged; it 
contested the anthropogenic degradation of nature, with a central focus on why the 
interests of industry and government over all others was an acceptable modus operandi. 
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Its underlying goal was to shift the focus from anthropocentricism (interests of humans) 
to eco-centric (interests of nature), which was to be achieved through the tenets of 
environmental conservation and preservation (Bullard, 2000). Aspects considered to be 
socially valuable included the protection of recreational opportunities, wilderness, and 
particular species (Melosi, 1997). Underscoring the movement was the value system held 
by those considered to be the catalyst: namely, affluent, white males from the upper and 
middle classes (Lee, 1992). Through this form of protection, environmental interests of 
individuals were treated as homogenous in that if one person benefits from such 
protection then all must benefit (Rhodes, 2003). 
With the development of the modern environmental movement, originally 
focusing on the impacts to ecological factors such as wilderness, the environs of humans 
were considered outside its scope (Rhodes, 2003). This restrictiveness, in particular its 
homogenous approach to environmental protection, was of serious concern to scholars 
embedded with the civil rights movement and advocates from grassroots environmental 
justice groups, as it overlooked the fact that "the most serious pollution problems and 
lack of access to natural resources fall on African-American, Native-American, and 
Latino" communities (Shrader-Frechette, 2002: pg. 25). As a result, environmental 
justice groups sent letters to environmental organizations belonging to the "Group of 
Ten4" (Melosi, 1992). These letters held the agenda of mainstream environmental groups 
responsible for creating the monoculture perspective of environmentalism (Getches and 
Pellow, 2002) that either directly or indirectly led to or supported the disproportionate 
impact. Bullard (2000) has attributed the disconnection of the modern environmental 
4
 The Group of Ten includes: Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defence Fund, National Audubon 
Society, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defence Council, Friends of the Earth, Izaak 
Walton League, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, and the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
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movement from the issues and concerns confronted by minority groups to the value 
system that underscores the framing of environmental issues. 
For many, this problem came to the fore as a result of the events in Shocco 
Township of Warren County, North Carolina. In 1982, citizens of this small community 
were faced with the siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) storage and disposal 
facility in close proximity to their homes. What separated this case from other 
environmental conflicts at the time was not that the citizens opposed the placement of 
such a facility in their community. After all, nearly every community will embrace the 
premise of NIMBY ("not in my backyard") regardless of its demographic composition or 
socioeconomic status (Shrader-Frechette, 2002). Rather, in this case it was the federal 
government's negation of environmental laws and regulations that had been enacted to 
protect human health: state officials were permitted by a branch of the federal 
government, specifically the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to bury the PCBs 
at the depth of 7ft instead of the 50ft minimum. In the end, residents of Shocco 
Township were denied a voice in the decision-making process, and were compelled to 
accept thousands of truckloads filled with contaminated soil that not only originated 
elsewhere but that other communities had also refused to accept (Bullard, 1994; Shrader-
Frechette, 2002) . More alarming was the fact that they had to do so with an elevated 
level of risk without compensation. 
In the following years, numerous studies were undertaken that examined the 
relationship between demographic composition, socioeconomic conditions, and land use. 
Early case studies include investigations by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 
Most notable was one that demonstrated that 3 out of the 4 hazardous waste facilities 
29 
within a southern EPA region were located beside communities predominately composed 
of African Americans (General Accounting Office, 1983). Another example is the study 
conducted by Bullard (1983) regarding the location of Houston, Texas' solid waste 
landfills. By comparing the geographic location of landfills to the demographics of 
surrounding communities, he discovered that twenty-one out of the twenty-five were 
situated in communities consisting mostly of minorities (Bullard, 1983). Taken alone, 
however, the correlation of race and the siting of LULUs in these cases did not indicate 
environmental racism. What it established was that a disproportionate distribution did in 
fact exist and the distribution impacted minorities and those with low-incomes more so 
than affluent non-minorities. 
Shortly thereafter the United Church of Christ's (UCC) Commission for Racial 
Justice (CRJ) released the findings of what is now regarded as one of the more prominent 
investigations of environmental racism. It examined the geographic distribution of 
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) throughout America 
in relation to neighbourhoods consisting of minority groups and low-income earners 
through the use of zip codes. Unlike previous studies, this study demonstrated that race 
is the most statistically significant variable that correlated to the geographic location of 
LULUs across the country, with income being the second most significant variable 
(United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1987). In addition, it revealed 
that approximately 3 out of every 5 African Americans live in a community with at least 
one uncontrolled hazardous sites, and that 50% of Native Americans live in communities 
with similar circumstances (United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 
1987). Because race was the underlying factor in the siting of LULUs, the UCC 
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requested that the EPA expedite the clean-up efforts for those minority communities 
disproportionately exposed to pollution and for the President to issue an Executive Order 
addressing the matter (Carr, 1996). 
Controversial events such as Warren County and the ensuing research findings 
clearly demonstrated that the underpinnings of this impetus digressed from the ethos of 
mainstream environmentalism. Values held by the architects of modern 
environmentalism were placed aside. What filled in were the social values of those 
environmentally victimized, namely women of colour residing in urban areas with a 
disproportionate amount of burdens from land use decisions, who undertook the task of 
framing environmental issues in light of local values in place of the usual practice of 
relying on outside environmental groups (Bullard, 1993a). Since many of the leaders 
were women that worked in the home, they had keen insight into the threats to their 
families' wellbeing and disenfranchisement (Krauss, 1993). As such, many of the 
women began to lead demonstrations against what they perceived to be an attack by 
industry on their environmental safe havens (Heiman, 1988) through pathways such as 
residential contamination, job loss, and capital intensification (Schwab, 1994; Krauss, 
1993). From this perspective, the term 'environment' was redefined to include the 
physical aspects of a system upon which a community's well-being is dependent 
(Kaswan, 1997). This includes key attributes such as the place of work, areas of leisure 
activities, and the home (Bryant & Mohai, 1992; Bullard, 1994). 
What distinguished the environmental justice movement from the existing 
analytical lens of environmentalism was the incorporation of human rights which was, up 
until that time, considered by most to be a philosophically separate movement. However 
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when combined, as the above discussion illustrates, the once accepted proposition that 'if 
one benefits all benefit' comes into question as individuals belonging to a minority group 
or with a low income receive a disproportionate distribution of environmental burdens 
than do white and/or affluent people. For this reason, according to Lein (2003), the 
principles of environmental justice were placed onto the agenda of policymakers and in 
this way put forward as a new set of considerations to be incorporated into environmental 
decision making processes. Today's land use planners and natural resource managers 
must now "confront one of the most complex and difficult issues of the century: how to 
care for the environment while dealing with all of the social justice concerns of the 
affected communities" (Collin and Harris, 1993: pg. 102) in order to ensure their 
decisions are socially acceptable. 
2.2 From Civil Rights to Environmental Rights 
As previously mentioned, most consider the decisive moment in the environmental 
justice movement as being in and around the time of the civil rights movement, 
culminating in the events that occurred at Warren County. Few (if anyone) would argue 
otherwise, as it would discount early cases where "race" and the "environment" 
intersected with one another. In the late 1960s, for example, the disposal of residential 
waste came to symbolize this relationship. Communities of colour were at that time 
questioning the placement of these LULUs due to their hazardous nature. But more 
importantly, it was Reverend Martin Luther King travelling to a southern state to deliver 
a speech in support of social issues relating to landfills and inequalities facing the mostly 
black workforce that conjoined these two terms; he was assassinated before delivering his 
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message (Bullard, 1994c). Equally important to when the movement began are the 
historical contexts of the underlying causes framing the situation (Greenberg and Cidon, 
1997) and the system that perpetuates and/or furthers the disproportionate impact 
(Bullard, 1994b). 
2.2.3 Race and Nature: An Overview 
Race, as a western construct, has remained somewhat consistent over the years in terms 
of its meaning. From its roots in middle age Scottish languages where it was used to 
depict lineage or clan by noble families (Hannaford, 1996) to its use in the 19th Century 
civil rights movements in America, it continues to represent "an ordering system" based 
on the values of those attempting to conquer or dominate others (Smedley, 2007: pg. 26). 
It is used to characterize what we may or may not see, the degree to which we are 
empathetic, and the nature of our responses (United Church of Christ Commission for 
Racial Justice, 1987; Saleem, 1994). In this way, people classify not only themselves but 
others based on racial makeup to a certain extent. 
As early as the 1400s, the underpinnings of this social phenomenon emerged with 
the arrival of Europeans on the western shores of what is now referred to as North 
America. State funded explorers descended upon the continent and the territories of its 
nations for nearly a century. With the endorsement of the Spanish Crown, for example, 
explorers such as Christopher Columbus were mandated to further imperial dominance 
through the use of lands and natural resources of the 'New World', a strategy that had 
proven to be quite profitable elsewhere (Helen Venne, 1998). Integral to the settlement 
of the Americas was the Eurocentric view through which not only was history written, 
33 
but which dictated the creation of legal systems and other social policies. Helen Venne 
(1998) writes: 
"One of the most powerful beliefs of out time concerning the world history 
and world geography.. .is the notion that European civilization - "The West -
has had some unique historical advantage, some special equality of race or 
culture or environment or mind or spirit, which give this human community a 
permanent superiority over all other communities, at all time and down to the 
present" (pg. 1). 
Throughout the years of what many Europeans believed to be the discovery of the 
New World, Eurocentricism underscored the manner in which matters relating to 
indigenous groups were handled. Williams (1990) has noted the following in this regard: 
"Europe during the Discovery era refused to recognize a meaningful legal 
status or rights for indigenous tribal peoples because "heathen" and "infidels" 
were legally presumed to lack the rational capacity necessary to assume an 
equal status or to exercise equal rights under the West's medievally derived 
colonizing law. Today, principles and rules generated from this Old World 
discourse of conquest are cited by the West's domestic and international 
courts of law to deny indigenous nations their freedom and dignity to govern 
themselves according to their own vision" (pg. 326). 
With colonization came the ideological components of racism, in particular the 
sense of exclusiveness on the part of group membership that was grounded in the English 
understanding of a law abiding civilization (Smedley, 1993). This led to the taking of 
lands and resources from indigenous groups. Removing access to and allocation of 
natural resources from Native American groups was devastating for many, as the 
environment represents their source of cultural subsistence. Impacts varied from group to 
group not only because their exposure to colonial influences was different, but also 
because natural resources were not evenly distributed across the North American land-
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base. Individual characteristics of any one group therefore depended on the local settings 
of its territory, as the landscape is as much an environmental mosaic as it is a cultural 
one. In this way, according to Fixico (2001: pg. 33), each group therefore has a distinct 
"culture area" that provides them with a relationship upon which their spirituality, 
philosophy, and sustenance are dependent. Local wildlife and plants provided them with 
not only food and medicines, but also a way to connect with what many now refer to as 
the Creator. To them, everything is connected. Fixico (2001: pg. 36), referencing 
Onondaga statesman Oren Lyons, writes: "In our Iroquois perception, all life is equal, 
and that includes birds, animals, things that grow, things that swim, All life is equal in 
our perception". For this reason, even though some animals run faster than others and 
one plant grows fruit whereas another does not, everything has a 'philosophically equal 
role in life'. As such, the natural surroundings of a particular group is the foundation to 
the physiological and psychological wellbeing of these groups. 
The aftermath of the Europeans' arrival, as Falkowski (1992) points out, resulted 
in the first case of environmental discrimination as the colonizers expropriated Native 
American land through the enactment of laws that limited (and removed) their access to 
and allocation of natural resources. Inherent rights held by those groups since time 
immemorial, which included the right to use natural resources upon their territories 
(Churchill, 1995, 1998, and 1999), were simply overlooked. In some cases, specifically 
the experiences of indigenous groups within the political boundaries of what is now the 
United States of America, physical conflicts emerged when the colonies attempted to 
limit or restrict indigenous' access and allocation. Such actions were considered to be 
within acceptable limits of the law at that time (Smedley, 1993). This engendered an 
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ecocide of Native Americans that persists today as many of the reservations and the areas 
surrounding them are highly polluted with toxic contaminants (Grinde & Johansen, 
1995). Thus the attempt of Native groups to obtain environmental justice for their 
cultures is inextricably related to addressing racism and colonialism (Weaver, 2001). 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the indigenous groups of North 
America were exploited as a result of the arrival of Europeans and the subsequent 
imperial colonization of the lands and natural resources. In similar fashion to their 
dominance of Celtic groups for example, the English reasoned that inhabitants of foreign 
lands that did not display the characteristics of European cultures were either savages or 
barbarians (Smedley, 1993). Because indigenous groups did not mirror nor practice the 
European worldview either in appearance or through customs, they were typically 
considered to be savages (Berkhofer, 1979). This classification brought the requirement 
of salvation on the part of Europeans which, depending on the group, took various forms 
of subjugation through the rule of law as defined by European ideology. Even after the 
abolishment of slavery and the integration of the education system, racism still exists 
within America. It has resulted in the country being divided racially, with one side 
bearing considerable inequalities (Kozol, 1991) because of discriminatory land use 
patterns that have forced people of colour into ".. .ghettos, barrios, and onto reservations" 
(Bullard, 1993: pg. 7). 
2.2.2 An "Environmental Justice Community" 
Taken together, it understandable why the terms race and environment have come to play 
an integral role in the enduring struggle of minority groups in America to attain what they 
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believe is a safe and healthy surrounding. It was not, however, until the 1980s that these 
terms were combined to form a challenging idiom. Reverend Benjamin Chavis, then-
executive director of the UCC, first used the term "environmental racism" during the 
public presentation of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice's 
report entitled "Toxic Waste and Race in the United States: A National Report on the 
Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste 
Sites" (the "UCC Report") as a means to succinctly explain the current state of 
environmental affairs confronting minority communities in America (Lazarus, 2000). In 
doing so, and because it implied cause and effect, Reverend Chavis brought immediate 
political attention to the plight of minority groups (Foreman, 1998). He has since stated 
the following: 
Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental 
policy-making and enforcement of regulations and laws, the 
deliberate targeting of communities of colour for toxic waste 
facilities, the official sanctioning of the presence of life 
threatening poisons and pollutants for communities of colour, and 
the history of excluding people of colour from leadership of the 
environmental movement (Bullard, 1994c: pg. xii) 
By pointing out that there are "communities of colour" that are subject to 
discrimination which results in negative impacts to their health and safety, Reverend 
Chavis furthers the view held by Kozol (1991). He suggests that communities 
themselves are vulnerable, which is in it self concerning. Their deterioration is serious 
from the perspective of the environmental justice movement, as communities are "both 
vital places of cultural identity, and also sources of power and meaning within the larger 
world" (pg. 314). Thus "environmental justice is not simply an individual experience; it 
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is embedded in the community" (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010: pg. 17). Accordingly, 
social interactions as represented by the term 'community' plays an integral role in a 
study that examines the relationship between race and land use decisions. It establishes 
the parameters used to identify the presence of an environmental injustice which, 
according to Williams (1999), "reflect[s] the nature of discrimination" (pg. 318). Thus a 
claim of an injustice is warranted by subpopulations that are mostly minorities (e.g. 
African Americans, American Indians) or belong to a lower economic class that have 
geographic boundaries attributable to their disposition (generally speaking, individuals 
and groups that are minorities). After all, the label of "environmental justice community" 
is applied to those that have a history of discrimination (Getches and Pellow, 2002). 
What a researcher discovers depends on where the investigation is occurring 
(Heiman, 1996; Perlin et al, 1995). Thus having a clear definition of what constitutes the 
spatial boundaries of a community is necessary (Krieg, 1998; Williams, 1999). 
Moreover, there is a higher likelihood that similar research methodologies will generate 
different conclusions if there is not a consistent approach (Williams, 1999). For this 
reason, as Williams (1999) points out, framing the analytical unit of analysis (i.e. the 
community) is key to drawing conclusions. There is, however, a considerable amount of 
debate surrounding the manner by which a community is to be understood and its borders 
delineated in the field of environmental justice. For example, the use of zip codes and 
census tracts are generally accepted as valid methodologies, although both were initially 
challenged by various scholars with respect to their suitability in measuring the 
relationship between LULUs and communities of lower income or minority groups. 
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With the UCC Report being perceived by many as the decisive study of its time, 
critics such as the Social and Demographic Research Institute (SDRI) at the University of 
Massachusetts questioned the means by which the boundaries of the groups were 
established. Relying upon a different method, the SDRI found that race is not a factor in 
the determination of the siting of LULUs, as they found no statistical significance in the 
location of LULUs and minority groups (Anderton et al, 1994). The SDRI study went so 
far as to conclude that the claims of environmental racism had been overstated (Cluett, 
1999) with respect to land use decisions; however, the outright dismissal of the interplay 
between race and the environment has not been fully supported (Wigley & Shrader-
Frechette, 1996). 
The UCC Report defined the community by zip codes, whereby all of the areas 
with LULUs were assessed against those without (Mohai, 1995). The SDRI study, on the 
other hand, used census tracts to establish the community, including only those tracts 
with LULUs falling within the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). From 
this, according to Mohai (1995), it becomes apparent that the UCC Report is inclusive 
and thus more likely to produce a representative assessment given that it takes into 
account all areas, whereas the SDRI study is restrictive since it eliminated tracts from the 
analysis regardless of whether or not they possessed LULUs. Furthering the view of 
Mohai (1995) is the research conducted by Been (1995) which, in similar fashion as the 
SDRI study, used census tracts to investigate the relationship between race and LULUs. 
Her study found that the SDRI findings were inaccurate largely due to the limited data 
used to identify the existence of LULUs. Additionally, Krieg (1999) has pointed out that 
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census tracts are inadequate simply because TSDFs are typically located within industrial 
parks where the population is next to nonexistent. 
This is not to say, however, that the methodological use of zip codes is more 
appropriate than census tracts. Been (1995) has noted that, in comparison to zip codes, 
census tracts tend not to change geographically and are created by the community. But if 
zip codes are considered to be areas that communities do not specifically identify with 
and are perhaps larger than required, then census tracts represent areas that are too small 
(Mohai, 1995) to determine the impacts of LULUs on minorities as a whole (duett, 
1999). Because the debate surrounding the suitability of geographic units is likely to 
continue, mainly due to the fact it is queried on a case-by-case basis, it is important to 
pay particular attention to the characteristics of a populace that one wishes to study in 
order to accurately define the spatial parameters of an environmental justice community. 
Currently in the environmental justice literature, the population of a potential 
environmental justice community may be defined through several means in terms of its 
spatial dimensions. Williams (1999) points to several spatial units that are likely to exist. 
He also notes that there is likely no one way to delineate an analysis unit for a 
community, as there has yet to be a consensus among the scholars. There is also more 
than one analysis unit for a community at any given time. But as Bullard (1994d) 
suggests, the focus ought to be on the analysis unit including the minority group within a 
particular area, rather than anything else. 
The first is political jurisdiction. In most instances, these units came to be prior to 
when most members of a community were either alive or prior to them moving into a 
particular area. The creation of such units has been suggested to be undemocratic, as 
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they are implemented with little to no input from those with little political power such as 
minority groups inside of its borders (Williams, 1999). Examples include states, 
counties, and townships (Williams, 1999: also see Bowen et al. 1996; Cutter et al. 1996; 
Zimmerman, 1994). What makes this unit of analysis appropriate, according to Williams 
(1999), is that they are typically responsible for what has or has not occurred within its 
area seeing as the entity is the decision maker: for example, the political entity issues 
permits that allows for pollution to occur and is likely responsible for monitoring in some 
fashion. 
A second is the neighbourhood. Williams (1999) points out that using such an 
unit of analysis is possible as it tends to reflect social and cultural identities within 
populations. Establishing the connection between people and a particular land base is 
important, according to Bullard (1994), as it ensures that the investigation into 
discrimination is not ineffectual. Williams (1999) notes that they can be used to further 
delineate which sources of data are applicable: for example, a neighbourhood with clear 
boarders would allow the proper census tracts to be identified and in that way enable a 
researcher to mine the associated data sets. 
Lastly, the third is using data as a means to refine the spatial unit. In some cases, 
data is assembled based on various constructs. Williams (1999) points to the system 
developed by (or perhaps for) the United States Postal Service: namely, zip codes. Data 
has been collected based on such units. These data sets were used by the UCC Report. 
Data has also been collected based on census tracks, which was the methodology used in 
the SDRI study discussed earlier. Another approach is to use the data associated with a 
LULU, that is, the area that will possibly experience burdens. Such an area is typically 
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larger than census tracts. Referred to as the 'aggregated unit', it enables a researcher to 
match the analysis unit with the community at the centre of the study. 
In many cases, according Krieg and Faber (2004), the identification of the study 
area through data sets is attributable to inaccurate findings. They point out that it is more 
appropriate to (1) establish the geographic boundaries of a community, (2) then identify 
the potential hazards and their impact zones within the community's boundary, and (3) 
investigate what data sets are potentially available. In this way, the methodological 
approach for an environmental justice analysis is to be designed based on the distinct 
characteristics of the community rather than the preference of the researcher or the 
discipline. By doing so, the impacts endured by the community will be recognized in 
order for the investigation to be a cumulative assessment. When this approach is applied 
to the same communities in the SDRI study, Krieg and Faber (2004) point out that a trend 
of environmental racism emerges. They also suggest that an environmental justice 
analysis be cumulative in nature, as most studies to date merely use single indicators such 
as PCBs or TSDFs. In so doing, they write, such a study will be more representative of 
race-based discrimination in the form of a disproportionate impact as injustices vary 
depending on "the inclusion of multiple indicators of environmental hazards" (pg. 670). 
In addition to those discussed in Williams (1999), other units of analysis exist 
such as the household and individual (see Mohai and Bryant, 1992; or, West et al., 1995). 
While less frequently used by environmental justice scholars, sub-units of analysis are 
likely useful to further refine the analysis in terms of scale. Such units are of use when 
assessing the effects of a LULU and its interaction with minorities. 
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Selecting a proper spatial unit is key to an environmental justice analysis, mainly 
because both the overall community and those within them are affected by changes to 
their surroundings in different ways. For example, African Americans and Latinos are 
typically impacted by the addition of pollution in urban areas, whereas Pacific Islands 
and Asian Americans that consume large quantities of fish feel the adverse effects of 
contamination (Getches and Pellow, 2002), both of which may be a result of 'point' or 
'non-point' source pollution. Unlike other environmental justice communities, American 
Indians that reside on government created reservations are distinct in that they have 
unique rights under domestic and international laws in addition to their intricate 
connection to the land (Suagee, 2002), which leaves them vulnerable to supplementary 
impacts from activities such as those related to the natural resource industry (Getches and 
Pellow, 2002). Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010) point out that the adverse impacts are 
perceived by native communities as 
"...direct assaults not only against the people, but also against cultural 
practices and beliefs, and the ability of their community to reproduce those 
traditions. Indigenous leaders thus articulate environmental injustices as a set 
of conditions that remove or restrict the ability of individuals and community 
to function - conditions that undermine their health, destroy economic and 
cultural livelihoods, or present general environmental threats" (pg. 18). 
They note that, "[a]s Winona LaDuke has argued, the survival of native nations is directly 
linked to their sustainable interaction with the land, and with the practices, ceremonies, 
and beliefs tied to that place" (pg. 19). When key functional elements of a community 
are removed, particularly in the case of indigenous groups, the ability of the community 
to determine its future requirements is also removed (Schlosberg and Caruthers, 2010). 
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2.2.3 Institutional Discrimination 
For over two decades, numerous studies have concluded that the environmental quality 
found in many of the environmental justice communities is much less than communities 
consisting of white and/or affluent people. Even with credible data linking race and 
income to discriminatory land use patterns it is questionable whether the movement's 
political vigilance has substantially improved the quality of life for minority groups. Case 
in point: when the results from the UCC Report were replicated, results showed that 
people of colour living in areas with hazardous waste facilities increased from 25% in 
1987 to 31% in 1993 (Goldman & Fitton, 1994; Carr, 1996). Additionally, the current 
level of minorities residing in close proximity to LULUs reached the highest it has been 
in over 40 years (Carr, 1996). Holifield (2001: pg. 84) has suggested that an increase in 
national attention and a focus on "geographic patterns and historical processes" 
associated with race has not translated into on-the-ground improvements. 
Many have attributed this to the predisposition of established decision-making 
processes. An example of which is public policy; the processes (Bryant, 1995; Bullard, 
1993b) governing the environmental decisions that are common within land use planning 
and natural resource management (Collin and Harris, 1993). Such policies continue to 
generate inconsequential results with respect to on the ground improvements (Cluett, 
1999). More specifically, a decision is made to burden a community of colour with a 
LULU whereby another community, one that consists largely of white people, is shielded 
from the unwanted land use. The UCC Report posited that this situation takes place 
when race-based prejudice is combined with the discretionary power held by the 
environmental decision maker, which is a result of 
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"...the intentional or unintentional use of power to isolate, separate and 
exploit others. This use of power is based on a belief in superior racial 
origin, identity or supposed racial characteristics. Racism confers certain 
privileges on and defends the dominant group, which in turn sustains and 
perpetuates racism. Both consciously and unconsciously, racism is 
enforced and maintained by the legal, cultural, religious, educational, 
economic, political, environmental and military institutions of societies. 
Racism is more than just a personal attitude; it is the institutionalized form 
of that attitude" (United Church of Christ, 1987: pg. ix-x). 
Similarly, Bryant (1995) contends that institutional discrimination, within 
the context of environmental racism, 
...refers to those institutional rules, regulations, and policies of 
government or corporate decisions that deliberately target certain 
communities for least desirable land uses, resulting in the disproportionate 
exposure of toxic and hazardous waste on communities based on 
prescribed biological characteristics. Environmental racism is the unequal 
protection against toxic and hazardous waste exposure and the systematic 
exclusion of people of colour from decisions affecting their communities. 
(Bryant, 1995: pg. 5) 
Based on the above, institutional racism is considered to be a product of a specific 
policy being implemented and/or the individual responsible for its implementation that 
discriminates against the characteristics unique to a minority group. Being able to 
distinguish intentional from unintentional is difficult at best. This is because even when 
an unjust decision can be traced back to the discretionary power of a decision-maker, it 
may not be intentional. Race characterizes what we may or may not see, the degree to 
which we are empathic, and the nature of our response (United Church of Christ 
Commission for Racial Justice, 1987; Saleem, 1994). Thus a decision maker may or may 
not be aware of his or her biases; on the other hand, such a decision maker may have 
taken advantage of the discretionary power to intentionally cause a disproportionate 
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impact. 
Generally, it is understood that it is unnecessary to differentiate between the two 
possible causes, which are referred to as the "pure-discrimination model" and the 
"institutional-discrimination model" (Downey, 1999). Both influence the outcome, 
according to Bullard (1994b), as the goals and mechanisms of a policy together with the 
personal biases of the decision maker readily synchronize with one another. Although 
the former of the models is an important element in any environmental justice analysis, 
Lui (2001) writes that it is the latter of the two that has largely been used throughout the 
movement. He furthers the point by noting that this has occurred as a result of the nature 
of the institutional-discrimination model, which is "broadly based; it emphasizes 
intentional and unintentional forms, personal and institutional forms" (pg. 12). 
Finding a clear-cut example of intentional racism is problematic to unearth in 
today's social milieu. This is mostly because the institutional policies of private 
companies and governments are innocuous when read. This does not mean, however, 
that such policies do not further institutional racism and those responsible for their 
implementations are unaware of the effect(s). An example is the selection of a site for a 
landfill, where proponents of developing such land uses employ criteria which, on the 
surface, choose the potential location of sites in an unprejudiced manner; however, 
whether or not such criteria are in fact neutral is questionable. Cole and Foster (2000) 
suggest that the method used to select sites is not socially indeterminate, as 
environmental justice communities are much more likely to satisfy such criteria (e.g. a 
small population surrounding the site, a low market price for the land, and the required 
geological and ecological setting). They point out that when the social and historical 
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context is taken into account, for example the link between the low valuation of land and 
racial make-up of those residing on such land, it demonstrates that the purported 
neutrality of the criteria is in fact an erroneous assumption. 
Decisions based on either model have resulted in a measurable impact to minority 
groups in America. They have been disproportionately exposed to toxics or hazards, 
resulting in "unequal protection" from such exposure (Bryant, 1995: pg. 5). For people 
of colour residing in urban areas this would mean impacts to the quality of land, air, and 
water (Bullard, 1993a). American Indians not only experience these impacts, but also the 
erosion of traditional knowledge, exploitation of natural resource required for 
subsistence, contamination of ancestors and their graves, and intrusions into traditional 
use areas as well as onto sacred lands (Harris and Harper, undated), which are arguably 
more substantive given the inherent values they represent and the unique set of rights that 
ensures their ability to be culturally different from mainstream society (Suagee, 2002). 
Much of the disproportionate distribution of impacts relates to the dual 
arrangement in environmental protection that emerges in, for example, housing, 
employment, and education (Bullard, 1994a). Studies have continuously demonstrated 
that communities of colour are more likely to have LULUs such as landfills (Bullard, 
1983, 1987, 1990, and 1991a) as well as toxic waste dumps (United Church of Christ 
Commission for Racial Justice, 1987) in their neighbourhoods. They are also more likely 
to be exposed to air pollution (Freeman 1972; Gianessi, Peskin, and Wolff, 1979; 
Wernette and Nieves 1992), and polluted water that contaminates the ecosystem and thus 
the resident fish they rely on for sustenance (West et al, 1990) or cultural subsistence 
(Bullard, 1993b: pg. 21). 
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Unlike white and affluent people, vulnerable individuals and groups cannot 
simply move to another location as a means of avoiding the perceived, potential, or 
anticipated risks associated with the development of a LULU within their community. 
An example of a barrier that such individuals are confronted with is market forces 
(Bullard 1993b: pg. 21). One cannot easily sell a dwelling when a LULU is planned for 
the neighbourhood. Even if it were possible, it remains questionable whether the return 
on the investment is sufficient to relocate to a healthier area that does not also contain a 
LULU, or an area that will not have one in the future. In the case of Native Americans 
this problem is amplified. They are tied to the Reservations (which are referred to as 
Reserves in Canada), making avoidance rather unachievable if the nature of the LULU is 
non-point pollution or covers a significant portion of land (Bullard, 1993a). 
A key question is this: do they actually have a choice in the siting of a LULU? It 
is here that two equally important economic issues come into play with respect to their 
resistance to inequitable treatment. The first is a community's ability to contest the 
siting. For this to occur, a community needs to be not only well-organized but also 
endowed with the economic means to allocate funds to contest the siting without having 
to sacrifice their quality of life (Kibert, 2001). More often than not this results in a white 
and/or affluent community being successful in fighting off the siting whereas the struggle 
of a community of colour to achieve a similar result is defeated. A second issue is the 
current economic conditions of the community. In this instance, which usually involves a 
community without the economic means to fight off the siting, the decision is made to 
embrace the siting simply because a derivative of the risk are employment opportunities 
and other potential avenues for revenue generation. As a result, some have contended 
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that this is not an example of environmental injustice since it was the community that 
made the choice, not an outside entity such as a government agency or a proponent. In 
this sense, some have argued, the land use decision is acceptable as the community 
weighed the benefits and burdens and concluded that the risk is reasonable given the 
returns that will ensue. Others have argued that such incidents are no more than 
coercion. Bullard (1992) uses the term "environmental blackmail" to describe the 
situation faced by such communities. Underlying this position is the idea that the 
community only accepted the risk because of its economic situation and, under more 
favourable circumstances, most would not likely have sacrificed the long-term protection 
of its environment and thus health for gains which are only short in duration. Thus an 
important element to keep in mind is examining 'who wins' and 'who loses' (Bullard, 
1993b). 
Such a predicament, as noted in Weaver (2001), has a long history in Native 
American communities. In this context, discrimination within environmental decision 
making occurs through spatial structures which, according to Laura Pulido (2000), results 
in white privileges being grounded in land tenures and access to natural resources. 
Bullard (1993b) suggests that a central component to environmental planning is racism, 
surfacing in such instances in its institutional form which influences local land use 
decisions. Much of this focuses on participation and collaborative decision-making in 
environmental planning and ecosystem management of natural resources in order to 
ensure access is equitable (Pulido, 1996, 1998; Pena, 2003). Moreover, insufficient 
participation of minority groups occurs even with laws and regulations requiring public 
participation (Bullard, 1994). In this way, a significant portion of racism is attributable to 
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the under representation of minorities in government agencies and organizations 
(Lazarus, 1993). 
Because of the lack of political power, vulnerable groups are targeted even more 
so when a company is entrusted with decision making power (Bullard, 1994). American 
Indian lands in particular are routinely inundated by companies (Angel, 1992). In the 
absence of capacity such as human capital, technology, and economic resources a group's 
vulnerability is amplified. Nearly all decision makers, according to Lazarus (1993), will 
favour a particular group over another depending on the path of least political resistance, 
although individuals making these decisions, whether they represent government or 
private industry, are generally unaware of the manner in which their cultural experiences 
influence personal attitudes towards others of a different race (Lawrence, 1987). 
Returning to the "landfill" example, the impacts listed above that are 
predominately shouldered by minority groups are not only caused by LULUs, but are also 
what underscores the siting of additional LULUs in and around environmental justice 
communities. For instance, in the early 1980s the State of California began a search for a 
location to place a new landfill. Prior to entering the planning stages, the State's Waste 
Management Board commissioned a political consulting firm (Cerrell Associates) to 
ascertain which communities would tolerate, or be less likely to resist, the siting of 
hazardous facilities. In 1984 the firm released its report, entitled Political Difficulties 
Facing Waste-to-Energy Conversion Plant Siting (referred to as the "Cerrell Report"), 
which found that the deciding factor for selecting the location of a LULU is not 
necessarily based on pure scientific variables: political factors are equally if not more 
significant in the successful siting of such a facility (Cole and Foster, 2000). Moreover, 
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according to Heiman (1996), the siting of any unwanted land use is more likely to be 
ninety-nine percent politics and only one percent science. 
The Cerrell Report demonstrated that most (if not all) socioeconomic groups 
oppose land use planning or the sitting of facilities which pose a hazard or risk to 
community health, and as such, will embrace the concept of NIMBY ("not in my 
backyard") regardless of demographic composition, size, and geographic location 
(Shrader-Frechette, 2002: pg. 11). But if a company were searching for a location to 
place a LULU, then target communities would include those that contain characteristics 
such as the following: a small population, located in a rural area, consist of a population 
of that is predominately low-income earners and/or minorities, include a majority of 
people with a level of education equal to or lower than high school, and have more than 
average industrial activity with little if any commercial activity (Cole and Foster, 2000). 
In all, the Cerrell Report, as referenced by Bullard (1993b), advised the State's Waste 
Management Board that: 
"[a]ll socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major 
facilities, but middle to upper socioeconomic strata possess better resources 
to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher socioeconomic strata 
neighbourhoods should not fall within one-mile and five-mile radius of the 
proposed site" (pg. 18). 
What the Cerrell Report not only brought to light, but also confirmed, was the 
vulnerability of low income persons and minorities. Such individuals and groups did not 
and likely still do not have the ability to protect themselves in the same fashion as their 
counterparts. Accordingly, the best place for a proponent to propose and possibly 
construct a LULU, such as a landfill, in terms of facing the least amount of opposition 
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and the possible rejection of the proposal is in and around environmental justice 
communities. Bullard (1993b), in addition to Cole and Foster (2000), further point out 
that, as the Cerrell Report recommends, the most effective approach to having a LULU 
approved is to examine the socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. income levels and racial 
make-up) of the land surrounding the proposed site, not environmentally-based variables. 
With the social sigma attached to discriminatory animus, most effects of 
environmental racism, as noted in the literature, are likely unintentional in that a 
seemingly innocuous white paper (e.g. law, regulation, and policy) is the cause. As such, 
Evans (1998) has suggested that it is more appropriate to ground the analysis in the 
outcome of such constructs. In this way derivative racism, the environmental inequity 
that has come about as a result of past discriminatory actions which underlies existing 
laws and regulations, is used as the basis to form our understanding of environmental 
injustices (Evans, 1998). 
2.3 Equity and Risk Assessment 
In the 1990s, the analysis of equity within land use decisions became a focal point within 
the field of environmental investigation (Carr, 1996). This was by and large the product 
of events such as Warren County and the release of findings from the GAO and UCC 
studies, many of which occurred early in the previous decade. Much of the focus, then, 
surrounded the implementation of the instruments used by the government in 
environmental decision making such as policies, permits, and standards. 
With the focus firmly placed on America's environmental law, the National Law 
Journal in 1992 investigated the issue of 'enforcement' within environmental justice 
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communities (Lavelle and Coyle, 1992). In particular, the study examined the EPA's 
implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 
By comparing the decisions regarding environmental justice communities to other 
communities, it found that polluters received fines which were 50% less, contaminated 
sites were added to the list to be cleaned-up 20% slower, reclamation and restoration 
activities took anywhere from 12-42% longer to initiate, and the decision to treat rather 
than contain the contamination was nearly 70% less likely to occur in environmental 
justice communities. Carr (1996: pg. 308) has noted the latter of the findings "is a classic 
example" of discrimination as the preferred approach under the purview of environmental 
law is treatment, not containment. 
Of the many studies released in the 1990s (including, for example, Anderton et 
al., 1994; Been, 1994; Bryant and Hockman, 1994; Glickman, 1994) relating to the 
disproportionate impact, the one that garnered national attention was the EPA 
investigation into the reported disproportionate distribution of negative effects from, for 
example, industrial development. Due to the pressure from those who had attended the 
Conference on Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards, as well as mounting 
evidence, the EPA during the summer of 1990 assembled a working-group with a diverse 
membership in collaboration with environmental organizations and advocacy groups to 
address the issue (Carr, 1996). The mandate of the working-group was to focus on the 
following four key areas: 
• Conduct investigations into whether a disproportionate burden is placed on the 
shoulders of minorities and low-income earners; 
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• Cases where a disproportionate burden exists as a result of internal policies are to 
be examined in order to develop methods on how to alleviate such issues; 
• Guidelines that have been enacted in regard to risk assessments are to be 
examined in relation to minorities and income levels; and, 
• The relationship with these communities is to be assessed in terms of consultation 
in order to ensure that the agency's mandate is achieved (EPA, 1990). 
In 1992, the EPA working-group released the final report entitled Environmental 
Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities. The study demonstrated that "clear 
differences between racial groups in terms of disease and death rates" did in fact exist 
(U.S. EPA, 1992: pg. 3; Saleem, 1994). Many of these distinct groups were also exposed 
to higher than average "air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities, contaminated fish and 
agricultural pesticides" (EPA, 1992: pg. 3). Minorities, specifically children from an 
African American descent, are approximately two-thirds more likely to have an increased 
level of lead in their blood in comparison to one-third of white children (EPA, 1992: pgs. 
20-30). The extent to which environmental factors play a role in such differences was 
indeterminate, largely because at that time there was a paucity of data regarding 
environmental health and race (EPA, 1992). Based on the findings, the working-group 
recommended that not only should the government move towards cleaning-up the 
hazardous sites in an expedient fashion, but that it also create an Office of Environmental 
Equity within the EPA (Carr, 1996) in order to further address the issue of inequities in 
America. 
While the release of the EPA study furthered the struggles of those 
environmentally victimized by placing the issue onto the national agenda, it did not come 
without its share of criticism from supporters of the movement. Of particular contention 
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was the methodological approach that the working-group relied upon to determine the 
distribution of environmental burdens are across social groups, specifically the mixing of 
the underpinnings of two terms: equity and risk assessment. 
Much of the controversy surrounding the EPA report was based on the 
methodological approach that was used by the working-group, specifically Risk 
Assessment (RA), which was used to determine the present and extent of environmental 
burdens confronting environmental justice communities. As a method of analysis, 
Freedman (1998) has noted that RA is defined as the quantification of potential adverse 
effects on a human population from an environmental hazard. Within this context, the 
risk of a hazard is determined by taking into account the probability of interaction 
between humans and the hazard, the probable concentration of the hazard, and the 
biological impact to be expected from the exposure (Freedman, 1998: pg. 269); for 
example, the release of a chemical substance into the environment (Noble, 2006). 
Two differing views have come to be synonymous with the debate relating to the 
use of this approach to investigate and/or prove claims of environmental injustice. The 
EPA considered this approach to be an objective technique that is grounded in scientific 
analysis (EPA, 1990; Sandweiss, 1998). Environmental justice groups, on the other 
hand, contended that this approach is a form of institutional discrimination (Heiman, 
1996; Israel, 1995) replete with disagreements surrounding scientific validity (Kreig and 
Faber, 2004) that results in different outcomes. The issue is therefore the efficacy of the 
approach for dealing with the underlying intricacies germane to identifying, 
understanding, and addressing the cause(s) and effect(s) of the disproportionate impacts. 
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Further, and more fundamentally, by implying that risk should be distributed fairly 
across social groups or in some cases being placed solely on the shoulders of minorities, 
rather than supporting an environmental ethos such as the avoidance of risk and pollution 
reduction (Holifield, 2001), mainstream environmental groups did not endorse the 
application of equity analysis (and to a lesser extent its reliance on RA as the sole means 
by which to demonstrate negative effects) in decisions relating to planning and 
management of land use activities. Some went as far as to impugn supporters, and by 
default environmental justice advocates, as being disingenuous with respect to protecting 
the environment (Carr, 1996). Such a response, according to Williams (1999), was to be 
expected given that advocates of this movement have had to contend with scepticism 
from the beginning when they tried to demonstrate that environmentalism does not 
merely revolve around protecting nature from industry; but, instead, the movement 
should enable individual groups to conceptualize what an environment consists of and 
how it is to be protected. As a result of this perception, both scholars and government 
agencies now avoid using the term environmental equity, mostly because its goal and 
meaning do not contribute to the overall political implications of the movement. The EPA 
therefore changed the name to the Office of Environmental Justice, a term that has been 
considered more constructive (Foreman, 1998; Taylor, 2000) and thereby in tune with 
broader environmental goals indicative of federal policy. 
2.4 Principles, Definitions, and Frameworks 
Since its inception nearly a decade before, and with a more appropriate term representing 
the underlying context of the movement, environmental justice as approach was taken 
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into consideration by various groups more formally by the early 1990s. Those with a 
vested interest (in comparison to federal and state governments which, at their core, are 
colonial-based systems: see Williams, 1994) in furthering the application of the 
framework in the mainstream decision-making process were at the forefront. A primary 
example of this is the inaugural First National People of Colour Environmental 
Leadership Summit held in 1991. This summit, according to Schlosberg and Carruthers 
(2010), "helped shape the landmark Principles of Environmental Justice" (pg. 12). 
Delegates gathered to discuss matters relating to issues such as culture, lands, and 
interdependence. By the end of the conference a framework consisting of seventeen 
principles was produced (Lee, 1992; Foreman, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Schlosberg and 
Caruthers, 2010), which are summarized as follows: 
• everyone has the right to live without "ecological destruction" and to participate 
as equals at all levels of decision making relating to their health, which requires 
their consent; 
• all policies are to be unbiased and non-discriminatory and must not force people 
into choosing between an income and their health; 
• everyone has "the fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food" as well as 
"to political, economic, cultural, and environmental self-determination"; 
• production of toxins is to cease and producers are to be held accountable, while at 
the same time producing "as little waste as possible" thus ensuring the health of 
current and "future generations"; 
• native peoples' sovereignty and the right to self-determination as well as the 
distinct legal rights to the land and their culture must be recognized by the 
government; 
• victims of injustices must "receive full compensation and reparation for 
damages"; education must be based on "diverse cultural perspectives"; and, 
• if the government permits any infringement of these principles then it is in 
violation of international law. 
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Following the lead of minorities was the American federal government. On Earth Day 
in 1993, it announced a plan that held as its objective the achievement of environmental 
justice for everyone. This plan came to fruition in 1994 when President Clinton signed 
Executive Order 12898, instructing all federal agencies to develop strategies for 
"identifying and addressing... [the] disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations" (Executive Order, 1994). Environmental justice, as defined by 
the EPA, is: 
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income 
with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environment laws, regulations, and policies. 
Fair treatment means that no group of people, including 
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic groups should bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative environmental 
consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and 
commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, 
local, and tribal programs and policies. 
While not directly contradicting the conceptualization put forward by the federal 
government, Bryant (1995) added that, environmental justice from a broader perspective, 
is an ideal that 
...refers to those cultural norms and values, rules, regulations, 
behaviours, policies, and decisions to support sustainable 
communities where people can interact with confidence that the 
environment is safe, nurturing, and productive. (Bryant, 1995: pg. 
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He further notes that the principles of environmental justice are achieved when a group of 
people are free to reach their full potential, which is fostered through 
...decent paying jobs; quality schools and recreation; decent housing and 
adequate health care; democratic decision-making and personal 
empowerment; and communities free of violence, drugs, and poverty. These 
are communities where both cultural and biological diversity are respected 
and highly revered and where distributed justice prevails (Bryant, 1995: pg. 
6). 
Getches and Pellow (2002) further the conventional idea of what environmental 
justice ought to embrace, including access to and allocation of natural resources and 
environmental (i.e. non-urban and non-rural) features as necessary components. They 
also note that, with the "expanded definition, the problem might take either of these 
forms: (1) low-income and minority communities are disproportionately exposed to 
environmental risks; and (2) low-income and minority communities are less likely than 
other communities to benefit from natural resources access and development policies" 
(Mutz, etal., 2002: pg. 32). 
For American Indians, however, the circumstances that forms an environmental 
injustice is more problematic and arguably more complex. They are confronted (as 
previously discussed in this chapter) with a distinct set of circumstances that separates 
them from other environmental justice communities. Much of the difference is centred 
around how "environmental law has been colonized by a perverse system of values which 
is antithetical to achieving environmental justice for American Indian peoples" 
(Williams, 1994; as referenced in Rechtschaffen and Gauna, 2003: pg. 436). O'Neil 
(2003) suggests that the situation is different as their views are primary based on the 
holistic nature and the interconnectedness of cultural aspects such as spirituality, social 
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interactions, and ecological attributes with environmental thought, all of which does not 
necessarily exist with other environmental justice communities in the same way (if at all). 
Further, a general element of the worldview of indigenous groups is surmised by 
Churchill (1999): 
"Human beings are free (indeed, encouraged) to develop their innate 
capabilities, but only in ways that do not infringe upon other elements -
called 'relations', in the fullest dialectical sense of the word - of nature. Any 
activity going beyond this is considered an 'imbalance', a transgression, and 
is strictly prohibited. For example, engineering was and is permissible, but 
only insofar as it does not permanently alter the earth itself. Similarly, 
agriculture was widespread, but only within norms that did not supplant 
natural vegetation." (pg. 17) 
Based on the research completed to date, Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010) note 
that "indigenous demands for environmental justice go beyond distributional equity to 
emphasize the defence and very function of indigenous communities - their ability to 
continue and reproduce their traditions, practices, cosmologies, and the relationship with 
nature that tie native peoples to their ancestral lands" (pg. 13). This calls for the 
environmental justice framework, according to Yamamoto and Lyman (2001), to more 
diligently examine the "social, political, historical, cultural, and power interactions 
among whites" and indigenous groups. 
Regardless of the type of community, the potential avenues available to them (or 
an assessor analyzing the situation) are of particular interest in relation to demonstrating 
that an injustice has occurred, is occurring, or will occur if a specific action were to 
transpire. Most communities, as Yamamoto and Lyman (2001) point out, follow a 
general approach consisting of four main steps. The first is the focus on the causes of 
burdens; for example, the pollution from LULUs like industrial facilities and landfills. 
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Second, the location of such facilities and whether they disproportionately impact a 
minority group in some way. The third is that such minorities must have equal 
representation in the administration of environmental decisions governing the LULU. 
Lastly, and from a community based approach, the minority group organizes to place 
pressure on the entity (including, a person or group) that has the power to make 
decisions. 
Although some (e.g., Been, 1994) have suggested that differentiating between 
process and outcome is a perquisite to selecting an appropriate cure, it remains 
questionable whether a singular focus is appropriate given the unpredictability of social 
institutions and their complex interactions. This uncertainty is largely due to ongoing 
disputes over the correlation of and the ability to differentiate between procedural and 
distributional injustices (Kaswan, 1997). Considering this limitation, as Greenberg and 
Cido (1997) note, to unearth the basis of an injustice it is not necessarily beneficial to 
choose between process and outcome; however, both are important as they are significant 
aspects that are contained within the definitions (Holifield, 2001). Instead, they suggest, 
that selecting (and, perhaps to some degree, developing) an analysis framework that 
incorporates both aspects is necessary. Based on the events and the literature to date 
within the field of environmental justice, Mutz et al. (2002) list five fundamental 
theoretical approaches that a community may consider when properly "defining injustices 
related to natural resources and the environment" (pg. 31), none of which are "mutually 
exclusive" from one another as "they overlap considerably" (pg. 34). 
The first is public participation. A long history exists regarding the inclusion of 
individuals and groups in environmental processes and the decisions that flow from them. 
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Cvetkovich and Earle (1994) point to the procedural inclusion of the American public 
that is protected by federal laws. Examples include the mandate by the Nation 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 for public involvement, in addition to it being a 
requirement in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (both the 1980 and 1986 versions). They further note that the extent to which the 
public is involved varies from participating in short-term procedures such as open-houses 
or participatory studies that are more long-term. Such inclusion is regarded as an 
essential component for "democratic governance" (Lauber and Knuth, 1999: pg. 19). In 
Table 1, Mutz et al (2002) provide a general overview of the framework. 
Table 1: Public Participation Framework 
What the Framework Underlying Assumptions Some Questions / Problems 
Requires 
• Devise fair procedures that • Fair procedures for whatever • Is a fair process enough? 
give voice to all members of outcomes are agreed to. • Can all parties participate 
a community, especially the • Participation allows affected fairly and effectively? 
politically powerless. parties to help determine what • Who should be involved in 
• Ensure that all groups have happens in their communities the process? 
the social capital to and how benefits and risks are 
participate effectively. balanced. 
(Adapted from: Mutz et al., 2002: pg. 36) 
Since the involvement of the public does not include a substantive element such 
as formal voting on the decision (Cvetkovich and Earle, 1994; Mutz, et al, 2002), there is 
likely to be both dissatisfied and satisfied participants (Lawrence and Daniels, 1997). 
Those responsible for the environmental decision often suggest that, when all parties are 
somewhat dissatisfied with the decision, then the decision is more reflective of justice as 
they properly balanced the views of the public (Wondolleck, 1988). Lawrence and 
Daniels (1997) argue otherwise, as "defining success as 'equilibrated dislike' is not 
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indicative of the quality of resource management" (pg. 560). In such cases, they write, 
the focus of those that either designed or implemented the process (and perhaps both) was 
likely on the need to have an outcome rather than on the procedures for arriving at an 
appropriate decision. 
While the requirement for the public to participate in environmental decision-
making has a long history, the involvement of people of colour in such processes does 
not. As previously noted in this chapter, the inclusion of minorities in decision making 
processes has many shortcomings. Both a lack of inclusion at key levels in decision-
making or the lack of capacity to effectively participate in such processes, are prominent 
examples of the challenges by which minorities are confronted with when attempting to 
seek justice via public participation processes. As such, the framework "does not always 
lead to justice" (both for the public in general and minorities in particular), as including 
people within the process is based on the questionable assumption that participation will 
result in an acceptable outcome (Cvetkovich and Earle, 1994). 
The second framework is ecological sustainability. Mutz et al. (2002) suggest 
that underscoring this framework are political motives; that is, the avoidance of 
accurately measuring the costs of development and/or shifting the burdens of such 
development onto those less capable of resistance, including the lack of serious 
consideration for future generations. In Table 2, Mutz et al. (2002) provide a general 
overview of the framework. 
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Table 2: Ecological Sustainability Framework 
What the Framework 
Requires 
Underlying Assumptions Some Questions / Problems 
Require pollution 
prevention and 
conservation of 
resources. 
Reduce pollution and 
risks for all people. 
Ensure that economic, 
equity, and ecological are 
intertwined. 
Make ecological 
sustainability the primary 
value. 
Use the precautionary 
principle in the face of 
uncertainty. 
The effects of 
environmental problems 
are to be eliminated rather 
than redistributed. 
Environmental problems 
are dealt with directly, as 
ecological challenges, 
rather than more 
indirectly, as social, 
economic, or political 
problems. 
Pollution may eventually be 
eliminated, but what about its 
impacts in the interim? 
Are these fairness, 
discrimination, and 
disproportionate impact issues 
that still need to be addressed 
beyond what sustainability 
implies? 
What use of resources, especially 
nonrenewables like fossil fuels, is 
consistent with sustainability? 
(Adapted from: Mutz et al., 2002: pg. 37) 
Central to this framework are the laws and policies developed and implemented 
by the various levels of government relating to sustainability that are typically interpreted 
inconsistently (Cowell and Owens, 1998), and which do not adequately account for the 
distribution of benefits and burdens from an environmental justice perspective (Mutz et 
al, 2002). In many cases, according to Martinez-Alier (2001), impacts are incorrectly 
incorporated in the economic valuation system. As a result, she writes, "people all over 
the world are seeing their basic rights compromised, losing their livelihoods, cultures and 
even their lives", which is by and large due to the "clash in standards of valuation when 
the languages of environmental justice, or indigenous territorial rights, or environmental 
security, are deployed against monetary valuation or environmental risks and burdens" 
(pg. 167). Further, Padilla (2002) suggests that there is also an international inequity 
when it comes to the manner in which sustainably is incorporated in the decision making 
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regimes, as existing "economic analysis treats future generations unfairly" (pg. 81). 
The third, distributive justice, focuses on the distribution of LULUs or other 
matters that adversely impact minorities. Kaswan (2003) suggests that, at the 
theoretically level, this injustice is present whenever there is an disproportionate 
distribution of burdens. In Table 3, Mutz et al. (2002) provide a general overview of the 
framework. 
Table 3: Distributive Justice Framework 
What the Framework 
Requires 
Underlying Assumptions Some Questions / Problems 
Distribute benefits and 
burdens fairly or equally. 
Ensure that differences 
benefit the least well-off. 
Provide compensation for 
past injustices such as 
treaty violations 
Consider environmental 
ethics 
Public policies should • 
produce fair 
outcomes. 
Policies should meet 
expectations of 
constitutional 
protection. 
What is fair? What is equal? 
Exposure to risks and access to 
benefits cannot be distributed 
equally, so how should they be 
shared? What obligations do we 
have to those who are especially 
dependent on natural resources and 
rooted in the land? 
(Adapted from: Mutz et al., 2002: pg. 36) 
Under this framework a significant emphasis is placed on the outcome rather than 
the processes that are likely the cause (in whole or part) of the potential injustice, 
particularly the benefits and burdens that are accrued and whether they are distributed 
equitably across the various social/cultural components (Kaswan, 2003). Although there 
is a general disagreement among the scholars as to what is to be adequately dispersed in 
society, Smith (1994) points to two explanations of the distributive paradigm. The first is 
material goods, that is, something that is or can be marketed to others such as natural 
resources. In contrast, the second focuses on items like "self respect, opportunity, power, 
and honour" (Young, 1990: pg. 8). 
65 
The fourth, which is the social justice framework, looks further than the precise 
siting of a LULU by considering the political, economic, market forces, and social 
aspects that influenced the placement of the LULU (Kaswan, 2003). Key to this are the 
rights of the people affected by the decision. In Table 4, Mutz et al. (2002) provide a 
general overview of the framework. 
Table 4: Social Justice Framework 
What the Framework Underlying Assumptions Some Questions / Problems 
Requires 
• Comprehensively assess the • The economic, • With such a broad agenda, what 
interaction of economic, political, and social are the priorities for legal and 
political, social, and cultural ideas, institutions, policy responses? 
power. norms, incentives, and • How can they be addressed in 
• Address the root causes of underlying assumptions environmental and natural 
injustices. that result in resource law? 
• Ensure the preservation of disproportionate risks • What are the historical land use 
cultural diversity, especially and harms are patterns and decisions that have 
groups with ties to the land. addressed. contributed to injustices, and 
how can they be reversed? 
(Adapted from: Mutz et al., 2002: pg. 37) 
In contemplating the potential conflict between rights (e.g., civil rights) and 
interests (e.g. employing Caucasians), Rawls' contends that the "[r]ights secured by 
justice are not subject to political bargaining or the calculus of social interests". 
Similarly, Dworkin (1984: pg. 153), as referenced by Smith (1994: pg. 37), has stated 
that "[rjights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for 
political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole". While Rawls (1999) 
and Dworkin (1994) essentially believe that a right is to override an interest, decision 
making process in general (are designed, for the most part) to focus on the 'balancing of 
societal interests'. It is such balancing that is often the focus of claims of environmental 
injustices. Institutions and their structures that distribute access and allocation are the 
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focus in this framework, as "social justice is predicated primarily of the basic structure of 
a society" (Smith, 1994: pg. 25). 
Lastly, the fifth is a civil rights framework. A significant amount of influence 
comes from the struggles brought to light during the civil right movement whereby users 
of the framework endeavour to remove the historic and present-day viewpoints as well as 
barriers that discriminate against minorities. This is accomplished through ascertaining 
whether a minority group has or is about to experience an adverse effect from, for 
example, an environmental law or the result of a decision-making process. Due to its 
roots, a great deal of emphasis is placed on seeking remedies through legal instruments 
such as the American Constitution (Mutz et al, 2002). 
Bryner (2002) has pointed out that using the available components of the 
American Constitution is practical as they apply to all levels of governmental decision-
making. The success of such mechanisms, however, largely depends upon the scope of 
the approach. Central to this is a non-environmental element, namely the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Bullard, 1994c). This Amendment provided, among other things, an Equal 
Protection clause which maintains that no state is permitted to "deny any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" (Saleem, 1994: pg. 11) regardless of their 
race or citizenship. Evans (1998) has noted that, investigating a claim of racism (whether 
environmental or otherwise), will more often than not lead to an innocuous piece of 
legislation or a decision. Further, according to Bryner (2002) and noted by Mutz et al. 
(2002), it is important to define what discrimination is, understand how and when does it 
occur, and whether an available remedy simply transfers the impact to another 
community. In Table 5, Mutz et al (2002) provide a general overview of the framework. 
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Table 5: Civil Rights Framework 
What the Framework Underlying Some Questions / Problems 
Requires Assumptions 
• Indentify disparate • Civil rights law • How is discrimination to be defined? 
impacts due to provides legal • When does it occur? 
discrimination. tools and • What are the remedies possible? 
• Devise remedies that concepts. . Should low-income communities be included? 
make victims whole. Will problems just be transferred to another 
community? 
(Adapted from: Mutz et al., 2002: pg. 36) 
However, claims of an environmental injustice brought fourth under the Equal 
Protection Clause have not been overly successful. A plaintiff is required to demonstrate, 
through evidence, that there was intent to discriminate (Mutz et al., 2002). This is quite 
difficult to accomplish given that cases of overt racism are atypical in today's litigious 
society. Establishing intent is even more problematic since a considerable portion of 
discrimination is inadvertent due to its institutional nature (Bullard, 1994a, 1994c). The 
most difficult barrier to overcome is the ability of government agencies to put forward 
numerous scientific and economic justifications for making a decision (Faerstein, 2004). 
Critics of the intent-standard approach have suggested that the Supreme Court has 
almost certainly disregarded their impartiality by rendering such a value-laden judgement 
(Lawrence, 1987). Underscoring the magnitude of this standard is the court's acceptance 
of unintentional discrimination as being constitutional, lessening it to nothing more than 
an accidental blunder of sorts (Lively & Plass, 1991). In doing so, according to Saleem 
(1994), this assumes that society is a colour-blind democracy that reinforces the abnormal 
growth of racism rather than purging the phenomena through dispensing with the 
likelihood that particular unintended actions cultivate and perpetuate racial suppression. 
Furthering the intent-standard approach is the decision from the Supreme Court in the 
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Village of Arlington Heights vs. Metropolitan Housing Development court case. In its 
decision, the court established that for an action to be considered intentional 
discrimination a claimant is required to provide evidence on five inquires (Kaswan, 
1999): (1) Does the government decision impact one racial group more than another?; (2) 
Is there a pattern, clear or veiled, that emerges from the decision that was based on a law 
which appears to be neutral on the surface?; (3) By reviewing the chronology of the 
decision does it become apparent that a series of events were taken by the government in 
order to produce an undesirable outcome?; (4) In the process of making a decision did the 
government neglect to follow established procedures or substantive principles? (5) Does 
a discriminatory purpose emerge when the background of the legislation and its 
administration is reviewed? It is important to note that it is not necessary to provide 
evidence of intent for each of the five factors for a claim to be successful. Instead, 
evidence of intent to discriminate on any one of the five would meet the standard 
resulting in the respondent being culpable for its actions (Evans, 1998). 
2.5 Conclusion 
With the emergence of the civil rights movement, which had long recognized the 
differential treatment between minorities and their counterparts, came the basis of the 
environmental justice movement. It combined (with modifications) the philosophical 
underpinnings of human rights with the environmental ethos contained with the modern 
environmental movement at that time. By doing so, the fact that minorities in America 
have for many years borne the negative impacts from anthropogenic activities (e.g. 
pollution resulting higher rates of health problems) more so than white, affluent citizens, 
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was brought to light. Such communities were being, and likely still are, exposed to more 
environmental risk and are less likely to receive a benefit from land and natural resource 
management laws, regulations, and policies. Although minorities in general and to a 
lesser extent those with low-incomes have been disproportionately impacted in similar 
ways, the nature and extent of impacts experienced by American Indians is arguably 
more detrimental given the manner in which environment-based problems (e.g. pollution, 
access to land) affects each of their cultures. 
What all environmental justice communities have in common are the means by 
which the system has or may discriminate against them; namely through either 
environmental processes or the result of the outcome, either of which may be intentional 
or unintentional. The key to indentifying these impacts begins with the appropriate 
delineation of a unit of analysis. Rather than a uniform approach to assessing impacts, an 
appropriate approach to establishing the unit of analysis is based on the specific 
circumstances of a situation. Similarly, the analysis framework should be selected based 
on the specific circumstances of the situation and the matter that is at the heart of the 
concern; for example, a concern relating involvement of a community in a process may 
be better addressed through a public participation framework instead of a sustainability 
framework. 
Fundamental to the American environmental justice movement in addressing the 
disproportionate impact is overcoming not only the "not in blacks backyard" (NIBBY) 
syndrome (see: Bullard 1993a, 1994a) in land use planning decisions, but also the use of 
NIMBY as a default approach; merely placing the problem onto the shoulders of another 
community, irrespective of whether it is community living without any current LULUs, is 
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considered inappropriate from an environmental justice perspective. In this context, an 
environmental decision may considered to be just when it enables a community to 
delineate the land use activities within its boundaries which will enable members to live 
in a safe and healthy environment. The parameters of such an environment include 
principles such as those outlined by the First National People of Colour Environmental 
Leadership Summit (see, e.g.: Lee, 1992; Foreman, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Schlosberg and 
Caruthers, 2010) and others such as Bryant (1995). 
In cases where a disproportionate impact has been identified, there are two main 
sources that are relied upon to address environmental injustices. The first is the Equal 
Protection clause in the American Constitution, although cases brought forward have not 
been overly successful as a community is required to demonstrate that discrimination has 
occurred and that it was intentional, which is commonly referred to as the intent-standard 
approach. The second is Executive Order 12898, which directed all federal agencies to 
address matters relating to environmental justice. While more operational than the Equal 
Protection clause, its scope is limited in the sense that it only applied to decisions within 
the purview of the federal government. Neither source therefore provides an overarching 
remedy to address concerns relating to environmental justice. 
In chapter three, equality as a concept is briefly reviewed followed by the 
development of the concept of equality in Canada. The guarantee of equality in Canada, 
protected by the Constitution Act, 1982, is used as a basis for developing a Canadian-
based environmental justice framework. 
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Chapter Three: Equality and its Development in Canada 
72 
3.0 Introduction 
".. .Canada... .where equality is not only a goal but a reality..." 
(Jean Chretien, 1992: pg. 13) 
Minority rights in governmental decision-making have been reinforced by Canadian 
social institutions and systems on a variety of bases. These bases are derived from the 
literature on race and ethnicity regarding the protection of First Nations and their 
particular interests in relation to the land. This chapter discusses the concept of equality 
and introduces a framework to further the environmental justice of minority groups such 
as First Nations. 
3.1 Equality as an Ideal 
Few would argue that inequalities do not exist in North American and elsewhere around 
the world. The mere presence of inequalities between individuals and among groups 
within social arenas is in all likelihood as old as humanity itself. Turner (1986) has noted 
that "social inequality is inevitable because it is endemic to the very constitution of 
human society... (pg. 30) since individuals are stratified on a variety of dimensions as a 
consequence of the very existence of social norms and sanctions" (pg. 77). Early 
accounts from ancient Hindu society with its castes of people to the various stratums in 
imperial China some 2500 years ago, are but a few of the examples (Turner, 1986: pg. 
18). More recent examples, as discussed in the previous Chapter, includes the 
enslavement of people from the continent of Africa during the 1600s and the treatment of 
indigenous groups residing in and around what is now referred to as North America. 
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3.1.1 Justice and Equality 
Over the years much has been written regarding the differences between and among 
individuals in society, which has resulted in a variety of terms being used to 
conceptualize this phenomenon. Two of the more prominent terms that have come to the 
forefront in the environmental justice movement are 'justice' and 'equality'. As Smith 
(1994: pg. 54) notes: 
The close connection between justice and equality is manifest in both 
history and language. The great historic struggles for social justice have 
centred about some demand for equal rights: the struggles against slavery, 
political absolutism, economic exploitation, the disenfranchisement of the 
lower and middle class and the disenfranchisement of women, 
colonialism, [and] racial expression. 
While both terms articulate a premise that recognizes the manifestation of 
inequality in social contexts, environmental justice literature suggests that the terms are 
nevertheless not synonymous with one another as they are fundamentally dissimilar. Lui 
(2000) points to Rawls' understanding of justice, as it is viewed by many as the most 
influential theory provided in recent years that is comprehensive. In A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls' notes that a "just society" is one that attempts to maximize the liberties that are 
fundamental to the society equally so that the liberty of one individual would not conflict 
with the liberty of another (Turner, 1986: pg. 43). In this sense, he viewed an injustice to 
be merely an inequality that does not benefit everyone (pg. 54). More specifically, 
Rawls' believed: 
All social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the 
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bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage. 
(Rawls, 1999: pg. 54) 
He considered that 'justice' in general did not give rise to a particular set of acceptable 
inequalities, but rather "only requires that everyone's position be improved" (pg. 55). In 
the context of Rawls' theory, the elimination of inequalities in society is therefore not a 
requisite of justice per se. 
Rawls' is not alone in ascribing to this belief. Amartya Sen (1992) points out that 
the leading theories on justice relating to social interactions all contain elements of 
equality. In particular, Trappenburg (2000) writes that Walzer, in his book Spheres of 
Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983), accepts the presence of social 
inequality subsequent to the distribution of benefits so long as it remains within the 
sphere it exists. Similarly, Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) takes into 
account equality during the distribution of benefits. He considers the presence of 
inequality afterwards as justifiable provided that "its benefit to the worst-off group... is 
greater than (or equal to) the cost of the inequality" (pg. 211). Each of the theories, 
according to Smith (1994), then "share the same egalitarian plateau'... [and] each 
attempts to define the social, economic and political conditions under which members of 
a community or society will be treated as equals" (pg. 117). 
By the theories focusing on a similar outcome, a salient point is revealed. That is, 
none of them require the elimination of the social inequalities between the haves and 
have-nots in order for an outcome to be considered just. This is problematical from an 
environmental justice perspective, as the underlying impetus since the beginning of the 
movement (largely considered the civil rights movement in America) focused on the 
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removal of social, environment, economic, and political inequalities through 
simultaneously changing the present distribution of benefits, not the acceptance of further 
inequalities. 
Lui (2001) points out that a decision made under the auspices of justice could 
aggravate an existing inequality, but still be justifiable so long as it benefited the 'haves' 
less than it benefited the 'have-nots'. On the other hand, he writes, a decision based on 
egalitarian principles will look more closely at existing inequalities. Decision makers 
then ought to expend time deciding the degree to which the decision reduces or perhaps 
eliminates such inequalities, which includes using the following principles noted by Lui 
(2001): existing inequalities are avoidable and cannot be justified, so they need to be 
purged from society; men and women are forever equal with respect to having "intrinsic 
value, inherent worth, and essential nature"; for there to be justice, there must be 
equality; while it is unnecessary to provide a justification when one creates an equality, it 
most certain is necessary for creating an inequality; and, individuals deserve to be treated 
alike, with the exception of cases where they deserve to be treated differently because of 
their situation, (pg. 23) 
Even though environmental justice primarily focuses protecting those belonging 
to minority groups, equal protection of a person's environment is not exclusive. The civil 
rights movement in America was not about improving the situation of one group of 
people while at the same time cause a second group to receive the injustice; more 
specifically, trading places was not the underlying purpose of the movement. As Bullard 
(1994) suggests, "the solution to unequal environmental protection is seen to lie in the 
struggle for justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, 
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should be allowed to become an ecological 'sacrifice zone'" (pg. 206). He believed that 
achieving environmental justice is dependent not on stopping the placement of LULUs 
("locally unwanted land uses") in a location that detrimentally affects minorities, as that 
would likely further the NIMBY ("not in my backyard") syndrome in some respects. 
Rather, he considers that an environmental processes ought to be focusing on NIABY 
("not in anyone's backyard"), as that would be indicative of a decision making process 
which held equality as its goal. 
In contrast to the theories of justice, egalitarianism focuses on purging inequality 
from society through simultaneously changing the present distribution of benefits (Lui, 
2001). Thus any distribution that does not fully remove an existing inequality, including 
derivative inequality, is unacceptable in the context of environmental justice. As a result, 
and from a strict sense, the principle of justice as represented by the Rawlsian version 
(and likely others as well) is not relevant in a structural context to the principle of 
equality (Temkin, 1986), as the "end goal" of both terms are fundamentally different 
(Lui, 2001: pg. 23). 
3.1.2 Particulars of Equality 
Historically, the concept of equality has been a focal point for Eurocentric societies. It 
has been ingrained into the social arrangements and institutions of most countries in some 
fashion or another, with scholars continuing to work on devising parameters with respect 
to the foundational meaning of the term. The further one attempts to apply precision to 
its definition, however, the more problematic it becomes. Even with most having an 
innate understanding of what the term means and what it may include, the further it is 
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explored the more it becomes apparent that the understanding moves about (Freedman, 
2002) depending on the situation as well as those involved. Equality thus not only 
"carries a range of meaning and connotation" (Persky, 2008: pg. 455), but more 
importantly it is also 
"...a protean word. It is one of those political symbols - liberty and 
fraternity are others - into which men have poured the deepest urgings of 
their hearts. Every strongly held theory or conception of equality is at once 
a psychology, an ethic, a theory of social relations, and a vision of the 
good society." (Persky, 2008: pg. 455) 
Such notions are seemingly limitless, and even more so since there are at least 
"108" notions of equality "and perhaps as many as 720", all of which are "structurally 
distinct interpretations" (Rae, 1981: pg. 119). Kurland (1979) goes one step further. He 
argues that trying to define 'equality' is akin to delineating "the shape of an amoeba" 
(1979: pg. 119). 
While it is clear that there is no single blueprint for delineating the boarders of 
equality, it is not to say that the term's elusive nature is impractical by any means. To 
deal with the ambiguity, Westin (1990) points out that the concept has various synoptic 
underpinnings with respect to cases involving "persons" and their "things", namely fixed 
and non-fixed variables that are for the most part constant. These are: "(1) the 
relationship that obtains among two or more persons or things, which, (2) although 
distinguishable in one or more respects, (3) have nevertheless been jointly measured, (4) 
compared, and, (5) ascertained to be indistinguishable, (6) by reference to a relevant 
standard of comparison, (7) a standard which, until specified, can be represented as "X" 
(Westin, 1990: pg. 120). He notes that variables (1) through (6) are fixed whereas 
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variable (7) is not. The latter of the variables represents the scores of different 
circumstances that are encountered and, as a result, the myriad notions of equality. 
The unfixed variable of "X" is intended to represent the unknowns of the human 
situation, or in other words, the diverse possibilities that may arise for any given 
individual. Such variances may arise at anytime and include to some extent both 
internalities and externalities. Understanding these variables in a given circumstances is 
important, according to Turner (1986), because societies "often attempt to justify and to 
explain social inequalities by reference to nature in suggesting that all social inequality is 
derived from the natural inequalities of individuals" (pg. 29). Much of the inequality is 
thus an outcome of an individual's "social location within the social structure" (pg. 57). 
From this, it is apparent that not all people share the experience of an equal 
starting point. Some are born into a life that has many benefits, while others are not. 
Smith (1994: pg. 54) suggests that the probability of the process of conception and birth 
to a particular parent or parents and in some cases guardian(s), along with the location of 
the birth in concert with its timing, all have a significant influence on the opportunities 
available in life. Family affluence and its continued accumulation play a role as well 
(Turner, 1986: pg. 72) since it provides subsequent generations with privileges. Also 
influencing this is the biological intersect between the genetic contributors, which may or 
may not be the parent(s). Described by Smith (1994) as natural attributes that are derived 
from the genetic pedigree of the contributors, they are not universally dispersed evenly 
throughout the population and therefore endow a specific individual with a particular set 
of opportunities. These include traits such as "physical strength, dexterity or intelligence" 
(pg. 55). 
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An individual's characteristics are not the sole contributing factors to the 
generation of potential inequalities that may emerge in the future. Smith (1994) suggests 
that the physical location and the natural surroundings are important in terms of 
determining what opportunities exist and whether an individual has access. In an optimal 
case, an individual is born into a situation where there is "bountiful natural resources or 
an advanced social economic environment, with first rate schools, hospitals and... well 
paid jobs available" (pg. 55) over a long period of time coupled with political stability. 
Conversely, those borne in an area replete with civil unrest, like a war for instance, are 
more likely to face distinct challenges that an individual borne into the optimal case 
would not otherwise face. As a result, the access and opportunity afforded to an 
individual or group is integrally connected to the probability of factors that they have 
little to no control over; at best, it is a "natural lottery" (Smith, 1994: pg. 55) 
An individual's characteristics and physical location represents avenues in which 
social inequality may arise. Smith (1994) suggests that pulling these together also 
demonstrates their importance in relation to the manner society considers them equal. He 
references Kymlicka's (1990: pg. 43-44) understanding of this: 
In deciding which particular form of equal treatment best captures the idea 
of treating people as equals, we do not want a logician, who is versed in 
the art of logical deduction. We want someone who has an understanding 
of what it is about humans that deserves respect and concern, and of what 
kind of best manifest that respect and concern. (Smith, 1994: pg. 58). 
Although it is important not to generalize or perhaps confuse the meaning of 
'human' when trying to discern what deserves concern and respect, as such an approach 
would likely carry with it an assumption that all individuals and groups are the same. 
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Not all differences between individuals and groups amount to an inequality between 
them, and in the same way different treatment does not necessarily result in inequality. 
As Friedrich Engels (as translated by Buzlyakov, 1973, and referenced in Smith, 1994) 
puts it: 
Between one country and another, one province and another and even one 
locality and another there will always exist a certain inequality in the 
conditions of life, which it will be possible to reduce to a minimum but 
never entirely remove. Alpine dwellers will always have different 
conditions of life from those people living on plains (pg. 49). 
Based on the above, it is unlikely that Engels was supporting a distribution of 
benefits that would further degrade the quality of either dweller-type. Rather, as Smith 
(1994) suggests, Engels was concerned with the lifestyle of each group more so than he 
was with the differences in which they exercised their way of life. He adds that the 
environmental differences of where homes are located translate into different ways 
people live, an example of which is the relationship between their surroundings and the 
method they build houses. To Engels, according to Smith (1994), the differences in 
"habitats and customs as well as attitudes to food and housing" merely reflected the 
"differences in culture to which it is hard to take moral exception" (pg. 50). 
In view of this, Turner (1986) writes that the 'sense of equality' must emerge 
from "the very fabric of social relations" (pg. 31). These relations, upon which a proper 
consideration of equality is based, is necessary to acknowledge as inequality "is endemic 
to the very constitution of human society", meaning that the unequal distribution of 
benefits is a product of the standards and norms people use in their daily social 
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interactions (Turner, 1986: pg. 30). The modus operandi that governs social relations, 
which is presumably a reflection of the fabric that underpins the society itself, is key to 
understand if the objectives of equality are to be applied and achieved. 
3.2 Equality in Canada 
Canada has an ambiguous history with respect to the literature and discussions 
surrounding the topic of race and racism, especially in comparison to Britain and the 
United States of America with which this country shares similar social values and legal 
traditions. In many respect, Canada has used this to embrace "[a] mythology of 
racelessness and stupefying innocence" when it comes to indentifying with the 
consequences of its legislated actions (Backhouse, 2001: pg. 14) and, in some cases, its 
inaction. Moreover, as Backhouse (2001) points out, unlike other countries Canada's 
'"colour bar' was much more muted and informal, fluctuating over time and place, 
depending on the proclivities of local proprietors and their white cliental" (pg. 281). 
Inequalities occurring in the early years of Canada went largely unnoticed by the general 
populace, as they were concealed through the enactment of laws according to Backhouse 
(2001). These laws were then used to foster "the inequality of racialized groups" 
(Backhouse, 2001: pg 15) such as First Nations. 
The following section is divided into two key time periods that correspond with 
the development of equality in Canada. The first is described as the Pre-Charter era, as it 
covers the time period from 1867 (the Confederation of Canada) up and until the day the 
Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. Beginning with the enactment of the British 
North American Act, the brunt of Eurocentric ideology were shouldered by First Nations 
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since there was no law prohibiting such behaviour in the years that followed. Even with 
the official Bill of Rights coming into effect in the 1960s there was little change. The 
prevalent change in First Nations' struggles for equality came in the early 1980s, which is 
described as the Post-Charter era. It began with the Constitution Act, 1982 coming into 
force and includes present-day matters. Unlike the years that followed Confederation, 
which included innumerable direct and indirect attempts by the Crown to assimilate First 
Nations into mainstream society, this time period has and continues to recognize the 
errors of past dealings and legal mandates and is gradually moving towards 
reconciliation. 
3.2.1 Pre-Charter Era 
British North America Act 
In 1867, the United Kingdom passed the British North American Act in order to unite the 
colonies of the 'new world'. This Act, which has since been renamed the Constitution 
Act, 1867, created the country of Canada. As a federal state, governmental power in 
Canada was initially designed to be divided between the national government, as 
represented by Parliament in Ottawa, and the provinces as represented by their 
legislatures. (Greenbaum et al, 1995a: pg. 26). More recently, however, this division has 
been modified to some extent whereby a portion of the power has been delegated to First 
Nations through land claims and other legal and political means. 
Since a key purpose of the Constitution Act, 1867 was setting up a nation and the 
division of power in terms of legislative jurisdiction between the federal and provincial 
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governments, the extent to which it protected the rights of minorities was limited (Sharpe 
& Roach, 2005: pg. 8). Other than provisions such as 93 and 133, which protected 
certain language and Judeo-Christian rights, the Constitution at the time did not explicitly 
recognize the rights of other minorities such as First Nations. Without this protection, 
government officials and others were seemingly free to not only form and disseminate 
stereotypes and other racial ideology, but to also practice discriminatory behaviours. 
An early example is the view expressed by then-Prime Minister John A. 
MacDonald with respect to those individuals from the orient, whom he referred to as an 
"alien race" that "would not and could not be expected to assimilate with our Aryan 
population". Such early views likely led to the "Chinese Head Tax", which at the time 
required immigrants from China to pay for their entry into Canada whereas other 
immigrants were exempt. Payment did not, however, result in unfettered access to the 
rights enjoyed by other Canadians. Their civil liberties were further restricted as they 
were not permitted, for example, to vote in federal elections. 
In comparison to other historically oppressed and subjugated groups, such as the 
Chinese, Aboriginal peoples in Canada have arguably faced the most far-reaching 
abhorrent treatments since Confederation.5 Generations of them were impacted since the 
arrival of Europeans. Nearly every aspect of their mode of lives has been either directly 
or indirectly confronted by a "goal" of the Church and the Crown to "civilize" them 
whereby they could be assimilated into the mainstream society (McMillian, 1995: pg. 
313). 
Under section 92(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal government has 
5
 Although the treatment of First Nations prior to confederation is outside the scope of this chapter (and 
thesis), there is a great deal of literature that reviews such treatment. 
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the legislative jurisdiction to administer the affairs of Indians. In 1876, the Parliament of 
Canada used this power to bring into force a piece of legislation, specifically the Indian 
Act, to deal with such affairs. Since its enactment, however, the Indian Act has come 
under significant scrutiny. It has provided First Nations with a special legal status within 
Canada, while simultaneously depriving them of the equality that is generally offered in 
Canadian society to every other citizen (Berger, 1981). Moreover, the implementation of 
the Act has "structured inequality, poverty, and underachievement among Natives... [and] 
has seriously encroached upon the personal freedom, morale, and well-being of Native 
people" (Frideres, 1988: pg. 37). 
Much of this inequality was (and perhaps still is) a derivative of the actions 
performed by the federal department that oversaw Indian affairs over the years. As an 
institution, the Department of Indian Affairs originally viewed the retention of traditions 
and customs by First Nations as a significant problem, and therefore made an effort to 
implement methods to achieve "acculturation" (Backhouse, 2001: pg. 66). Perhaps the 
most well-known cultural suppression under the Indian Act was the focus on First 
Nations' spiritual connectedness to the land, including their traditions and ceremonies. 
Along the western shores of British Columbia, for example, First Nations prior to 
the arrival of Europeans were freely practicing a traditional custom referred to as the 
Potlatch. In general, the custom is a spiritual ceremony that often occur as a result of 
"births, coming-of-age events, marriages, and deaths" (Steckley and Cummins, 2001: pg. 
167). While the cultural-uniqueness of ceremony makes it problematic to translate into 
terms easily understood by non-aboriginals, it is essentially similar in many respects to a 
combination "of a Christian mass, a christening, a confirmation, and the Bible, a 
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country's constitution and a legal contract... the ballet and an art exhibition, an old-style 
storyteller and a mandatory course in local history" (Steckley and Cummins, 2001: pg. 
167). 
Seeing the significance of the ceremony to the continuation of those First Nation 
cultures that practiced the tradition, the Church and the Crown identified it as a rival to 
their 'goal'. They believed the potlatch was "by far the most formidable of all obstacles 
in the way of Indians becoming Christians, or even civilized" (Steckley and Cummins, 
2001: pg. 172). As such, and because of a prominent impetus from the local 
missionaries, Canada enacted a law in 1884 that banned the ceremony, which reads: 
Every Indian or other person who engages in or assists in celebrating the 
Indian festival known as the "Potlatch" or in the Indian dance known as 
"Tamanawas" [the Spirit Dance of the Salish] is guilty of a misdemeanour, 
and shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than six nor less 
two months in any gaol or other place of confinement, and any Indian or 
other person who encourages, either directly or indirectly, an Indian or 
Indians to get up such a festival or dance, or to celebrate the same, or who 
shall assist in the celebration of same, is guilty of a like offense, and shall 
be liable to the same punishment. (Steckley and Cummins, 2001: pg. 172) 
As Richardson (1994) points out, the government not only banned the Potlatch 
but also other major ceremonies like the Sundance in the Prairies. By 1914, he writes, 
the government went as far as to consider "almost any performance that an aboriginal 
person might like to give or attend" as inappropriate (pg. 105). He also notes that First 
Nations were even banned from wearing traditional clothes or performing at community 
events held by mainstream society, such as stampedes, unless they requested and 
obtained written permission from the local Indian Agent. Often when First Nations 
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people were caught exercising their cultural traditions and practices they were subject to 
prosecution, resulting in incarceration (Richardson, 1994). Making matters worse, some 
individuals even faced imprisonment for a period up to 30 days merely for playing pool 
in local establishments (pg. 106). Ensuring the efficacy of the approach was the fact such 
individuals and/or groups were not permitted to raise money and hire lawyers to assist in 
their defence against the discriminatory practices of the government (Richardson, 1993). 
Such laws were not repealed in Canada until 1951, which was 17 years after America had 
done so (Steckley and Cummins, 2001). 
Key to unhindered settlement of lands by European settlers, as well as their 
unconstrained use of the land and its resources, was the geographic impoundment of First 
Nations through the creation of land reserves, which would also assist in the Crown 
achieving its overarching goal of assimilation. In many cases, First Nations were 
unilaterally told by Indian Agents to settle on specific parcels of land that were selected 
by the government as 'lands set aside' (Frideres, 1988). As Tobias (1977: pg. 89) writes: 
Legislation outlining the goals of the reserve system and establishing the 
procedure for assimilation was passed in the Legislature for Upper Canada in 
1857 in "an Act to encourage the gradual civilization of the Indians in this 
province..." In 1869 essentially the same bill with a slight change in 
emphasis was passed by the Parliament of Canada entitled "an Act for the 
gradual enfranchisement of Indians..." Both laws were based on the 
assumption that the reserve was the place where the Indians could be 
"civilized, meaning Christianized, educated and be made a farmer. 
By design, the reserve system was to be an instrument that would foster the 
deconstruction of the First Nations' way of life. They are comparable in many respects to 
the "apartheid system in South Africa", according to Richardson (1994: pg. 99). He 
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points out that they were intended to restrict the movement of First Nations on their 
territories. In Tobias' view, the reserve also focused on 'atomization' (1977: pg. 94). 
The attempt was to change the cultural tradition of First Nations in terms of their 
communal orientation into societies that valued the individual, an example of which was 
to have them ranching and farming isolation from the Nation (Notzke, 1994). Having 
First Nations people on reserves instead of dispersed on the landscape seemed to free up 
the land in regard to promoting the land use of Europeans, as subsequent to the creation 
of reserves the traditional territories underwent "massive assaults" (Notzke, 1994: pg. 
175). 
The control of First Nations' land use did not stop at the creation of reserves. 
Under the Indian Act, the federal government also dispensed with the custom governance 
structures of First Nations, with "elected officials" being substituted for chiefs and other 
traditional systems (Richardson, 1994: pg. 98). In addition to having their customary 
systems replaced with one that was Eurocentric in origin, the power of First Nations to 
make decisions relating to everyday affairs of their communities was revoked. The 
federal government retained the power to make decisions relating to land use and 
environmental management, in particular on lands set aside for First Nations (i.e. 
reserves). 
Although the late 1880s saw the government attempting to train First Nations to act 
like local governments such as municipalities, the Indian Agents assigned to each First 
Nation had the power to control what the elected officials did in terms of procedures and 
substance (Richardson, 1994). Chief and Councils were not permitted to pass laws 
according to their traditions. They were instead compelled to work within the framework 
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dictated to them by the Indian Agent assigned to the area when developing potentials 
bylaws, which only included matters within the physical boundaries of the reserve. Once 
they drafted a bylaw, it was then sent to the Superintendent-General where it was 
reviewed and potentially approved (Richardson, 1994). 
While more than 100 years has since passed, the approach of the federal 
government with respect to land governance on First Nation reserves has largely 
remained the same. First Nations today are not permitted to make decisions such as 
bylaws without the direct oversight of another government, whereas local governments 
that are non-First Nation (e.g. municipalities) are allowed. As such, the Indian Act in its 
contemporary form is still used to control the lives of First Nations. In particular, section 
60 of the Indian Act reads: 
(1) The Governor in Council may at the request of a band grant to the band 
the right to exercise such control and management over lands in the 
reserve occupied by that band as the Governor in Council considers 
desirable. 
(2) The Governor in Council may at any time withdraw from a band a right 
conferred on the band under subsection (1). 
Further, section 60 of the Indian Act enables a First Nation to apply for grant to 
address matters of interest to a particular group; however, in effect, the provision limits 
the scope of a leadership's authority with respect to environmental matters on reserve. 
They are permitted to make bylaws, but such laws must adhere to all other laws made by 
the Government of Canada. In addition, the scope and substance of any potential bylaws 
must be in accordance to section 81 of the Indian Act, which reads: 
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(1) The council of a band may make by-laws not inconsistent with this Act or 
with any regulation made by the Governor in Council or the Minister, for any 
or all of the following purposes, namely, 
(a) to provide for the health of residents on the reserve and to prevent 
the spreading of contagious and infectious diseases; 
(b) the regulation of traffic; 
(c) the observance of law and order; 
(d) the prevention of disorderly conduct and nuisances; 
(e) the protection against and prevention of trespass by cattle and 
other domestic animals, the establishment of pounds, the appointment 
of pound-keepers, the regulation of their duties and the provision for 
fees and charges for their services; 
(t) the construction and maintenance of watercourses, roads, bridges, 
ditches, fences and other local works; 
(g) the dividing of the reserve or a portion thereof into zones and the 
prohibition of the construction or maintenance of any class of 
buildings or the carrying on of any class of business, trade or calling 
in any zone; 
(Ji) the regulation of the construction, repair and use of buildings, 
whether owned by the band or by individual members of the band; 
(7) the survey and allotment of reserve lands among the members of 
the band and the establishment of a register of Certificates of 
Possession and Certificates of Occupation relating to allotments and 
the setting apart of reserve lands for common use, if authority 
therefore has been granted under section 60; 
(/) the destruction and control of noxious weeds; 
(i) the regulation of bee-keeping and poultry raising; 
(/) the construction and regulation of the use of public wells, cisterns, 
reservoirs and other water supplies; 
(/») the control or prohibition of public games, sports, races, athletic 
contests and other amusements; 
(/?) the regulation of the conduct and activities of hawkers, peddlers or 
others who enter the reserve to buy, sell or otherwise deal in wares or 
merchandise; 
(d) the preservation, protection and management of fur-bearing 
animals, fish and other game on the reserve; 
(p) the removal and punishment of persons trespassing on the reserve 
or frequenting the reserve for prohibited purposes; 
ip.\) the residence of band members and other persons on the reserve; 
(p.2) to provide for the rights of spouses or common-law partners and 
children who reside with members of the band on the reserve with 
respect to any matter in relation to which the council may make by-
laws in respect of members of the band; 
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(p.3) to authorize the Minister to make payments out of capital or 
revenue moneys to persons whose names were deleted from the Band 
List of the band; 
ipA) to bring subsection 10(3) or 64.1(2) into effect in respect of the 
band; 
(q) with respect to any matter arising out of or ancillary to the exercise 
of powers under this section; and 
(/) the imposition on summary conviction of a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty days, 
or both, for violation of a by-law made under this section. 
In comparison, non-aboriginal urban communities in Canada are not regulated by 
the either the federal or provincial governments to the same extent as the federal 
government oversees the lives of First Nations. Such an approach is viewed by some as a 
medium that produces more problems, rather than less (Notzke, 1994). Groves (1991) 
writes: 
In contrast to the American system of recognizing Tribes as distinct and 
dealing with their lands as consequential subjects for jurisdictional contest, 
Canadian legislation has all but ignored Indian political existence in favor of 
regulating with minute precision all aspects of the essentially "federal" 
property that reserves constitute. The Indian Act in this sense is more 
properly styled "an Act for the administration of federal reserve lands", with 
the Indian people connected to those lands being effectively reduced to mere 
adjuncts and agents for the convenient administration of those lands. The 
American experience has been to place tribal recognition first and deal with 
the territorial realities after, while the Canadian trend has been to legislate 
territoriality closely and leave recognition of aboriginal peoples as political 
entities as an afterthought, (pg. 230). 
With significant power afforded to it under section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
with respect to administering the affairs of First Nations, the federal government soon 
realized that it had an opportunity to foster the acculturation of First Nations' people 
through education. This was to be accomplished by opening residential schools that were 
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designed to 'seize of the minds and bodies' of the future generations of First Nations 
(Kelm, 2001: pg. 59). The schools were based on a model that comes from a similar 
institution in the United States of America, which held as it motto: "Kill the Indian in him 
and save the man" (Steckley and Cummins, 2001: pg. 190). They were therefore 
established as 
...vehicles for assimilation, where students were forced to adopt the ways 
of the dominant society. Children were severely punished for speaking 
their own languages or practicing native customs. Contact with their 
families was discouraged. Much of their school time was spent in 
religious indoctrination and in vocational training, with a corresponding 
neglect of academic subjects. School routines were highly regimented, 
with strappings and beatings to enforce discipline. (McMillian, 1995: pg. 
329) 
Since the placement of Aboriginal children in residential schools was not 
compulsory under the law at that time, attendance was low. Parents clearly did not want 
to send their children away. Kelm (2001: pg. 60) notes that by 1919 there were "only 
878" children were in such schools. She further points out that in 1920 the Government 
of Canada, in an attempt to increase enrolment, amended the Indian Act thereby making 
school attendance mandatory for children from First Nations. The amendment 
significantly influenced enrolment levels, as in the span of twelve years the number of 
Aboriginal children in residential schools grew to over 17,000 (Kelm, 2001: pg. 60). 
The number of children in the system fluctuated throughout the year and from 
year to year, mostly due to the adverse effects of the schools themselves. Many died as a 
result of influenzas, smallpox, scarlet fever, and various other infectious diseases (Kelm, 
2001: pg. 66). They also died at the hands of those entrusted to operate the institutions, 
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as physical abuse was common (Steckley and Cummins, 2001). In hearing the reports, 
the Government of Canada appointed Dr. Bryce to investigate the matter (Steckley and 
Cummins, 2001). He found that the living conditions were terrible, resulting in 24% of 
the children dying in prairie schools. Even more, he concluded, in the span of one decade 
approximately 69% of the children being held at File Hills School in Saskatchewan died. 
Many of these schools as a result were shut down in the mid to late 1900s due to 
political pressure. By that time, however, the damage to the integrity of First Nations 
was already significant. Though the extent to which the residential schools adversely 
affected First Nations is likely immeasurable, that is with any degree of accuracy, the 
outcomes are apparent in many communities and families. McMillian (1995: pg. 330) 
relates the social issues that have been observed in many First Nation communities such 
as alcohol abuse, suicide, and family violence as being fully, or perhaps in some cases 
partially attributable to the following experiences of most children that survived their 
residential school experience: alienation from their cultures, loss of identity, barred from 
speaking their traditional languages, loss of parenting skills, and physical and mental 
abuse. 
When a First Nation's person did complete a formal education in which he or she 
obtained a university degree, they lost their status as an Indian. For those that became a 
priest or a minister, in the same way as those that received a university degree and were 
then defined as "enfranchised", a parcel of land was provided to them as a reward 
(Notzke, 1994). What made this ironic in the eyes of then-Chief Joe Mathias of the 
Squamish First Nation, as referenced by Mathias and Yabsley (1991: pg. 39), was that the 
government would reward the First Nation person by giving them a small piece of their 
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own land if they give-up their way of life. 
Implied Bill of Rights 
As mentioned above, and from a non-First Nations' perspective, the authority to 
govern the lands and all of the proceedings in Canada was determined by the Constitution 
Act, 1867. Through this Act, the power to make laws was divided between the federal 
and provincial governments, namely the Parliament of Canada and the provincial 
legislatures. Because of this division, in particular the splitting of a whole into two parts, 
it has been generally understood that if one level of government does not have the power 
then the other must. As such, when a case involving a citizen challenging an abridgment 
of a civil liberty espoused in the Constitution Act, 1867 was brought forward the court 
ought not to focus on whether the infringement in particular was just, but rather on 
whether the level of government was within its jurisdiction (Hogg, 2004). While this 
may seem logical, it is not necessarily legal. 
On more than one occasion, the courts found that neither level of government had 
the explicit right to curtail a specific civil right, an example of which is the Alberta Press 
(1938) case (Hogg, 2004). In that case, an attempt was made by officials to limit the 
speech of newspapers in situations where the paper was openly critical of government 
policy; the court rejected such interference as it was an illegitimate exercising of power. 
Since then, many have interpreted the Alberta Press case and subsequent cases such as 
Switzman v. Elbling (1957) to indicate that there was an "implied bill of rights" within the 
Constitution Act, 1867 because the courts were seen to reject the proposition that the 
government in either form had unfettered power to limit civil liberties (Hogg, 2004: pg. 
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693). 
Although the courts were reluctant to formally acknowledge and thus uphold an 
implied bill of rights, the concept remained an issue. Much of the debate seemed to 
resemble a 'sense of being' apprehension of the part of the Canadian. This was marked 
by an initial unwillingness to overtly recognize that the values and norms unique to the 
United Kingdom were adopted by the Canadian society (Hogg, 2004) by means of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. Hogg (2004: pg. 694) notes that 
[i]n the OPSEU case, his lordship for the majority quoted with evident 
approval the dicta in the Alberta Press case and Switzman v. Elbling case, 
and said that "quite apart from Charter considerations, the legislative 
bodies in this country must conform to these basic structural imperatives 
and can in no way override them". In context, it is clear that by "basic 
structural imperatives" he meant the political freedoms, including freedom 
of expression, that were necessary to preserve "the essential structure of 
free parliamentary institutions". 
Even with the court becoming more open to the idea that the Constitution Act, 
1867 shielded civil liberties to some extent, the theory of an implied bill of rights was not 
engrained in legal precedent - this may not be pertinent today given that many of the civil 
liberties are now entrenched in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In other words, the 
role of the Constitution Act, 1867 in the relationship between the power of Canada's 
governments and the civil liberties of citizens remained unresolved for the time being. 
This is not to say, however, that the debate and the events that surrounded it for more 
than half a century were unproductive in any way. At the very minimum, society 
identified a potential gap in the institutional arrangement that makes up the democratic 
system as practiced in Canada. In this way, according to Hogg (2004), discussions about 
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whether particular injustices ought to be prohibited outright likely fostered the 
momentum for developing and implementing a formal bill of rights. 
Bill of Rights 
During the 1900s many of the world's democratic countries went through a transition 
with respect to civil liberties. Canada was no different. It was not immune to the 
changes in the global political landscape in relation to individual rights, namely those of 
minorities. Influenced by seminal events such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 by the United Nations (Hogg, 2004), the Government of Canada followed 
many of its counterparts by enacting a Bill of Rights (the "Bill") that explicitly recognized 
egalitarianism as a right within the country. 
After it was enacted, many were hopeful that the Bill would attend to the limitations 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 in terms of protecting the interests of minorities (Hogg, 
2004) and, in doing so, it would put to rest the proposition that the Parliament and 
Legislatures have unfettered decision making authority. The Bill included various 
provisions for fundamental freedoms that have since become synonymous with civil 
rights in Canada such as freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association. The 
concept of 'equality' is addressed under Part 1 of the Bill, which reads in part: 
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and 
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national 
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, namely, 
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection 
of the law; 
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the 
Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian 
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Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or 
infringe or authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any 
of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared... 
Other than the existence of some precedent in the common law, the Bill provided 
legal guidance in an area that was once ambiguous from a legislative perspective; 
however, it did not fully address the situation. According to Gibson (1990), one of its 
shortcomings was the narrow design. He points out that Parliament chose to limit the 
scope of its applicability to federal laws, which is made clear in Section 2, and in that 
way excluding the actions of provincial legislatures from being scrutinized. Gibson 
(1990) also notes that with the Bill being a statute of the Parliament of Canada, rather 
than an instrument contained in the Constitution, it lacks the legal force that other tools 
such as the now-enacted Charter of Rights and Freedoms possesses as a result of its 
entrenchment in the highest law of the land. In addition to its narrow scope, another 
shortcoming rested in Section 1 of the Bill (Gibson, 1990). The provision ensured 
equality to some extent, namely an individual was guaranteed to be equal "before the 
law" and to receive equal "protection of the law". As such, the "provision has been the 
basis of the Bill's most dramatic success to date, as well as some of its more noteworthy 
disappointments" (Gibson, 1990: pg. 23). The latter shortcoming is demonstrated 
through the development of equality through a sequence of judicial decisions. 
In less than a decade after its enactment, the strength of the Bill in regard to its 
ability to protect the rights of minorities was tested by the SCC in R. v. Drybones (1969) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Drybones"). The case centred around the Indian Act, more 
specifically, a provision that prohibited those belonging to a First Nation to be intoxicated 
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while off reserve. This rule did not, however, apply to individuals that were not defined 
as an Indian. As such, the SCC struck down the provision as it placed more burdensome 
requirements on First Nations in comparison to the "general liquor ordinance of the 
Northwest Territories" that was applicable to non-aboriginals (Sharpe and Roach, 2005: 
pg. 278). In doing so, the SCC found that Section 1(b) of the Bill nullified a statutory 
provision, which was a first since its enactment (Hogg, 2004). 
Another case involving a person belonging to a First Nation that challenged the 
legality of a federal law with respect to equality is Canada (A.G.) v. Lavell (1973) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Zave//'). In contrast to Drybones, which was regarded as a 
step forward for re-establishing equality for First Nations (Sharpe & Roach, 2005), the 
Lavell decision was a setback. In this instance, the SCC was asked to examine a 
particular provision of the Indian Act which, in effect, disbarred women from claiming 
status as Indians if they were to marry a man from outside of their race. Their children 
were also ineligible for status. For such women, according to Mahoney (1992: pg. 235), 
the consequences were significant as they were, for example: forced to leave the reserve 
and relinquish their current property and forgo future ownership; prohibited from taking 
part in matters relating to business of the Band; deprived of social amenities; barred from 
returning to live on the reserve unless there was a substantial reason such as divorce, 
severe sickness, or they become a widow; and, deprived of the opportunity to be buried 
with their family on reserve. The impugned provision did not, however, apply equally to 
men. Men defined as an Indian were able to retain their status regardless of their 
spouse's racial designation. They were also permitted to confer their status onto their 
respective wife and offspring. 
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While it was clear that the impugned provision treated women differently than men 
and that such treatment was adverse in nature, an important question remained: did the 
differential treatment under the Indian Act amount to discrimination? In its decision, the 
SCC concluded that differential treatment did not amount to discrimination insofar as 
equality was conceptualized under section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights. What separates the 
Lavell decision from that of Drybones is the court's interpretation of "equality before the 
law". More specifically, in Lavell the court stated that the 
...fundamental distinction between the present case and that of Drybones... 
appears to me to be that the impugned section in the latter case could not 
be enforced without denying equality of treatment in the administration 
and enforcement of the law before the ordinary courts of the land to a 
racial group, whereas no such inequality of treatment between Indian men 
and women flows as a necessary result of the application [of this law]. 
The court believed that the consequences of the provision, namely the negative 
effects felt by women, was not considered germane to the analysis of whether a 
government action was discriminatory. As such, because 'equality before the law' only 
prohibited discrimination in the administration of the law, the patrilineal approach that 
underscored the particular provision of the Indian Act was justifiable as it was applied 
equally to both men and women (Hogg, 2004). 
A few years later, the SCC in Canard v, Canada (A.G.) (1976) heard a case 
involving differential treatment under the Indian Act pertaining to the administration of 
the estate of a person that is legally defined as an Indian. Family members were not 
permitted to be the administrator of the estate. That power rested with a representative of 
the federal government. This rule of law only applied to those individuals defined as 
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Indians however, as non-Indians were permitted to appoint a family member or otherwise 
as the executive of their estate. In its decision, the SCC did not conclude that the 
impugned provision of the Indian Act was discriminatory even though it made a 
distinction based on race. In similar fashion as in the Lavell decision, the court did not 
consider the effect of the decision to be a relevant variable in the analysis. 
Furthering the precedent set in Lavell and Canard cases, the SCC in Bliss v. 
Canada (A.G.) (1979) ruled against a women seeking relief against the Unemployment 
Insurance Act. In this case, a woman claimed that she was denied ordinary insurance 
benefits when her work-term was interrupted as a result of being pregnant. While the 
Unemployment Insurance Act did provide women with maternity leave, the benefit was 
restrictive as women had to be employed longer than did males (Hogg, 2004). The court 
did not consider the differential treatment to be discriminatory in nature. Rather, the 
court believed that the class of the alleged discrimination was based on pregnancy, not 
sex (Hogg, 2004). Within the context of the Bill of Rights, differential treatment based on 
pregnancy did not amount to discrimination as the legislation conferred a benefit rather 
than a right, which means the legislation could not be challenged (Sharpe and Roach, 
2005). When the decision was released, it was criticized as 'pregnancy' is a physical 
condition that only applies to women, implicitly making it an issue relating to 'sex' 
(Hogg, 2004). 
In Lavell (1973), Canard (1976), and Bliss (1970), the SCC largely focused on the 
concepts of 'equal before the law' and 'equal protection of the law', which was in 
accordance to the equality framework found in the Bill of Rights. This produced, 
according to Mahoney (1992), judicial precedent that was grounded in 'formal equality'. 
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He notes that the court took a limited view of the framework when determining whether 
discrimination occurred. Only procedural aspects of a case were relevant in an equality 
analysis. Matters substantive in nature were excluded. In this sense, and under the 
umbrella of the Bill of Rights, the court considered that a "judicial review on equality 
grounds did not extend to the substance of the law but only to the way in which it was 
administered" (Hogg, 2004: pg. 1087). 
As Ryder et al (2004) writes, "the focus of formal equality is on the individual's 
situation, and on the relevance of the personal characteristic at issue to the objectives of 
the challenged law or policy". Using this approach is problematic, which the SCC 
pointed out in Andrews v. The Law Society of B.C. (1989). In that case, the court held 
that dismissing the substantive effect of a government action may result in a law or policy 
being justifiable if it meets its objectives, even though it discriminates against a particular 
minority group or individual while doing so. 
Moreover, Sharpe and Roach (2005) and Hogg (2004) write that 'formal equality' 
is comparable to the 'similarly situated test', which is analogous to the equal protection 
clause of the American Constitution, namely the Fourteenth Amendment. Aristotle is 
largely credited for the basis to this understanding of equality. In The Politics of Aristotle 
(Book III, xii, 1282b), as translated by E. Baker and referenced by Hogg (2004), Aristotle 
believed that 
"...justice considers that persons who are equal should have assigned to them 
equal things, [and] there is no inequality when unequal's are treated in 
proportion to the inequality existing between them" (pg. 1087). 
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For years, Aristotle's perspective of equality that underscored the 'similarly 
situated test' was used in Canada. With many criticising its use and the detrimental 
affects it has on minorities, the SCC ruled in Andrews v. Law Society of B.C. (1989) that 
this approach was to a large extent inappropriate. The reason for its abandonment and the 
subsequent change in direction are twofold. The first relates to the difficulty of applying 
Aristotle's characterization of equality. Essentially it does not lend itself to being applied 
without a particular degree of difficulty, mostly due to its oversimplification. In addition, 
his concept of equality does not, according to Hogg (2004), answer questions such as 
'what variations in human attributes warrants different treatment' and to what extent 
should a variation persist in order to be afforded consideration? Second, the SCC in 
Andrews (1989) believed that if his concept was applied in a strict sense the test could be 
used as a means to justify a law or policy that discriminated against minority groups, as it 
merely protected such individuals from "worse treatment than others who were similarly 
situated" (Hogg, 2004: pg. 1088). 
As such, the test would likely be unsuccessful in terms of upholding the purposes 
of section 15. This includes, among other things, upholding the principle of ameliorating 
inequalities in Canadian society. This is not to say that the test is absolutely 
unacceptable, however; it is merely inept. Accordingly, Hogg writes, the concept of 
equality "cannot be applied without first working out the criteria of likeness and like 
treatment, and the idea of equality cannot by itself supply those criteria" (Hogg, 204: pg. 
1088). 
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3.2.2 Post-Charter Era 
As previously noted, the historical placement of First Nations within the Canadian social 
structure has been subordinate in nature. Much of the abhorrent treatment was likely 
directly or indirectly attributable to the enactment of the Indian Act and the outcome(s) of 
it being implemented such as the prohibition and restriction of their cultural practices, in 
particular those pertaining to and based on the use of land and natural resources. With 
the laws and other governmental actions being at the centre of the majority of problems, 
First Nations had little to no recourse during the pre-Charter time period. This was 
largely due to the Constitution Act, 1867, which was not intended to address issues 
surrounding equality between minorities groups such as First Nations and the European 
settlers. In addition, the enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1960 was for the most part 
ineffectual as it was limited in scope and was unable to examine a particular set of 
circumstances from a substantive equality perspective, which in some cases resulted in 
the discriminatory behaviour towards First Nations being permitted or even codified. 
Throughout the 1970s, according to Hogg (2004), the significant shortfalls in the 
protection of those that were most vulnerable within the Canadian society began to 
surface. He notes that the government at the time believed that such matters were best 
addressed by means of amending Canada's Constitution. This led to a series of 
deliberations relating to Canada's polity and what it constituted, which brought to light 
"profound questions about the basic nature of the country, its values, and its ability and 
willingness to acknowledge equality for...disadvantaged groups" (Mahoney, 1992: pg. 
229). After lengthy discussions, the majority of the Canadian provinces (9 of 10) agreed 
to the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, Part I of which was the Charter of Rights 
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and Freedoms (Hogg, 2004). In addition, First Nations and First Nation organizations 
pushed the governments to address long standing injustices and include their interests in 
the Constitution as well. As a result, Section 35 was added to Constitution Act, 1982, 
which recognizes and affirms the existing inherent rights of Aboriginal peoples within the 
borders of Canada (Hogg, 2004). 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: the Equality Provision 
Canada's pre-Charter history played an integral role in framing the discussions that lead 
up to the development and enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 
"Charter"). In "Readings in the Philosophy of Constitutional Law", Bronaugh et al. 
(1990) writes that a provision in the Charter that explicitly dealt with 'equality' was 
needed in recognition of the country's distinct make-up because, 
"[w]ith the steady increase in population from the earliest days of 
European emigration into Canada and with the consequential growth of 
industry, agriculture and the vast increase in national wealth which 
followed, many social problems developed. The contact of the European 
immigrant with indigenous populations, the steady increase in 
immigration bringing those of neither French nor British background, and 
in more recent years the greatly expanded role of women in all forms of 
industrial, commercial and professional activity led to much inequality and 
many forms of discrimination (pg. 243). 
These interactions, and the conflicts they produced, ended up giving rise to a 
number of civil liberties that have come to represent a wide range of social values, many 
of which have been embedded in federal statues and provincial legislation as well as 
being fixed in the common law (i.e. case law). When the country decided to repatriate its 
104 
Constitution on April 17, 1982, substantial amendments included, among other things, a 
number of these liberties being entrenched in the supreme law of the land (Milne, 1991). 
Most notable are the egalitarian rights derived from section 15 of the Charter, which 
provides as follows: 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, 
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as 
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. 
While jurisprudence in the area of equality is in the early stages of conceptual 
development, it is nonetheless considered by the Right Honourable Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachlin to be "the Leviathan of Rights" within Canadian society (McLachlin, 2001: 
pg. 20). It must be taken into account whenever the Crown, in both its federal and 
provincial forms, is passing law, developing a policy or regulation, and using its statutory 
discretion within decision making processes that affect the everyday lives of Canadians 
(Gibson, 1990). And unlike other provisions of Canada's Constitution, the Charter limits 
governmental powers and actions in relation to minorities and their rights to equality 
(Hogg, 2004). In recognition of this limitation and the potential implications, the force of 
the provision coming into effect was delayed by three years in order to provide the 
various governments and other entities with a period of relief to evaluate the conventional 
modus operandi for inconsistencies with the provision and, where required, make the 
necessary adjustments (Hogg, 2004). 
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Ever since it was included in the Charter, a considerable amount of effort has 
gone into trying to articulate what the purpose of the equality provision is and, just as 
importantly, what it is not. Since 1985, however, a concise articulation of its meaning 
and its purpose has never been put forward by either Parliament or the courts, other than 
general associations within the broader philosophical principles of egalitarianism 
(Andrews, 1998; Law, 1999). The courts have nevertheless begun to collate what they 
believe to be the purpose of section 15 while in many respects prudently avoiding a 
delineation that results in a strict interpretation. In Law (1999), for example, the SCC 
provides several points on the purpose of section 15. These are summarized below: 
• It is "...both the protection against the evil of discrimination by the state whatever 
form it takes... and the promotion of human dignity" (para.47); 
• It is so that the Canadian society can "...take a further step in the recognition of 
the fundamental importance and the innate dignity of the individual, and in the 
recognition of the intrinsic worthiness and importance of every individual 
regardless of the...characteristics of the person" (para. 50); 
• It is "to prevent the violation of human dignity and freedom by imposing 
limitations, disadvantages or burdens through the stereotypical application of 
presumed group characteristics rather than on the basis of merit, capacity, or 
circumstance" (para. 48). 
• In all, it is "to remedy or prevent discrimination against groups subject to 
stereotyping, historical disadvantage and political and social prejudice (para. 47) 
...through ameliorating the position of those disadvantaged within the Canadian 
society (para. 51). 
With the above in mind, and namely in recognition of the magnitude of the 
fundamental purpose of the equality provision for Canadian society as a whole, the SCC 
in Law (1999) stated "[n]o single word or phrase can fully describe the content and 
purpose of s. 15(1)" (para. 52). To do so, it is presumed, would most likely abandon the 
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underlying intent of achieving equality in an ever changing and multifaceted society. As 
suggested in the Andrews (1989) case and echoed in Law (1999) as well as subsequent 
cases, a flexible 
... [approach] is preferable because it permits evolution and adaptation of 
equality analysis over time in order to accommodate new or different 
understandings of equality as well as new issues raised by varying fact 
situations" {Law, 1999: para. 15). 
Based on the manner that the court has taken in relation to the manner it works with 
the concept of equality since the Charter became legally enforceable, the narrow 
understanding of equality that guided its application during the pre-Charter, specifically 
'formal equality', was abandoned. Through section 15, the courts have begun to view the 
equality provision in terms of the substantive effect of law, regulation, policy, and 
discretionary decision-making on those in which the equality provision protects. As 
Nelson and Fleras (1995) outline: 
"With its emphasis on equal outcomes or conditions rather than 
opportunities, this position takes into account the unique circumstances of 
a person or group as a basis for entitlement. People cannot be treated alike 
because some groups have special needs or unique experiences. They 
need to be treated differently by making substantive adjustments to the 
social and cultural components of society" (pg. 195). 
Soon after the Charter came into force the first major case made its way through 
the judiciary system. By 1989, the significant departure from the approach used under 
the Bill of Rights became apparent when the SCC rendered its decision in Andrews v. Law 
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Society (British Columbia). In this case, according to Sharpe and Roach (2005), the court 
was unified in its agreement with respect to rejecting the use of 'formal equality' and the 
'similarly situated test' as the sole means in which to determine whether discrimination 
has occurred. They also noted that the court clarified that not all differential treatment 
caused by law would necessarily amount to discrimination. Instead, they write, for a 
legal challenge to be successful it must demonstrate (1) that the impugned law has 
through differential treatment denied an individual or group of one or more of the four 
elements of equality, and (2) that such treatment is based on one or more of the protected 
grounds. Further, such differential treatment is to be considered discriminatory if it 
amounts to 
...a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to 
personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of 
imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group 
not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. 
Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual 
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of 
discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities 
will rarely be so classed. {Andrews, 1989: para. 175) 
In contrast to the court's unified stand in Andrews (1989), which as noted above 
provided a clear direction forward with respect to addressing discrimination, the SCC in 
1995 delivered three cases (the "Trilogy") around the same time which made public the 
court's division regarding to the approach to be applied when determine whether 
discrimination occurred; these are: Egan v. Canada (1995), Miron v. Trudel (1995), and 
Thibaudeau v. Canada (1995). The main difference of opinion among the judiciary 
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centred around whether the equality analysis should be grounded in a 'internal-relevance' 
approach or the approach outlined in the Andrews (1989) case. 
The SCC used the internal-relevance approach in both the Miron (1995) and Egan 
(1995) cases. Both decisions of the court, according to Sharpe and Roach (2005), 
believed that discrimination does not occur when a government decision is based on the 
"functional values underlying the legislation" (Miron, 1995: para. 436). It remains 
acceptable even if a distinction is drawn between two individuals that are protected by 
section 15(1) (Sharpe and Roach, 2005). Thus an internal-relevance analysis is 
appropriately applied when it focuses on whether the distinction made by the action is 
based on "some objective physical or biological reality, or fundamental value (Miron, 
1995: para. 446) of the legislation; in this context, legislative objectives were not 
considered to be discriminatory given their entrenchment in a statute (Sharpe and Roach, 
1995). 
For example, in Egan (1995) the court stated that special support ought to be given 
to values fundamental to the legislation which, in this case, was the protection of the 
definition of marriage; marriage by its very nature was heterosexual and important to 
society (Sharpe and Roach, 2005). As such, the majority of the court believed, it was 
necessary to provide that support in the form of shielding it against incommensurable 
values: 
Neither in its purpose or effect does the legislation constitute an infringement 
of the fundamental values sought to be protected by the Charter. None of the 
couples excluded from the benefits under the Act are capable of meeting the 
fundamental social objectives thereby sought to be promoted by Parliament. 
These couple undoubtedly provide mutual support for one another, and that, 
no doubt, is of some benefit to society. They may, it is true, occasionally 
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adopt or bring up children, but this is exceptional and in no way affects the 
general picture, I fail to see how homosexuals differ from other excluded 
couples in terms of the fundamental social reasons for which Parliament has 
sought to favour heterosexuals who live as married couples... (Miron, 1995: 
para, 463 as referenced in Sharpe and Roach, 2005: pg. 287). 
This approach was rejected by the other judges in Miron (1995) and Egan (1995). 
Writing for the four dissenting justices in Miron (1995), McLachlin J. stated the 
following: 
"If the basis of the distinction on an enumerated or analogous ground is 
clearly irrelevant to the functional values of the legislation, then the 
distinction will be discriminatory. However, it does not follow from a finding 
that a group characteristics is relevant to the legislative, that the legislator has 
employed that characteristic in a manner which does not perpetuate 
limitations, burdens and disadvantages in violation of s. 15(1). This can be 
ascertained only by examining the effect of the distinction in the social and 
economic context of the legislation and the lives of the individuals it touches 
(Miron, 1995: para, 742 as referenced in Sharpe and Roach, 2005: pg. 287-
288)". 
Further, writing for the dissenting Justices in Egan (1995), Cory J. stated that: 
"[f]he definition of "spouse" as someone of the opposite sex reinforces the 
stereotype that homosexuals cannot and do not form lasting, caring, mutually 
supportive relationships with economic interdependence in the same manner 
as heterosexual couples. The appellants' relationship vividly demonstrates 
the error of that approach. The discriminatory impact can hardly be deemed 
trivial when the legislation reinforces prejudicial attitudes based on such 
faulty stereotypes. The effect of the impugned provision is clearly contrary to 
s. 15's aim of protecting human dignity... (Egan, 1995: para, 604 as 
referenced in Sharpe and Roach, 2005: pg. 288)". 
Subsequent to the Trilogy, the SCC released its decision in Law (1999) and in 
doing so settled much of the ambiguity with respect to the approach to use when 
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determining whether a particular action amounts to discrimination. As Sharpe and Roach 
(2005) point out, this includes the following: 
1. "Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant 
and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to 
take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position within 
Canadian Society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the 
claimants and others? 
2. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more 
enumerated and analogous grounds? and, 
3. Does the differential treatment discriminate by imposing a burden upon, or 
withholding a benefit from, the claimant in a manner that reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or 
that otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the 
individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being 
or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, 
and consideration?" (pg. 291). 
Although the SCC in the Law case did not side with the appellant, in the decision 
the court held that an equality challenge under section 15 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
includes a requirement of proving discrimination based on a protected ground and 
substantive discrimination that breached an individual's or group's right to human dignity 
(Sharpe and Roach, 2005). Since its release, the above set of questions is considered as 
the foundation when assessing whether discrimination has occurred. 
Scope of the Provision 
The coverage of the equality provision of section 15(1) is an overarching one. In similar 
fashion as other Charter rights, its application is pursuant to section 32 of the Constitution 
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Act, 1982 in that the Charter applies to Parliament and the legislatures, including 
everything that falls within their authorities. Hogg (2004: pg. 1085) points out that the 
responsibility of ensuring all actions uphold the equality provision also falls onto those 
implementing the law and corresponding regulations and policies, as they draw their 
power from the authority of government. Actions that are therefore attributable to 
statutory decision-makers and other bureaucrats, including discretionary power conveyed 
onto them by a particular statue or legislation, are subject to obligations of section 32 of 
the Constitution. 
Local governments such as municipalities, although not explicitly mentioned in 
Canada's Constitution, are likely included irrespective of the fact that they may be on the 
periphery of constitutional authority. Their exclusion from being a constitutionally-
mentioned level of government does not, as Hogg (2004) points out, remove or lessen the 
efficacy of the equality provision. Section 32 follows the authority of law (Hogg, 2004) 
no matter how many layers of delegation exist. As such, since the legal authority of local 
governments to govern a specific populace within a defined spatial unit is derived from 
provincial legislation, such as the Local Government Act in British Columbia, actions on 
the part of municipalities and regional governments in the province are subject to the 
limitations of the Charter as well. 
While the elimination of inequality may be fundamental to egalitarianism, the 
same cannot be said of the manner in which all levels of government are required by law 
to use the equality provision. A case in point is the proactive removal of inequality 
through the implementation of legislation or other legal mechanisms, which was central 
to R. v. S.(S.) (1990), a case that involved the Young Offenders Act of Ontario. In that 
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case, the court heard arguments that challenged the manner in which governments opted 
to use their discretionary power to enact legislation and other mechanisms. The claimant 
purported that the Provincial Government of Ontario breached section 15 as it failed to 
enact similar legislation as other provinces, which were designed to alleviate existing 
social inequalities that are a fact of life for some youth (Hogg, 2004). Building upon its 
decision in Andrews (1989) where it held that the equality provision is to apply to a law 
in operation, the SCC held that governments are under no obligations to take advantage 
of its discretionary power and implement a law because an inequality is present. Here the 
court drew a distinction with respect to discretionary power. 
This distinction was further explained in Rogers v. Faught (2002). In that case, 
the court found that section 15(1) unquestionably applies to the actions of governments. 
What was made clear was that the equality provision does not apply to the inaction of 
government. In others words, the government is under no legal obligation per se to enact 
a law, policy, or regulation to ameliorate discriminatory circumstances. So caution must 
therefore be taken when discerning whether a discriminatory effect is the result of a 
government action or a pre-existing condition (Symes v. Canada, 1993). 
Not only does the equality provision not apply to the inaction of government, but 
it also does not apply to private action; the obligation set out in section 32 of the 
Constitution is exclusively a government responsibility (Hogg, 2004). An action private 
in nature, namely between or among entities that are non-government such as those 
decisions relating to employment, are omitted because the power to make them does not 
flow directly from the authority of the law. For instance, people are provided the 
freedom to work for whomever they wish, and in the same way companies are free to hire 
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whomever they believe to be the most capable of accomplishing the task(s) required. 
Where this becomes problematical is when a private entity, such as an employer, 
engages in behaviour that is discriminatory in nature. Hogg (2004) notes that though the 
door may be opened for a moment in terms of the potential for discrimination to occur in 
the workplace, in many cases it is presumably closed by the Human Rights legislation 
that each provincial government has enacted. In many respects, such legislation is akin to 
the protection afforded to an individual under the equality provision (Hogg, 2004). 
Further solidifying the role of human rights in the protection of people from 
discrimination is the fact that, as legislation enacted by a provincial government, it falls 
under the purview of section 32 of Canada's Constitution (Blainey v. Ontario Hockey 
Association, 1986). 
When considering the fact that section 15(1) reads "every individual", the right to 
equality appears to be conferred onto a person rather than other entities such as an 
employer. Supporting this position is the enumerated grounds listed in section 15(1), 
namely: "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical 
disability". Taken as a whole, this list is outwardly comprised of distinctly human 
attributes more so than any other entity such as a company or government. In addition, 
Gibson (1990: pgs. 53-55) has noted that the word "everyone" was purposely replaced in 
an early draft of the Charter by the word "individual" by a parliamentary committee so 
that the right would only apply to the "natural person". To be considered a 'natural 
person', an individual must also be living and not deceased (Stinson Estate v. British 
Columbia, 1999), which means entities that are similar to estates, such as corporations or 
private enterprises, are not covered. Further, according to the SCC, the Crown is not to 
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benefit from this section either (Hogg, 2004: pg. 755). In this way, individuals and 
groups belonging to one or more of the enumerated grounds have the right to equality, 
but companies and the like do not. 
Enumerated and Analogous Grounds 
Under the precept of section 15(1), an action by any level of government in Canada is to 
be non-discriminatory in the sense that it does not worsen or espouse a disadvantaged 
position. As previously noted, this does not necessarily apply to all Canadians and to 
specific Canadians in every situation. Thus the separation of Canadians and certain 
situations with the hope of making everyone equal to one another is important. A chief 
difficulty in this process is determining whether a person is to be considered, either 
individually or as a group, in a distinct position that likely places them at a disadvantage 
within the Canadian society. In Andrews (1989) and subsequent cases (e.g. Law, 1999; 
Hodge, 2004), the SCC has held that there are two main grounds that need to be 
considered when making a determination of whether an individual is covered by section 
15: enumerated and analogous grounds. 
Enumerated grounds are listed in section 15(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
These are: "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability". Sharpe and Roach (2005) note that from a historic perspective the list 
incorporates many areas in which society has considered, through their politics and/or 
legal decisions, to be at risk from discrimination, either directly or indirectly. This is 
likely the reason they are found in many of the human rights codes throughout the 
country, and are now entrenched in and therefore protected by the Constitution of 
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Canada. As such, these personal characteristics are not to be the basis for discriminatory 
treatment on the part of government (Hogg, 2004). 
The enumerated list is not, however, considered to be exhaustive in terms of 
containing those personal characteristics that are protected under section 15(1) from 
discriminatory treatment. They merely "reflect the most common and probably the most 
socially destructive and historically practised bases of discrimination" in Canada and, 
most likely, around the world (Andrews, 1989: para. 175). And since section 15(1) reads 
"in particular", the extent of prohibited grounds has been regarded by the courts as an 
element to be broadened when appropriate (Sharpe and Roach, 2005). Although, unlike 
enumerated grounds, determining whether a particular circumstance is an analogous 
ground and in that way deserving of consideration under a section 15 analysis is less 
straightforward. 
In the years that followed the implementation of the equality provision, several 
court cases found that discrimination was occurring against individuals and/or groups that 
were not explicitly listed in section 15(1) (Hogg, 2004). The SCC took notice that a 
ground may be analogous based on the susceptibility of the individual's characteristics. 
Personal traits that were predisposed to this included those having little to no political 
power, who are likely to be disregarded as their interests diverged from the mainstream in 
a way that "equal concern and respect" to their rights are "violated", in addition to the 
likelihood of "becoming a disadvantaged group on the basis of the trait" (Law, 1999: 
para. 29). 
Furthering this description, Justice McLachlin writing for the majority in 
Corbiere v. Canada (1999), held that an analogous ground contains "...a personal 
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characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal 
identity". An example that emerged early on in the jurisprudence was 'citizenship'. The 
SCC court in Andrews (1989) and later on in Lavoie v. Canada (2002) found that, while 
'citizenship' was not an enumerated ground in the explicit sense, it did meet the intent of 
section 15(1) and therefore requires protection as an analogous ground. The court based 
its decision on the fact that the: 
"...characteristic of citizenship is one typically not within the control of the 
individual and, in this sense, is immutable. Citizenship is, at least, 
temporarily, a characteristic of personhood not alterable by conscious 
action and in some cases not alterable except on the basis of unacceptable 
costs". {Andrews, 1989: para. 195) 
Since Andrews (1989), much has then been made of whether a personal 
characteristic is "immutable" to an individual. Hogg (2004: pg. 1104) suggests "looking 
at immutability" as an "inherent" characteristic, instead of it being something "acquired" 
in some fashion or another through the diversity of life's choices. Thus the question as to 
whether a characteristic is immutable, or conversely socially fluid, is dependent upon 
condition of the "inheritance". If it were not, then at any given time all Canadians could 
in theory belong to a group that is analogous. Such a broad sweeping categorization does 
not meet the intent nor follow the purpose of the inclusion of section 15 in the 
Constitution Act, 1982. As such, this is best understood by determining whether the 
characteristic was inherited in a "voluntary" or "involuntary" way (Hogg, 2004: pg. 
1104). In that way, it is possible to distinguish between those that are deserving of 
protection in accordance with the equality provision, and those that are not. 
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This is not to say, however, that a personal characteristic acquired by an 
individual is necessarily unprotected. A decision that "...adversely impacts on a discrete 
and insular minority or group that has been historically discriminated against, may be 
seen to flow from the central concept of immutable or constructively immutable personal 
characteristics, which too often have served as illegitimate and demeaning proxies for 
merit-based decision making" (Corbierev. Canada, 1999: para. 13). 
With democracy, at least in its Canadian form, comes the right of individuals in 
the country to assemble based on their collective interests. An upshot of this is the 
variability of a group's composition, although the mere assembly of individuals under the 
pretext of a collective interest, whether political or otherwise, does not necessarily equate 
to being an analogous group. To deal with this ambiguity, the SCC rendered a decision 
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward in which it outlined three ways a protected "social 
group" is to be broadly categorized. These groups consist of people that: 
1. retain "unchangeable characteristics" that are innate, including individuals of the 
same sex and/or orientation, or ethnicity; 
2. willingly assemble because of a trait integral to their human dignity, including 
social activists; and, 
3. formerly assembled in such a manner that it satisfied the requirement of the 
second category, whereby their previous participation is recognized as a binding 
part of them due to its significance. 
However, the courts in general have been selective in their delineation of analogous 
grounds given the far-reaching implications such a consideration could produce. They 
have also differentiated between an analogous ground with respect to an individual or to a 
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group, which was central to the Corbiere v. Canada (1999) decision. In that case, an 
individual that belonged to a First Nation challenged an action of the Government of 
Canada, as represented by the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, which 
denied members residing off-reserve the right to vote in the Nations' political elections. 
In its decision, the SCC found that the "Aboriginality residence" of off-reserve members 
was an analogous ground; however, the place of residence was not an analogous ground 
for non-aboriginals. In this sense, the courts have held that a distinction regarding the 
residence of a member of First Nations amounts to discrimination whereas a similar 
distinction made regarding non-aboriginals does not amount to discrimination. 
Sharpe and Roach (2005) point out the court's distinction is not a case of reverse 
discrimination, but rather is a direction that implements the substantive elements of the 
purpose of section 15(1) because it makes steps towards ameliorating existing problems. 
They point to the contextual factors used by the SCC when determining whether the 
location of an individual's home or likewise the location of a collection of individuals 
that comprise a group. The court emphasized that usual place of residency contemplated 
by non-First Nations in Canada must not be considered equal to the choice of 'should I 
live on or off reserve' that a member of a First Nation goes through - assuming that a 
choice even exists for such a person (Sharpe and Roach, 2005). 
"The reality of their situation is unique and complex" (Sharpe and Roach, 2005: 
pg. 295). As such, and in comparison to all of the individuals and groups that comprise 
the Canadian community, First Nations and their membership are likely the most 
vulnerable part of the populace to experience discrimination given their sui generis 
(unique unto their own) nature as indigenous peoples and their experiences with, for 
119 
example, colonization. Their Nations consist of individuals that at any one time may 
bring a claim forward based on one or more, and perhaps in rare cases, all of the 
enumerated grounds. This distinct position within Canada also provides a First Nation as 
a whole, or subdivision of the community, the ability to bring a claim forward based on 
an analogous ground. 
Over the years various court decisions have provided a general outline by which 
particular grounds are protected from questionable decision-making or latent 
discrimination, although the extent to which the equality provision provides cover is 
largely determined on a case-by-case basis. Once identified by a judicial decision, the 
various categories within the two grounds for considering an individual or group as 
distinct are to be used as a marker in such a pursuit (Corbiere v. Canada, 1999: para. 7-
11). While the court in Andrews (1989) held that discrimination must be based on at least 
one enumerated or analogous grounds, the SCC in Law (1999: para. 37) added that an 
individual or group may "articulate a claim on the basis of more than one ground" in 
order to demonstrate the "differential treatment". In that sense, indentifying the 
marker(s) of an individual or group is an important element of a section 15 analysis. As 
Hogg (2004) points out, markers indicate whether a particular government action is at 
risk of leading to discrimination and thus the potential denial of substantive equality. 
Determination of the Nature and the Situation 
In a constitutional context, establishing whether an action is discriminatory consists of 
reviewing the setting of the individual or group that have been impacted by the impugned 
government action. This involves a case-by-case analysis of the nature and situation of 
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the individual or group. The following section reviews the necessary elements in 
determining the nature of those affected and their situation, namely determining the 
comparator group, perspective of the claimant, the contextual factors, and the nature of 
the burden {Law, 1999). 
The Necessity of Comparison 
Equality is by its very nature a comparative concept. This means that to ascertain 
whether an inequality is present within society it is necessary to compare one individual 
to another, or group to another. Further, as Bronaugh et al (1990) write, "the conditions 
of which may only be attained or discerned by comparison with the conditions of others 
in the social and political setting in which the questions arises" (pg. 241). As such, it is 
necessary for the individual or group asserting an inequality to choose what or whom 
they ought to use as a reference point in order to demonstrate the burden imposed by a 
given action. In this sense, according to the Canadian courts, a claimant is required to 
select a 'comparator group': 
The appropriate comparator group is the one which mirrors the 
characteristics of the claimant (or claimant group) relevant to the benefit 
or advantage sought except that the statutory definition includes a personal 
characteristic that is offensive to the Charter or omits a personal 
characteristic in a way that is offensive to the Charter {Hodge v. Canada, 
2004: para. 23). 
Sharpe and Roach (2005: pg. 296) further point out that a 'comparator group' is a 
party that is receiving the benefit (accorded to it by the impugned law) that the claimant 
is not. They note that such a group bears a similar resemblance to the pertinent traits of 
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the claimant, other than those traits that are the basis for the differential treatment. More 
to the point, a 'comparator group' is one which receives the benefit because of its traits 
whereas the 'claimant group' receives the burdens, all of which relates to the differential 
treatment under the impugned law. 
Individual or Group Perception 
The views of individuals and groups in Canadian society have been recognized as an 
important element of determining whether an action is discriminatory. While such views 
are taken into account, it is important to understand that any and all views are not 
necessarily held to be valid in every situation. For instance, in Law (1999) as referenced 
by Sharpe and Roach (2005), the SCC held that "the appropriate perspective is 
subjective-objective". 
"...subjective in so far as the right to equal treatment is an individual right, 
asserted by a specific claimant with particular traits and circumstances; and 
objective in so far as it is possible to determine whether the individual 
claimant's equality rights have been infringed only by considering the larger 
context of the legislation in question, and society's past and present treatment 
of the claimant and of other persons or groups with similar characteristics or 
circumstances (Law, 1999: para. 59)". 
Included within the equality analysis, according to Sharpe and Roach (2005), is the 
consideration of "the various contextual factors which determine whether an impugned 
law infringes human dignity" (pg. 298). Over the years, the court has placed a significant 
emphasis on the role that 'human dignity' plays in the analysis of whether an action is 
discriminatory. As pointed out in Law (1999), such a term 
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...means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is 
concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. 
Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal 
traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, 
or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, 
capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the 
context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when 
individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued and is 
enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups 
within Canadian society, (para: 53). 
Unlike the approach that is used to establish whether an individual or groups 
belongs to an enumerated or analogous ground, which is based on their place within the 
broader Canadian society, the court in Law (1999) took the approach that whether the 
treatment from a government action amounts to indignity is determined at the individual 
or group level: 
Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does not 
relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather 
concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted 
with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into 
account all of the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and 
excluded by the law? (para: 53). 
Further, the "perspective" of the individual or group that believes an action of the 
government to be discriminatory is important in conceptualizing impacts to human 
dignity (Law, 1999: para. 59). In most cases, establishing whether the perception of an 
action is appropriate or not, case law has continuously relied upon the 'reasonable person 
test': a standard that is based on the average person, one which has "...particular 
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characteristics that are not peculiar or idiosyncratic..." and represent the ordinary 
practices "in the community" (Dukelow, 2002: pg. 345). The SCC has, however, 
expressed caution in applying general legal practices to matters relating to equality, as the 
'perspective' of minorities is not to be held to the same standards used in the 'reasonable 
person' test (Law, 1999). If such an approach were to be used it "could, through 
misapplication, serve as a vehicle for the imposition of community prejudices" (Law, 
1999: para. 61). Thus the use of the 'reasonable person test' could either render the 
protection guaranteed by section 15(1) ineffectual, or perhaps place the rights of 
minorities at the pleasure of the majority, neither of which fulfills the underlying purpose 
of the provision's entrenchment in the Charter. 
Contextual Factors 
Whether the human dignity of an individual or group has been violated by an action of 
the government is dependent upon a review of the contextual factors, all of which are 
based on the particulars of the person and the circumstances surrounding the action. In 
Law (1999), the court noted that 'contextual factors' ought to remain as an "open" 
concept in order to avoid a restrictive approach so that an individual or group is not 
unduly constrained from establishing the impacts to their human dignity. Based on the 
case law to date, Sharpe & Roach (2005: pg. 292) point out that there are four criteria that 
comprise such an assessment at this time. 
The first is whether a pre-existing disadvantage is present. In Law (1999), the 
court stated that a challenge to a government action is most likely to be successful in 
cases where an individual or group has encountered to some degree a "disadvantage, 
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vulnerability, stereotyping, or prejudice" (para. 63) prior to the impugned action. Since 
those in such a situation are typically not granted equality in terms of respect and 
consideration due to their trait(s) and/or condition(s), and in some cases a mixture of 
both, a government decision may not treat them justly. For this reason, according to the 
court in Law (1999: para. 63), it is reasonable to deduce that additional differential 
treatment will not eliminate inequality but rather will propagate thoughts and behaviours 
that facilitate the unfair treatment of minorities, in that way the negative effects will be 
more intense. 
Furthering its point, the courts in Canada have expanded on the role of pre-
existing disadvantages in society and emphasized its significance in determining whether 
an action violates section 15(1) of the Constitution. An example of this is when a 
stereotype is present but not taken into consideration by the government. In such a case, 
the decision likely "reflects and reinforces existing inaccurate understandings of the 
merits, capabilities, and worth of a particular person or group within Canadian society, 
resulting in further stigmatization of the person or the members of the group or otherwise 
in their unfair treatment" (Law, 1999: para. 64). For the action to avoid causing an effect 
that infringes upon the right of minorities to equality, it must therefore not carry on or 
support a perception that someone "is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value 
as a human being or as a member of Canadian society" (Law, 1999: para. 64). This is to 
occur "whether or not it involves a demonstration that the provision or other state action 
corroborates or exacerbates prejudicial stereotype" (Law, 1999: para. 64), which 
essentially implies that a cumulative approach is likely necessary or perhaps warranted. 
While determining the presence of a pre-existing disadvantage is integral to 
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establishing an infringement, it is not a compulsory requirement (Law, 1999: para. 65). 
Similarly, a member of a group is not required to base a challenge on their membership in 
a historical disadvantaged group, as an individual may bring forward a case based on 
personal traits. 
The second contextual factor is the link between the enumerated or analogous 
ground(s) and the characteristics and/or circumstances of the individual or group, which 
is fundamental to understanding the differential treatment. Grounds that have previously 
demonstrated this connection are disability, sex, and age (case law includes Eaton (1997), 
Eldridge (1997), Weatherall (1993), Brooks (1989)). They require differential treatment 
in a particular circumstance as a result of their personal characteristics. 
As previously mentioned, laws passed by the Parliament of Canada and provincial 
legislatures must take into account the characteristics unique to each minority at the 
individual and group level. A notable difficulty in accomplishing this task is Canada's 
multicultural composition. The requirement necessitates a method that ensures their 
"actual needs, capacity, or circumstances" will be considered respectfully whereby their 
value as citizens of Canada is not going to result in "a negative effect on human dignity" 
(Law, 1999: para. 70). Whether a law effectively accomplishes this is dependent upon 
the perspective of the individual or group it affects. Thus the determination of "negative 
effect" is contingent upon the perspective(s) of an individual or group, specifically the 
manner in which an impugned law does not take into consideration their circumstances 
(Law, 1999). Then to be justifiable, an action on the part of government cannot achieve 
"a valid social purpose" on the one hand while at the same time resulting in a violation of 
an individual or a group's rights under section 15(1) on the other (Law, 1999: para. 70). 
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The focus must always remain upon the central question of whether, viewed from the 
perspective of the claimant, does the differential treatment negatively impact their human 
dignity? 
A third contextual factor is the 'ameliorative purpose or effect' of a government 
action. In Eaton (1997) as referenced by Law (1999), the court stated that "the purpose of 
s. 15(1) of the Charter is not only to prevent discrimination by the attribution of 
stereotypical characteristics to individuals, but also to ameliorate the position of groups 
within Canadian society who have suffered disadvantage by exclusion from mainstream 
society" (Law, 1999: para. 72). Accordingly, a law, regulation, or policy, et cetera that 
has a purpose to be ameliorative is by and large intended (at least in theory) to 
redistribute or provide access to an individual or group that did not otherwise have such a 
benefit. To be ameliorative is not necessarily inclusive, as it focuses on those that belong 
to an enumerated and/or analogous ground and thus are disadvantaged from a historical 
perspective. 
Even though such laws or policies make a distinction based on enumerated and/or 
analogous ground, they are not discriminatory per se. So long as the action in question 
has as it purpose to improve the conditions of the most disadvantaged group, which may 
include some or all of the disadvantaged groups, it would likely satisfy the requirements 
of being ameliorative (Law, 1999). In contrast, if the purposes or effects of an 
ameliorative action were to exclude members that are historically disadvantaged whereby 
its focus was on improving the situation of individuals or groups that were not protected 
by section 15(1), it would then most likely be considered discriminatory in nature (Law, 
1999). 
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Lastly, the 'nature of the interest affected' is the fourth contextual factor. To fully 
understand and thus appreciate the concerns expressed by a claimant according to the 
court, it is necessary to comprehend the interest that is negatively impacted by the 
impugned action (Law, 1999). In this sense, the court in Egan (1995: para. 63-64) and as 
referenced in Law (1999) notes: "[i]f all other things are equal, the more severe and 
localized the... consequences on the affected group, the more likely that the distinction 
responsible for these consequences is discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15 of the 
Charter" (para. 74). Whether the distinction restricts access to "institutions" or "full 
membership in Canadian society" or does not recognize a group, are all important to 
discern when determining the presence of inequality (Law, 1999). 
Nature and Extent of the Burden 
Once the context of the situation has been established in a purposeful sense, it is then 
necessary to examine the 'nature and extent of the burden' which the impugned action 
has placed upon the shoulders of those protected from discrimination under section 15(1). 
Individuals and groups must take into consideration three elements when demonstrating a 
burden. 
The first is data. Although not required, an individual or group would be best 
served in an equality analysis if supporting information, such as social scientific data, 
was submitted to demonstrate the violation of their dignity (Law, 1999: para. 77). Courts 
may also take "judicial notice" or "logical reasoning" when an impugned law breaches 
the purpose(s) of section 15. For instance, an argument can be made that it is reasonable 
for a court that is hearing a case involving a woman that belongs to a First Nation to take 
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judicial notice of the place such women are in within Canadian society. They are 
confronted with additional discrimination in comparison to men of aboriginal ancestry, in 
addition to what they are already confronted with because they are a member of a First 
Nation in the first place, according to Evelyn Webster's presentation to the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: 
As aboriginal women, we face discrimination and racism because we are 
Aboriginal and because we are women. We lack access to jobs, to support, to 
training programs, and to positions of influence and authority... All across 
Canada, Aboriginal women are involved in the struggles for equal rights. 
(Green, 2000: pg. 332). 
As is the case for many of the statistical categories used in Canada to measure 
social problems, those focusing on women demonstrate that approximately eight out of 
ten women that live in aboriginal communities experience violence in their homes, which 
is double the rate that is experienced by women living in non- aboriginal communities 
(Green, 2000: 334). The statistics are as follows: 91% of women had personal 
experiences with family violence; 75% grew up as targets of family violence; 46% 
indentified alcohol as a factor in violence; 29% experience violence without the alcohol 
factor; 70% suffered violence at the hands of relatives; 50% were currently single; 75% 
lived on monthly incomes of less than $1,000; 50% were supporting children (Green, 
2000: pg. 334). Since such statistics are undisputed, as First Nations are more often than 
not confronted by conditions that are unlike the rest of Canada, the court in Law (1999) 
held that it may take under consideration facts that may underscore a claim of 
discrimination; however, the court expressed caution so as to not create additional 
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stereotypes with such facts. 
Second, an individual or group that is challenging a government action is required 
to prove that discrimination occurred, but not that the action itself was intended to be 
discriminatory. More specifically, in Law (1999) the court stated that a claimant is not 
required to demonstrate that the "legislation was consciously premised upon prejudicial 
stereotype, or the legislature purposely failed to take into account the social disadvantage 
of an individual or group in enacting the legislation" (para. 80; also see Miron, 1995). 
Instead, the claimant is required to establish one of the following: the purpose of the 
legislation infringes section 15, or (2) the effect of the legislation infringes section 15. In 
either case, the onus to establish one or the other is "satisfied by showing only a 
discriminatory effect" and then for the government to justify the infringement {Law, 
1999: para. 80-81). 
Lastly, an individual or group should not focus on showing more than one aspect of 
discrimination, that is, demonstrating that they belong to more than one protected ground 
and that the action discriminates against all of them {Law, 1999). This is because, 
according to Law (1999), in a case that involves a law that makes a formal distinction 
then the equality analysis will focus on whether it "discriminates in a sense which 
interferes with the claimant's dignity". But if the law does not make a formal distinction, 
and the individual or group belongs to one or more enumerated or analogous ground, 
which is likely the case for many members of a First Nation, then it may be advantageous 
to include the scope of the discrimination or perhaps select a particular ground that is 
more straightforward and well-known in order to demonstrate the burden. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
The philosophy of equality has long held that discrimination is unjust. While the same 
cannot be said of equality and its historical implementation within Canada, the 
repatriation of the country's Constitution in 1982, in particular the inclusion of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its equality clause, marked a new course for the 
treatment of minorities in the coming years. Both the philosophy and legal reality of 
equality within contemporary Canadian jurisprudence now share a common principle: 
decisions ought to remedy inequality, not support or worsen existing situations. 
For minorities that have been historically subjugated or those that have 
experienced more recent discrimination, the guarantee of equality (section 15 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982) is a right that is paramount over most other rights and interests. 
The same applies to First Nations and their memberships. When used, the equality clause 
provides an analytical framework that is capable of bring forward a specific plight 
experienced by a First Nation. The objectives of the framework are for a claimant to 
demonstrate: (1) section 15 applies to the situation because the claimant is (or ought to 
be) considered a member of a protected ground; (2) the government action in question 
draws a distinction which is based on a claimant's personal characteristics and that the 
distinction fails to take into account their disadvantaged position within the Canadian 
society that has resulted in substantively different outcomes in comparison to others; and, 
(3) the effects of the government action results in a burden, or a restriction to a benefit, or 
it furthers the idea(s) that the claimant is less capable and/or worthy of recognition. 
Key to addressing the objectives and thus using equality provision effectively, 
however, is largely dependent on inputting the appropriate information in order to 
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demonstrate that an injustice has in fact occurred. As such, in chapter four an example of 
a First Nation's situation is used to illustrate the application of the equality framework in 
the context of environmental justice. The example is based on a First Nation's struggle in 
northeast British Columbia to protect a threatened caribou herd and their culture from a 
coal mine. 
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Chapter Four: Application of the Canadian EJ Framework 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a Canadian-based framework for assessing the environmental 
justice of a decision made by a level of government in Canada. To demonstrate the 
application of the framework, an example of a conflict between the Provincial 
Government of BC and West Moberly is reviewed. Subjecting the action of the BC 
government to the framework allows for the determination of whether the government's 
decision to approve coal mining activities in the critical habitat of a threatened herd of 
caribou amounts to an environmental injustice for the culture of West Moberly. 
4.2 Overview of an Environmental Justice Framework for Canada 
In this section, the literature on environmental justice (developed in the United States of 
America) and the provision of equality (developed in Canada) are combined in order to 
construct a Canadian-based environmental justice framework. In what follows, an 
equality framework for determining whether a particular set of circumstances amounts to 
an environmental injustice is presented. The framework consists of four main 
components: namely, principles, situational factors, perceptions and contextual factors, 
and the nature and extent of the burden. Each of the components is reviewed in more 
detail below. 
4.2.1 Principles 
Based on the principles developed by the First National People of Colour Environmental 
Leadership Summit (Lee, 1992; Foreman, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Schlosberg and Caruthers, 
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2010), coupled with those outlined by the Canadian judiciary in relation to the equality 
provision in the Canadian Constitution (Law v. Canada, 1999; Sharpe and Roach, 2005), 
it is possible to derive six fundamental principles of an equality framework for the 
application of environmental justice in Canada to issues and problems confronted by an 
individual or group. These are: 
• promote human dignity; 
• ensure substantive rights to the environment for humans; 
• uphold meaningful exercising of inherent cultural rights; 
• prevent actions that limit freedoms or create burdens; 
• ameliorate disadvantage(s) or compensate for damage(s ); and, 
• protect against intentional and unintentional discrimination. 
These principles can be used to determine whether a particular set of circumstances 
arising as a result of a government action amounts to an environmental injustice for an 
individual or group6 in Canada that is considered protected. 
4.2.2 Triggers and Parameters 
An important element of the equality framework is determining whether it applies in a 
particular case. To do so, there are three components that must be satisfied in order to 
adequately trigger an equality analysis and to set the parameters by which the analysis 
For greater clarity, the term "community" is used interchangeably with the term "group" in this thesis 
The term "community" is used in the context of an "environmental justice community", which is akin to a 
"group" of individuals that have similar and immutable characteristics protected by section 15(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 For example, either term in the context of environmental justice may be used to 
describe a First Nation in Canada 
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will occur. First, a community must be considered protected under section 15 of the 
Canadian Constitution from discriminatory actions by a government in Canada; the 
framework is not triggered without such a designation. While an individual community 
may be considered protected under more than one enumerated or analogous grounds in 
some cases, it is important to select the most apt ground in terms of demonstrating an 
action is discriminatory. In addition, the ground that is chosen should be reflective of the 
'cultural area' used to frame the discrimination against the community (Fixico, 2001). 
The second is to identify a government action that has created, worsened, or espoused the 
disadvantaged position of the community; the framework is not triggered without an 
action. Legislation, regulation, policy, or any decision (including, discretional power) 
used by a level of government in Canada to make a decision is considered an action 
covered by the equality framework. A third is the selection of a comparator group. The 
proper identification of a group will, comparatively speaking, illustrate the discrimination 
endured from the impugned action. The comparator group is therefore a separate entity 
with similar, pertinent characteristics that is shielded from the burden, or receives a 
benefit, or is respected as being capable and worthy of continued existence (Law v. 
Canada, 1999; Sharpe and Roach, 2005). 
4.2.3 Perceptions and Context 
The foundation to the equality framework consists of two main components with respect 
to determining whether the differential treatment arising from the government action (in 
purpose and/or effect) demeans the human dignity of a community, and in that way, is 
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discriminatory. These are: the perceptions and the contextual factors that underscore the 
situation. 
The perceptions of the community are based on whether it believes their human 
dignity has been negatively impacted as a result of the government action. Their 
perceptions are divided into two categories: (1) there are subjective perceptions, which 
are considered those that one may associate with the impugned government action and 
the community's pertinent characteristics; and (2) there are objective perceptions, which 
shed light on the larger context of the impugned government action, including the past 
and present treatment of the community in comparison to the comparator group. Within 
this context, the perception of the community regarding the impact to their human dignity 
is integral. Emphasis is placed on whether the community's physical or psychological 
integrity is negatively affected by their needs, capacities, or merits not being met, which 
has the result of marginalization or devaluation. 
Establishing the context of the situation is integral as it is used to substantiate both the 
subjective and objective perceptions of a community. It is accomplished by providing 
information relating to the following four components. First, determine whether there is 
a pre-existing disadvantage. While not a compulsory requirement pre se, including such 
information is beneficial as it assists in demonstrating that there are pre-existing 
conditions that have placed a burden upon the shoulders of a community; however, such 
burdens ought to be relevant to the impugned government action and the pertinent 
characteristics. Second, determine the link between the protected ground and the 
personal characteristics. This assists in the correlation of the community's human 
dignity to the differential treatment. Third, determine whether an ameliorative purpose 
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or effect is present. This involves demonstrating that the impugned government action 
does not prevent a situation from getting worse or making the situation better in some 
way. Fourth, determine the nature of the interest affected. This involves demonstrating 
the sensitivity of the impact through, for example, showing how severe and local the 
burden is for a community. The more fundamental the characteristic being impacted is to 
the community, the greater the likelihood the case is considered discriminatory (Sharpe 
and Roach, 2005). 
4.2.4 Nature and Extent of Burden 
Key to demonstrating that the impugned government action discriminates against a 
community is articulating the 'nature and extent of the burden'. This is accomplished 
two ways. The first, which is not a requirement per se but valuable nonetheless, is to 
provide data (from, e.g., the social and natural sciences) that shows how the action 
violates the community's human dignity. The second involves demonstrating that the 
action discriminates against a community in either purpose and/or effect. While proving 
discrimination is necessary in general, establishing that it was part of a government plan 
in particular is not a requirement; that is, a government action may be defined as 
discriminatory irrespective of whether the purpose and/or effect were intentional or 
unintentional. (Law v. Canada, 1999) 
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4.3 Illustrative Example: Culture, Caribou, and Coal Mining 
The circumstances of a recent land use conflict between the Crown and a First Nation, 
namely the Provincial Government of BC and West Moberly, will now be subjected to 
the framework to illustrate the application of environmental justice in a Canadian context. 
At the heart of the conflict is a threatened heard of caribou and its critical habitat7. The 
government of BC wishes to use the land for the development of a coal mine (that will 
destroy the critical habitat) in order to generate revenue via royalties paid to the Crown. 
West Moberly wishes to use the land for the preservation of ecological integrity (that will 
protect the critical habitat) to ensure the survival of the caribou for future cultural use. 
4.3.1 Triggers and Parameters 
This section determines whether the illustrative example of West Moberly's struggle to 
protect a herd of caribou from mining activities is an appropriate case for the application 
of an equality-based environmental justice analysis. In establishing this, as previously 
noted, the particular circumstances must include a community (or members) considered 
protected by the Canadian Constitution, a government action that is the basis of the 
potential discrimination, and an identifiable comparator group that will assist in the 
illustration of the negative effects placed upon the shoulders of the community as a result 
of the differential treatment. 
7 
The term "critical habitat" originates from a federal law, specifically the Species at Risk Act While the 
Government of Canada uses the term with respect to species at risk in Canada and the habitat needed to 
ensure their survival, it is not used by the Provincial Government of BC at all Instead of "critical habitat", 
BC has decided to uses the term "core habitat" or "high quality habitat" From an ecological perspective, 
both of the terms used by BC more or less have the same meaning as the term used by Canada. The official 
reason BC uses its term rather than Canada's is unknown, the former (which is legally defined) 
significantly and explicitly restricts impacts to a land base that is defined as "critical habitat", whereas the 
latter (which is not legally defined) does not 
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West Moberly First Nations 
The community of West Moberly is located in northeast British Columbia; according to 
West Moberly (WMFN Petition, 2009), the Government of Canada refers to the 
community as a "Band" in accordance to the Indian Act (1985).8 Since members of a 
Band are legally defined as "Indians" under the Indian Act (1985), community members 
of West Moberly (individual level) are protected from discrimination as they are 
considered to fall under an enumerated ground, such as "race". Further protection under 
section 15 is also likely due to a First Nation's unique situation in Canada. For example, 
in the context of the Indian Act (1985) a First Nation is defined as a "band", which means 
"a body of Indians". The community is also considered to be '"aboriginal peoples of 
Canada' within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982" (Affidavit #1 of 
Chief Roland Willson. 2009: para. 2). Since the term "body" implies union, which means 
an assemblage of people, and West Moberly is legally considered a "band" (Petition, 
2009: pg. 19) that consists of a collection of individuals that are the descendants of the 
same distinct cultural group called the Mountain Dunne-za (WMFN Initial Submissions, 
2009), it is possible to consider the members of West Moberly as a group with similar 
and "immutable characteristics", making the community (group level) an analogous 
ground which is protected by section 15(1). 
As the term "Band" comes from the Indian Act, which does not allow for non-Indians to be registered on 
a First Nation's Band List, there is likely a difference between how the federal government defines an 
Indian and the approach used by a community. It is very likely that some (if not all) First Nation 
communities may consider (for a variety of reasons) other individuals to be members of their Nation, 
irrespective of the Eurocentric view of the Government of Canada with respect to defining members 
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As a sui generis (unique unto their own) group, the community of West Moberly 
has a distinct "cultural area". While the land base that comprises the area in which they 
are legally permitted to exercise their rights is the boundary of Treaty No. 8, the Nation's 
preferred area to exercise their inherent9 cultural rights is approximately the Peace River 
Sub-Basin in British Columbia, which is referred to as their "preferred Treaty Territory" 
(WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009). This area is culturally significant as it provides the 
community with subsistence, both physical and spiritual. Their mode of life includes the 
exercising of rights such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering, along with the 
necessary incidental rights like, for example, the construction of cabins to trap and the 
conservation of the environment in order for it to be capable of meaningfully sustaining 
their interconnectedness with the land as they have done since time immemorial (WMFN 
Initial Submission, 2009). 
British Columbia's Actions 
The dispute between the Provincial Government of BC and West Moberly is based on 
statutory decisions, namely the approval of FCC's Advance Exploration Program and its 
Bulk Sample Application that were issued by the Ministry of Energy, Mines and 
Petroleum (MEMPR), and the decision by the BC Cabinet regarding the basis of the 
caribou protection and augmentation plan (the "Plan") subsequently developed. Take 
9
 The term "inherent" is used to represent that the rights of First Nation cultures in general, and West 
Moberly in particular, are not "contingent" upon the pleasure of the Crown That is, the rights of First 
Nations are based on the fact that they are sovereign states that enjoyed rights prior to the arrival and 
settlement of Europeans in what is now referred to as Canada, their rights exist irrespective of the opinion 
of the Crown (in both its federal and provincial forms) and cannot be extinguished without consent of a 
First Nation (see, e g Asch, 1984) 
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together, these decisions form the basis of the impugned government action. These 
decisions (collectively, the "BC's Action") are summarized are below. 
Statutory Decisions 
On September 9, 2009, the Chief Inspector of Mines for BC sent a letter to West Moberly 
which stated that MEMPR approved permits for FCC to carry out the Advanced 
Exploration Program and Bulk Sample Application.10 While BC's decision does not 
provide an analysis with respect to the impacts to the culture of West Moberly if the 
mining activities were to proceed, or vice versa, it does provide the conclusions in the 
form of four 'accommodation measures' that apply to both Crown Authorizations 
(Hoffman, 2009). 
The first was the development and implementation of the Caribou Mitigation and 
Management Plan (CMMP) by FCC. The mitigation proposed within the CMMP, 
according to the Aboriginal Relations Branch (ARB) of MEMPR, will "avoid or limit 
effects... to ensure that mining activities do not have a significant impact on the Burnt 
Caribou Herd" (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009b: pg. 3). While the Crown noted that 
West Moberly expressed concerns that they did not have the capacity to provide 
substantive technical input into the review and modification of the CMMP, it does not 
comment on whether that inability was addressed. Additionally, the ABR includes West 
Moberly's concern that, based on the comments from the caribou experts from MOFR 
and MOE, the First Nation believed that the "Project would have significant and possible 
Pursuant to section 10 of Mines Act, the statutory decision makers approved "173 drill holes and 5 
trenches" for the Advanced Exploration Program and the removal of "50,000 tonnes" of coal for the Bulk 
Sample Application (WMFN Petition, 2009: pg 8). 
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irreparable harm" to the herd. There is no indication whether the ABR addressed this 
concern. The ABR points to the Burnt-Pine Caribou Task Force, which is to be convened 
by FCC as part of the CMMP as a process to further monitor the situation with the 
caribou and the mine, which includes FCC assisting "in the recovery of the population". 
The second accommodation measure was the amendment to the Bulk Sample Permit, 
namely the reduction of the program from 100,000 tonnes to 50,000 tonnes. By doing so, 
and based on the premise of attempting to reduce the impact to the caribou, the ARB 
suggested that the reduction will likely result in 50% less waste rock and traffic 
(Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009b: pg. 4). The third accommodation measure relates 
to the closure of a road, which was built along the windswept ridges of the critical habitat 
of the Burnt Pine caribou herd. Based on discussions with the Ministry of Forests and 
Range (MOFR) and MOE, FCC agreed to close what has been referred to as the 'Spine 
Road' in recognition of the importance of windswept ridges as productive caribou 
habitat. Lastly, the fourth accommodation measure was the change of FCC's mining 
technique, a new system that replaced the open-pit design that was contemplated in the 
initial stages of planning that occurred back in 2006. 
BC Cabinet Decision 
On June 18, 2010, the BC government sent a letter to West Moberly that outlined its 
decision relating to caribou and Treaty rights. The letter noted that BC had chosen 
"Option 1", as described in the Planning Team Report (the "PT Report"), to form the 
basis of a plan (the "Plan") "to protect and augment the Burnt Pine caribou herd" 
(Perrins, 2010b: pg. 1). Under the Plan, BC notes that several "new measures" where to 
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be undertaken. First, the province was going to identify "Resource Review Area" (RRA) 
as a means to limit impacts to critical habitat. Inside of these areas there would be no 
new development for up to five years, with a possibility of a time extension. Second, a 
predator management program was going to be implemented, which will cull the wolves 
in and around the Burnt Pine caribou range. Third, "a boarder Northern Caribou 
Management Plan" (NCMP) that covers the remaining herds (i.e. Graham, Moberly, 
Scott, Kennedy Siding, Quintette, and Narraway herds) was to be developed and 
implemented in the future. Fourth, the areas of the Burnt Pine caribou's core habitat that 
fall outside of the RRAs that are (or likely will be) tenured would be subject to Best 
Management Practices (BMP), (pg. 1) 
Impugned Decisions 
West Moberly did not agree with the statutory decisions made by BC; therefore, the First 
Nation initiated legal proceedings by filing two petitions to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia (SCBC). These put the statutory decision makers and the BC Cabinet "on 
notice" that the community was asking the judiciary to review the decisions (i.e. BC's 
Action). In the 2009 Petition, the First Nation contended that the decision-makers from 
MEMPR and the Ministry of Forests and Range (MOFR) breached their legal obligations 
under the Constitution Act, 1982, namely protecting the community's right to harvest 
caribou under Treaty No. 8 for cultural purposes, by approving the Bulk Sample and 
Advanced Exploration Program under the Mines Act and the Occupation License to Cut 
(OLTC) under the Forestry Act and the Coal Act (WMFN Petition, 2009). In the 2010 
Petition, West Moberly contended that BC "has not put in place a reasonable, active 
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program for the protection and augmentation of the Burnt Pine caribou... as required... 
[by] the British Columbia Supreme Court" (WMFN Petition, 2010: pg. 4), which is 
needed in order for community members to harvest caribou in accordance with their 
traditional seasonal round (West Moberly v. British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines), 
2010). 
The Provincial Government ofBC: A Comparator 
Treaty No. 8 provides the parties, namely the Crown and First Nations, with a framework 
for land use planning and natural resource management that is grounded in peace and 
friendship, enabling both to coexist in the future. The parties therefore share in the 
benefits associated with the signing and implementation of Treaty No. 8, and in addition, 
logically share in the burdens that may occur as well. As a beneficiary of Treaty No. 8, 
the characteristics of Provincial Government of BC are assured so long as they do not 
unjustly create burdens for First Nations, such as West Moberly. 
Based on BC's Action, the government of BC has created a benefit for itself in 
terms of increasing its economic development by zoning the land as industrial use, rather 
than as "critical habitat". This shields the mining industry (as well as other industrial 
users like oil & gas) from restrictions, which, in turn, provides BC with benefits that 
shield its interests; for example: social components, such as BC's economy, health care, 
social security, education, employment, and quality of life are likely enhanced. These are 
protected as a result of the most notable benefit: the monetary gain from industrial 
development. By allowing anthropogenic activities to continue, the approached used by 
BC "has the least impact on tenure holders and economic values" as it does not require 
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expropriation, which means the risk to BC having to compensate existing tenure holders 
(e.g. coal, oil and gas, forestry, and wind) is mitigated. Loss of revenue is also alleviated. 
Thus, the loss of potential monies is removed and the collection of potential revenue from 
resource development is assured. With such benefits, the Provincial Government is able 
to continue its mode of life without having to assume any of the significant burdens that 
transpire as a result of the impugned decisions. BC's approach to land and natural 
resource use is thus protected. 
4.3.2 Perceptions and Context 
This section provides the background information necessary to determine if BC's Action 
negatively impacted the human dignity of West Moberly. As previously noted, the focus 
here is on the perceptions of the community in terms of whether their needs, capacities, 
or merits have been met without being marginalised or devalued in some fashion by BC's 
Action. These perceptions are then supported by the context of the situation, specifically 
whether the community has a pre-existing disadvantage, the presence of a link between 
the community's characteristics and BC's Action, the presence or absence of an 
ameliorative purpose or effect of BC's Action that is positive for the community, and the 
nature of the community's interested. 
A Community's Perception 
In June 2009, West Moberly presented their views to BC regarding mining activity in the 
critical habitat of the Burnt Pine Caribou Herd by submitting a document entitled "I Want 
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to Eat Caribou Before I Die: Initial Submissions for the Proposed Mining Activity at First 
Coal Corporation's Goodrich Property" (hereinafter referred to as the "WMFN Initial 
Submissions"). The WMFN Initial Submissions detail how the loss of caribou from the 
landscape has negatively impacted their culture (i.e. mode of life) in many ways. Based 
on the data presented, observable physical effects would include not having the ability to 
harvest the species for a source of food or being able to use them for manufactured goods 
like art and clothing. Less noticeable, but equally significant impacts from a cultural 
perspective, include losses of immaterial elements of their mode of life. In the words of 
one community member: 
"I have talked to a lot of young people from our Reserve that would like to 
hunt caribou, but can't because the caribou populations are too low. Because 
we have not been hunting caribou for the last 35 years or so, stories about 
hunting, eating, or making things with caribou are not told as often as they 
once were. A crucial part of our culture will soon slip away unless we are 
able to recover caribou populations to healthy levels" (Desjarlais, 2009: pg. 
9). 
Similarly, and seeing that the species is of such significance to their culture, West 
Moberly noted that the impacts to their culture are both philosophical and spiritual. 
"There are only a few caribou left in the Burnt Pine herd. But the 
government wants to allow mining exploration in their core winter habitat. If 
this is how we treat the habitat of the caribou, how will we treat the habitat of 
the other animals our people want to hunt? 
Based on what the Elders have taught me, I believe that destroying the habitat 
of animals upsets the balance that the Creator has put in place. We need this 
habitat as much as the animals do because our way of life depends on it and 
on the health and survival of the animals. I have taught it to my children. I 
can't imagine what would become of my grandsons if by the time they grow 
old enough to go out in the bush, there are no animals left to hunt" 
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(Desjarlais, 2009: pg. 9-10). 
"I pray to God that the caribou will multiply so that we can once again 
sustainably hunt them, as our people have done for generations" (Desjarlais, 
2009: pg. 9). 
Impacts from the extirpation of caribou from the landscape are not necessarily 
constrained by locale or the particulars of the species with respect to it role in the mode 
of life. Secondary impacts, which are considered to be those that arise as result of the 
direct impact (i.e. loss of caribou), also arise (Noble, 2006). These include, for example, 
the redirection of community needs to other large ungulates. 
"The loss of the caribou has impacted the way we hunt other species. We are 
now much more dependent on moose. Since the Elders said we can't hunt 
caribou anymore [traditional law], they told us to start hunting for yearlings 
of moose in the springtime. Moose numbers vary from year to year, but there 
aren't enough moose for us to sustainably harvest so that we have enough 
meat to be stored through the winter until spring. So, the loss of caribou puts 
a new pressure on moose, because now we are harvesting more moose" 
(Desjarlais, 2009: pg. 8). 
Different Values, Different Land Uses 
To avoid causing additional impacts to the caribou and their culture, West Moberly 
believed that mining is able to continue within its territory but not in the location of 
FCC's activities as planned: "there is tons of coal in the Peace Region that could be 
used.. .First Coal could go [there].. .they are not going to go out of business. This spot is 
wrong" (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 48). When the option of moving the 
project was turned down by the Proponent, a decision that was presumably supported by 
MEMPR as the Crown did not voice any opposition or concern to FCC's position 
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(WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009), the direction of the Crown was challenged by West 
Moberly. 
What is the priority? To us the obvious priority is improving the herd -
increasing it. Help them recover back to healthy populations so we can start 
harvesting some animals maybe - years to come. I just think that they are 
prioritizing money right now" (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 48). 
As West Moberly is a beneficiary of Treaty No. 8, the First Nation believed that the 
Crown was in breach of their constitutional rights. In the Treaty, according to the Initial 
Submissions (also see the Commissioners Report), the First Nation was promised that 
they would be able to hunt, fish, trap, and gather as though they never entered into the 
agreement with the Crown and that there would be no "forced interference". But with all 
of the impacts that have occurred since the time the community's ancestors accepted 
annuities under Treaty No. 8, the First Nation has questioned the efficacy of the Crown's 
"solemn promises" to them: "Our people have lived up to the agreement, Canada and BC 
have not lived up to any of the terms except creating reserves and paying us our five 
dollars a year... [w]e have hunting restrictions.. .we have not been able to hunt caribou..." 
(Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 50). With the significant decline in caribou, and based on 
the resulting cultural impacts, West Moberly believed that the mining activity proposed 
by the Proponent should be rejected by MEMPR and a recovery plan should be 
developed and implemented; anything less, the First Nation believed, was a violation of 
their rights under Treaty No. 8. 
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A Canadian Perception 
The community of West Moberly is not alone in being concerned for caribou and the 
habitat of the species, including the matter of the encroachment of anthropogenic 
activities that adversely effect recovery potential. Citizens of Canada have also 
recognized the dire state of affairs for caribou, in addition to the precarious situations of 
many other species throughout the country, and those concerns resulted in the enactment 
of the Species at Risk Act (SARA) in 2004. 
Under SARA, caribou are legally defined as "Threatened", which means the 
species "is likely to become endangered if nothing is done to reverse the factors leading 
to its extirpation or extinction" (SARA, 2002: s.2). A key element of reversing such 
factors, according to West Moberly, is the protection of the habitat necessary for the 
species to survive; the government of BC's caribou expert has also stated that the 
destruction of critical habitat and the goal of recovery planning are incompatible (Initial 
Submissions, 2009). Critical habitat is defined as: 
".. .the habitat that is necessary for the survival or recovery of a listed wildlife 
species and that is identified as the species' critical habitat in the recovery 
strategy or in an action plan for the species. 
Building on the intent of SARA, Canada and BC signed an agreement to protect the 
species that are at risk within the province: the Canada-British Columbia Agreement on 
Species at Risk (the "Agreement"). In section 2 of the Agreement, as West Moberly 
points out (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 70), the governments agreed to the 
following: 
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• "the protection and recovery of a species at risk 'will be informed by the best 
available science'" (SARA, section 2.4) "and 'will take into account...the 
traditional knowledge of aboriginal people'" (SARA, section 2.6). 
• '"If there are serious threats or irreversible damage to a species at risk, cost 
effective early actions will be taken to prevent the further reduction or loss of the 
species and to facilitate the protection and recovery efforts'" (SARA, section 2.7); 
and, 
• Canada and BC '"will endeavour to develop recovery strategies and action plans 
that meet timelines and other requirements set in federal and provincial 
legislation'" (SARA, section 11.1), "including the provision 'for the protection 
of the 'critical habitat' of species at risk" (SARA, section 12.2). 
Included in the Agreement, specifically Appendix A, is an Accord that both Canada 
and BC signed. Through this Accord, Canada and BC agreed to protecting species from 
becoming extinct as a results of anthropogenic activities. Further, the governments 
agreed to the following: 
"ii) the conservation of species at risk is a key component of the 
Canadian Biodiversity Strategy, which aims to conserve biological 
diversity in Canada; 
iii) governments have a leadership role in providing sound information 
and appropriate measures for the conservation and protection of 
species at risk, and the effective involvement of all Canadians is 
essential; 
iv) species conservation initiatives will be met through 
complementary federal and provincial/territorial legislation, 
regulations, policies, and programs; 
v) stewardship activities contributing to the conservation of species 
should be supported as an integral element in preventing species 
from becoming at risk; and 
vi) lack of full scientific certainty must not be used as a reason to 
delay measures to avoid or minimize threats to species at risk." 
In addition, Canada and BC agreed to the following: 
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iii) establish complementary legislation and programs that provide for 
effective protection of species at risk throughout Canada, and that 
will: 
c. legally designate species as threatened or 
endangered; 
d. provide immediate legal protection for threatened or 
endangered species; 
e. provide protection for the habitat of threatened or 
endangered species; 
f. provide for the development of recovery plans 
within one year for endangered species and two 
years for threatened species that address the 
identified threats to the species and its habitat; 
i. implement recovery plans in a timely fashion; 
m. encourage citizens to participate in conservation and 
protection actions; 
n. recognize, foster and support effective and long 
term stewardship by resource users and managers, 
landowners, and other citizens; and 
o. provide for effective enforcement. 
For species that are defined as being "Threatened", such as caribou, Canada and 
BC committed to developing and implementing a recovery strategy by June 5, 2007 
(SARA, 2002: s. 42). However, according to the Initial Submissions (2009), neither 
Canada nor BC has fulfilled this requirement for any of the herds within West Moberly's 
preferred Treaty Territory. Making matters worse is that BC initiated a planning process 
in 2003 that most likely would have satisfied such a requirement; however, the process 
was cancelled by the government: 
"This Recovery Implementation Group (RIG) met informally once during 
the spring of 2003. Shortly thereafter most caribou RIGs were temporarily 
suspended pending direction from the provincial Species at Risk 
Coordination Office (SARCO). The herds that will be addressed by this 
RIG include: Moberly, Burnt Pine, Kennedy Siding, Quintette, Graham, 
Belcourt, and Narraway." (RICBC, 2009; also see Initial Submissions, 
2009: pg. 71) 
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In June 2009, both Canada and BC acknowledged that they were in violation of 
SARA by approximately 2 years (Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 72). Even though the 
development and implementation of the recovery was past due, BC reaffirmed its 
position that it was not planning on reinitiating the process upon West Moberly's request: 
"...there are no current plans to develop or implement recovery planning for those 
caribou herds in the south Peace Region..." (pg. 72). West Moberly found the 
cancellation of the planning process to be problematic in terms of the protection of 
cultural practices protected by Treaty No. 8: "[g]iven the state of affairs with respect to 
caribou herd populations, we consider the suspension itself to be unreasonable and 
unacceptable on the part of British Columbia" (pg. 71). In his decision, Justice 
Williamson concurred with West Moberly and appeared to place an emphasis on the 
underlying intent of SARA. He concluded that: 
"...a balancing of the treaty rights of Native peoples with the rights of the 
public generally, including the development of resources for the benefit of the 
community as a whole, is not achieved if caribou herds in the affected 
territories are extirpated" (West Moberly, 2010: para. 53). 
Traditional Law: A Conservation Measure 
Caribou within West Moberly's preferred Treaty Territory have been at risk since the late 
1960s and early 1970s. After the construction of the W.A.C. Bennett hydroelectric dam 
and the subsequent flooding of the Williston Reservoir, which took up approximately 
1,780 km2 of land (Tetra Tech 2002, p. i) and habitat, community Elders foresaw the 
long-term impacts to the species and the oncoming impact of European settlement 
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(WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009). This resulted in the community implementing 
conservation measures as a precautionary approach. More specifically, a traditional law 
was passed by the First Nation's Elders that banned the harvesting of caribou by 
community hunters. The passing of the law was in direct response to the existing and 
foreseeable impacts caused by the impoundment of water from the dam, which destroyed 
not only habitat but also ecological features such as migration corridors. In the WMFN 
Initial Submission (2009), the community recounted the impacts that they witnessed 
when the land was flooded: 
"WAC Bennett Dam was constructed. The Peace River Valley coming 
through the Rocky mountains. And with all that debris floating on the 
reservoir it made it difficult for them to cross. Great herds drown because 
they could walk out onto the log jams on top of floating degree and jump 
into the water to follow their natural migration route, through the Peace 
Valley and they couldn't get out on the other side. Who knows how many 
drown. Lots of them did. 
Same thing happened with the caribou trying to move north across the 
Williston Reservoir and eventually small groups, isolated groups were left 
on the south side. After a few years they didn't try crossing anymore. And 
even to this day, and we are talking about the '70s here and that was 30 
years ago, even to this day there is still a lot of debris floating on the 
reservoir. I don't think it has as much danger as it used to - when the 
flooding first occurred." (pg. 32) 
"...[the dam] killed lots of them [i.e. caribou] we took them out this side 
of the mountain. Mount Clearwater. The animals were just trying to go 
across. Right in those sticks, those sticks are flowing. They got stuck. We 
took them out of there. We saved a few of them. If we tried to save all of 
them we would be there 24 hours a day." (pg. 31) 
"As far as we know, the migration across the Williston Reservoir doesn't 
occur anymore. It left these isolated groups south of the reservoir along 
the trench." (pg. 32) 
Elders were especially concerned. They recall the "sea of caribou" that once 
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existed in their territory. The WMFN Initial Submissions (2009) recounted the views of 
one Elder, who expressed his and his family's distress over the situation: 
"...[the Elder's] teachings once included the traditional ecological knowledge 
of Wah stzee [caribou] and its use for medicinal purposes, ceremony, 
clothing, and other uses such as tools, art, and food. But that was before 
significant impacts such as the dams and roads were built without due 
consideration for the species and our Nation's Treaty rights. Today he 
watches an ever fragile habitat being destroyed and fragmented day-by-day. 
Coupled with an already overwhelmingly low population, his worries 
continue to deepen. The animal that was once so integral to his mode of life 
and his ancestors is on the verge of becoming extirpated from the territory -
in other words, extinct from the homeland of Mountain Dunne-za. Most 
bothersome, however, is that all of this is occurring within one generation" 
(pg. 40). 
The temporary loss of caribou (as noted above) has greatly troubled the community. 
Their submissions provided insight into the basis for the traditional law restricting 
caribou hunting, which was implemented around 40 years ago in an attempt to avoid a 
significant cultural impact. In addition, the views frame the rationale of the First Nation 
with respect to why it has launched legal proceedings against BC in order to compel the 
government to protect the species for future generations. 
First Nations and Treaty Rights 
With respect to First Nations and environmental/cultural matters, the link between the 
protected ground and their personal characteristics is typically conjoined by their rights 
and interests that are recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution of 
Canada. These rights protect their cultures, as it is unconstitutional (i.e. illegal) to 
extinguish such rights (Hogg, 2004). Within Canada, many of these rights have been 
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further recognized and defined through treaties (e.g. the historic numbered treaties), 
modern day land claims (e.g. Nisga'a Final Agreement Act, 2000), and other mechanisms 
such as agreements and case law (Isaac, 2004). 
In the case of West Moberly, as previously mentioned, the First Nation has been 
part of Treaty No. 8 (a historic treaty) since accepting annuities in 1914. Although the 
text of Treaty No. 8 lists various rights, such as the protection of the First Nation's "usual 
vocation of hunting, trapping, and fishing" (see: Treaty No. 8, 1899), the community 
points out that understanding the substance of such rights requires the incorporation of 
the 'oral promises' in the framing of what such rights mean, notwithstanding the fact that 
they (oral promises) are rights in and of themselves (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009). 
Such promises were made by the Treaty Commissioner during the negotiations of Treaty 
No. 8 (R. v. Badger, 1996). Over the years, the importance of these promises have been 
the focus of several court cases and decisions rendered by the SCC, in addition to the 
lower courts. 
In R. v Marshall (1999), for example, the SCC stated that "it would be 
'unconscionable for the Crown to ignore the oral terms' of a Treaty" (WMFN Oral 
Argument, 2010: pg. 7; Marshall, 1999: para. 12). As such, West Moberly believed that 
the 'oral promises' made by the Commissioner during the treaty negotiations, some of 
which are in his report (entitled "The Commissioner's Report") while others are 
contained within affidavits of those that were a witness to the negotiations, are integral to 
protecting their rights and, most importantly, their culture. In particular, they point to the 
following promises: "that the same means of earning a livelihood would continue after 
the treaty as existed before it; that the Indians would be as free to hunt and fish after the 
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treaty as they would have been had they not entered into it; that the treaty would not lead 
to any forced interference with their mode of life" (WMFN Petition, 2009: pg. 11). 
The oral promises, coupled with the main intent of the Treaty No. 8, which was 
the preservations of the mode of life for participating First Nations (WMFN Oral 
Argument, 2010: pg. 8; R. v. Horseman, 1990), provides significant insight into how land 
and resources ought to be managed. In this sense, West Moberly believed that the court 
had recognized that their right to harvest species via hunting and trapping under Treaty 
No. 8 as it was intended to protect the "continuity in traditional patterns of activity and 
occupation" (WMFN Petition, 2009: pg. 11). This included species such as caribou 
because, as West Moberly states, they used caribou in a variety of ways before entering 
into Treaty with the Crown; it formed a vital part of their culture (WMFN Petition, 2009: 
pg. 12). 
In the WMFN Initial Submissions (2009), West Moberly provided decision-
makers with substantial data with respect to caribou in their territory (discussed in more 
detail below). Given the functional role of caribou within the Mountain Dunne-za mode 
of life, the community contends that the species is integral to the continuation of their 
culture as promised by Treaty No. 8, and as such, the Crown has a legal obligation to 
ensure that there is a harvestable surplus available. Not all species, according to West 
Moberly, play such a significant role in the culture; therefore, their rights to other such 
species would clearly be different from those relating to ungulates like caribou (WMFN 
Oral Argument, 2010: para. 19). 
Within the context of the Sparrow decision, the Crown has a legal responsibility to 
prioritize the use of land and natural resources amongst potential users. In general, the 
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order is as follows: (1) conservation of ecosystems and species; (2) First Nations use, 
including commercial; (3) non-First Nation private (e.g. industry) uses; and, (4) member 
of the public (non-First Nation) users (WMFN Oral Argument, 2010: pg. 20; R. v. 
Sparrow, 1990). Further, Justice Vickers in the Tsilhqot'in decision recognized that the 
right "to hunt and trap over an area means wildlife and habitat must be managed to ensure 
a continuation of those rights" (para. 1291). In effect, this means that the Crown must 
manage the caribou habitat (land) and caribou (natural resource) for the use of First 
Nations, such as West Moberly, prior to the use of a non-First Nation company like FCC. 
While Treaty No. 8 did anticipate a smaller landscape in which to exercise rights, 
First Nations such as West Moberly did not consider that the acceptance of benefits from 
the Treaty would "seriously prejudice or eradicate existing harvesting practices" (WMFN 
Oral Argument, 2010: pg. 22). In that way, to give the priority of using land and 
resources to FCC without ensuring that the community's priority meaningfully existed, 
West Moberly contended that BC's Action contradicted the Tsilhqot'in decision (para. 
1293-1294) as it relates to the interpretation of Treaty No. 8 and thus it constituted "an 
unjustifiable infringement" of their rights (WMFN Oral Argument, 2010: pg. 22). 
Justice Williamson's Decision 
On March 19, 2010, Justice Williamson of the SCBC released his Reasons for Judgement 
for the landmark court case West Moberly First Nations vs. British Columbia (Chief 
Inspector of Mines) (hereinafter referred to as "West Moberly (2010)"). This case 
confirmed the established rights of West Moberly, in particular the practices associated 
with their traditional seasonal round and thus the harvesting of caribou. 
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In the Reasons for Judgement, Justice Williamson provided a succinct overview of 
the "Background Facts" of the evidence presented during the hearing. In particular, he 
noted the following evidence as facts: (1) West Moberly's "harvesting practices included 
a traditional seasonal round" that includes the area of FCCs operations (para. 16); (2) 
"caribou were a source of food, and that caribou hide, bone, and antlers were important to 
the manufacturing of a number of items for both cultural and practical reasons" (para. 
17); (3) due to the decline in the caribou population because of anthropogenic activities 
such as the W.A.C. and Peace Canyon hydroelectric dams, the community's "right to 
carry on their traditional harvesting practice has been diminished" (para. 18); and (4) the 
caribou in and around FCCs "operations has been decimated... to a population of 11" 
and have thus been listed as "threatened" pursuant to SARA (para. 18). 
Since the case at bar revolved around the exercising of rights pursuant to Treaty 
No. 8, including the rights of both West Moberly and the Crown (which in this case was 
BC), Justice Williamson in his decision reviewed the Treaty itself and some of the 
relevant legal precedent. He pointed out that BC cannot, as it did during the process that 
preceded the decisions for the impugned permits, rely solely on the "rights as expressed 
in the written Treaty"; rather, the 'oral promises' (many of which have been included in 
the Commissioner's Report) made by representatives of the Crown must be taken into 
account (para. 28) whenever a Crown is contemplating impacting land and natural 
resources within the boundaries of the Treaty. To do anything less would contradict legal 
precedent developed over the years by the SCC through various judgements. 
Generally speaking, reading the Commissioner's Report along side Treaty No. 8 is 
key in such instances as it provides a background to the accounts of when the Treaty was 
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signed and subsequent adherences. In particular, Justice Williamson references R. v. 
Badger (1996) to elucidate the rights WMFN has as a beneficiary of Treaty No. 8: 
55. Since the Treaty No. 8 lands were not well suited to agriculture, the 
government expected little settlement in the area. The Commissioners, cited 
in Daniel, at p. 81, indicated that "it is safe to say that so long as the fur-
bearing animals remain, the great bulk of the Indians will continue to hunt 
and to trap." The promise that this livelihood would not be affected was 
repeated to all the bands who signed the Treaty. Although it was expected 
that some white prospectors might stake claims in the north, this was not 
expected to have an impact on the Indians' hunting rights. For example, one 
commissioner, cited in Rene Furmoleau, O.M.I., As Long As This Land Shall 
Last, at p. 90, stated: 
We are just making peace between Whites and Indians - for them to 
treat each other well. And we do not want to change your hunting. If 
Whites should prospect, stake claims, that will not harm anyone. 
56. Commissioner Laird told the Indians that the promises made to them 
were to be similar to those made with other Indians who had agreed to a 
treaty. Accordingly, it is significant that the earlier promises also 
contemplated a limited interference with Indians' hunting and fishing 
practices. 
Further, as Justice Williamson points out, signatory First Nations to Treaty No. 8 
within British Columbia, or beneficiaries as is the case for West Moberly, have the 
constitutional right to hunt throughout their traditional lands (para. 62). The exercising of 
such rights must have an important effect upon the First Nation, however. By this, it 
seems, the quintessential exercising of such rights (e.g. harvesting ungulates via hunting) 
must reflect the culture of a First Nation for it to have meaning; to view it otherwise 
would likely rendered the Treaty as a collection of hollow rights and promises. As such, 
according to Justice Williamson, Treaty No. 8 must be viewed in the context of 
protecting'the traditional practices, such as hunting, so that the First Nation is able to 
meaningfully exercise such rights (para. 15) and for their cultures to continue to exist in 
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the present and future. To further emphasize this point, he references Mikisew Cree First 
Nation v. Canada (2005), which held that: 
"[t]he "meaningful right to hunt" is not ascertained on a treaty-wide basis (all 
840,000 square kilometres of it) but in relation to the territories over which a 
First Nation traditionally hunted, fished and trapped, and continues to do so 
today. If the time comes that in the case of a particular Treaty 8 First Nation 
"no meaningful right to hunt" remains over its traditional territories, the 
significance of the oral promise that "the same means of earning a livelihood 
would continue after the treaty as existed before it" would clearly be in 
question, and a potential action for treaty infringement, including the demand 
for a Sparrow justification, would be a legitimate First Nation response", 
(para. 48). 
Based on the rights included in the written Treaty and the 'oral promises' noted in 
the Commissioner's Report, Justice Williamson found that West Moberly has the right to 
"exercise meaningfully traditional hunting practices" (para. 15), which includes hunting 
"caribou in the traditional seasonal round in the territory affected" by FCC's mining 
activities (para. 63). In doing so, he rejected BC's position that the community did not 
have the right to hunt caribou (different from the specific right to caribou) within its 
territory. 
Using the geographic proximity approach to understanding impacts to a First 
Nation culture within Treaty No. 8 that was developed in Mikisew (2005), Justice 
Williamson rejected BC's argument that the affects from FCC's operations on caribou 
and West Moberly's harvesting rights are negligible. He held that it is unacceptable to 
"say 'hunt elsewhere'" (para. 62). Further, and even if it were acceptable to tell a First 
Nations to hunt elsewhere, community members are not able to do so as all of the caribou 
with their territory are legally defined as "threatened" under SARA, making it impossible 
to exercise their right anywhere in their territory as they did prior to entering into the 
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Treaty in 1914. 
Lastly, BC contended that it had meaningfully consulted West Moberly and 
reasonably accommodated their rights, which includes the Crown's responsibility to 
balance the interests of all parties such as West Moberly, other First Nations, and the 
general public which includes FCC (para. 73). Justice Williamson, however, disagreed. 
He was "not satisfied" that BC had meaningfully consulted given the situation. Nor did 
he believe that BC "reasonably accommodated" the community's "concerns about their 
traditional seasonal round of hunting caribou for food, for cultural reasons, and for the 
manufacture of practical items" (para. 75). 
In conclusion, Justice Williamson held that "...a balancing of the treaty rights of 
Native peoples with the rights of the public generally, including the development of 
resources for the benefit of the community as a whole, is not achieved if caribou herds in 
the affected territories are extirpated" (para. 53). Further, he concluded that the "...treaty 
protected right is the right to hunt caribou in the traditional seasonal round in the territory 
affected by the" operations of FCC (para. 63). Since there was no recovery plan for the 
Burnt Pine caribou herd and West Moberly was unable to hunt caribou because of their 
lower population, he believed that a reasonable accommodation measure of the Crown is 
to develop and implement a plan that accommodates the community's right. Without 
such a plan in place, he accepted West Moberly's accommodation measure that it 
proposed during the consultation process, which MEMPR had rejected based on its 
opinion that such a measure was outside of the scope of consultation and accommodation. 
Such an approach to reconciliation, that limits the scope of the process regarding 
addressing concerns raised by a First Nation, was also rejected by Justice Williamson. 
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He noted that: 
"the honour of the Crown is not satisfied if the Crown delegates its 
responsibilities to officials who respond to First Nation's concerns by saying 
the necessary assessment of proposed 'taking up of areas subject to treaty 
rights is beyond the scope of their authority" (para. 55). 
In the Order that was entered on June 10, 2010, the court presided over by Justice 
Williamson declared that the Crown, as represented by MEMPR and MOFR, "failed to 
consult adequately and meaningfully and failed to accommodate reasonably the 
Petitioners' hunting rights provided by Treaty No. 8 with respect to the Bulk Sample and 
amendments and Advanced Exploration amendments to mining permit CX-9-022 and 
with respect to the Occupant Licenses to Cut L48261 and L48269". Based on that 
finding, the court ordered the Advanced Exploration Program to be "stayed" and the 
OLTC to be "suspended for 90 days" from the date the Reasons for Judgement were 
released, which was from March 19, 2010 to June 19, 2010. Within this timeframe, the 
court ordered that BC and West Moberly were to "proceed expeditiously to put in place a 
reasonable, active plan for the protection and augmentation of the Burnt Pine caribou 
herd, taking into account the views of... [WMFN] as well as reports of British Columbia's 
wildlife ecologists and biologists Dr. Dale Seip and Pierre Johnstone". 
Effects ofBC's Action 
This section reviews BC's Action to determine whether West Moberly's disadvantaged 
position (discussed above) is negatively or positively influenced. To do so under an 
equality-based environmental justice analysis in Canada, as previously noted, an action of 
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a level of government must not (in purpose and/or effect) create, worsen or support the 
disadvantaged position of a community protected by the Canadian Constitution, with an 
ameliorative effect being the most appropriate result. 
Burnt Pine Caribou Herd 
The first effect of BC's Action are the ecological burdens on the Burnt Pine caribou herd, 
which has been described by BC's lead caribou expert as "critically endangered" at 
present due to the "threats" and its extremely low population (WMFN Initial 
Submissions, 2009: pg. 57) 
Over the years, scientists working for provincial government agencies (namely 
MOE and MOFR) had expressed serious concerns with mining activities in the critical 
habitat of the Burnt Pine caribou herd. Beginning as early as 2006, MOE sent a letter to 
MEMPR in regard to FCC's proposed Bulk Sample application. It reads: "[w]e 
recommend that no work should be done within the UWR [ungulate winter range] and 
WHA [wildlife habitat area] areas". Additional letters were sent from MOE to MEMPR 
outlining the adverse effects pertaining to coal mining activities, such as: 
...[MOE]... "would not recommend approval be granted for... [the] Notice 
of Work and Reclamation Program due to the significant wildlife and 
ecosystem values" detailed in the letter which included Mt. Stephenson 
providing critical winter range habitat; that the proposed activities would pose 
a significant threat to caribou populations as the activities would result in the 
destruction of terrestrial lichens, increase physical disturbance to wintering 
caribou and create possible displacement of caribou from critical winter 
range" (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 61). 
In order to be clear on the environmental management practices required to protect 
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the threatened caribou herds in the Peace Region, MOE put forward the Best 
Management Plans that industrial activities needed to follow regarding potential 
operations in and around the critical habitat. These are: "[d]o not reduce the terrestrial 
lichen ground cover; [d]o not reduce the arboreal lichen; [d]o not create disturbances 
which will disturb caribou or displace caribou from the area; [d]o not create improved 
predator or human access" (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 65). Further, the 
document containing the BMPs states: "The core winter ranges are a very limited habitat 
and support high caribou densities. Any activities which degrade this limited habitat, or 
displace caribou from the area, pose a significant risk to the caribou population" (WMFN 
Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 65). For activities (industrial or otherwise) to be 
considered sustainable from the perspective of caribou management, they must adhere to 
the BMPs. The mining activities contained within BC's Action, however, did not follow 
the BMPs; the activities reduced terrestrial and arboreal lichen, in addition to 
disturbing/displacing caribou and creating access for predators (Initial Submissions, 
2009). 
While MOFR was not asked to comment on the coal licenses and the previous 
mining activities in the same fashion as MOE, MEMPR asked MOFR's to provided 
comments on FCC's draft mitigation plan (i.e. CMMP) for its proposed mining activity in 
the critical habitat of the Burnt Pine caribou herd. MOFR's comments are summarized in 
the WMFN Initial Submission (2009): 
"The Mt. Stephenson block [which includes FCC's proposed mining 
activities] provides about 2/3 of the habitat value to the herd. 
That impact could occur on up to 69% of the core winter habitat on the 
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Central South Property, which as discussed in point ii) above, is the most 
important part of the Burnt Pine caribou winter range. 
The mitigation plan does an excellent job of attempting to reduce the 
environmental impacts of bulk sampling and exploration program on caribou. 
However, the program will still destroy or compromise substantial amounts 
of core winter and summer habitat for a small Threatened caribou herd. It 
will also compromise previous management actions by the Ministry of 
Forests and Range to protect habitat for this caribou herd. 
If the government intends to conserve and recover the Burnt Pine caribou 
herd, habitat conditions need to be maintained or improved. Allowing 
additional habitat destruction is incompatible with efforts to recover the 
population (emphasis added)" (WMFN Oral Argument, 2010: pg. 34; see 
also: WMFN vs. Chief Inspector of Mines, 2010: para. 52). 
Overall, BC's scientists from MOE and MOFR recommended that MEMPR not 
approve any mining activities in the critical habitat (i.e. the UWR or the WHAs) (WMFN 
Oral Argument, 2010: pg. 33). To do otherwise, the scientists believed, would result in 
significant adverse impacts to the caribou (pg. 33) and would thus be contrary to SARA. 
The scientific opinion on the Plan was similar to previous comments, mostly 
because the outcome of the Plan did not significantly change the degree to which 
anthropogenic activities in the critical habitat impacted caribou. The likelihood of the 
Plan being successful was seriously questioned by the government scientists, as it was in 
contrast to the report they put forward which called for the protection of all critical 
habitat (KT Report, 2010). For instance, the scientist from MOFR stated that the 
contents of the Plan relating to the management intent and habitat protection were 
"misleading and technically impossible" (Seip, 2010). The Plan, therefore, was unlikely 
to "reverse the factors leading to its extirpation or extinction" (SARA, 2002: s.2) as it 
was not based on the "best available science" and did not "take into account...the 
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traditional knowledge of aboriginal people'" (SARA, section 2.6), as it allowed the 
"threats" from anthropogenic activities (e.g. mining, oil & gas, and wind energy) to 
continue. 
Cultural Rights 
A second effect of BC's Decision is the burden placed on the shoulders of West Moberly 
and its members. As currently designed, the future use of caribou by community 
members in their traditional seasonal round will be negligible at best. This is primarily 
based on the fact that a harvestable surplus is not expect, meaning "[fjhere is likely no 
opportunity for a sustainable harvest" of caribou from the Burnt Pine herd (PT Report, 
2010: pg. 64). Although if all of the management techniques were successful and the 
caribou moved to other (albeit undesirable) areas set aside for them, which is 
questionable given the stochasticity of the environment, then there is a slight possibility 
that West Moberly (and/or First Nations with rights pursuant to Treaty No.8) could 
harvest a total of 1-2 bulls on an annual basis (PT Report, 2010). 
As noted earlier, the loss of caribou from the traditional seasonal round has lasted 
for nearly forty years. The potential permanent loss of the species is something that 
troubles the community greatly, as noted in their Initial Submissions (2009): 
"A long time ago, once in a while they go to the mountains to kill caribou 
and they use them, Old Elders like my grandmother, my grandma, my 
grandpa, my dad. That's what the Elders, my Dad used to say, "If we can't 
go to the mountains, us guys, you guys will never go". 
I, myself, would one day like to hunt caribou. I haven't been able to hunt 
caribou. I never even had a chance to hunt caribou... My Dad, my 
Grandfather, my great grandfathers, they used to take me hunting but they 
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never took me to the mountains. They talked about it. They talked about 
hunting caribou. They talked about hunting sheep and goats. 
There are a lot of young people from this reserve that would actually like 
to go hunting caribou but they can't. The numbers are not there for it to be 
a sustainable harvest to utilize them again. Like we traditionally did... 
In the past there were a lot of caribou in our area but because of the dam, 
I've heard that the migration routes have been severed so that the caribou 
didn't come over as much. But stories from my grandparents, they used to 
hunt caribou all the time ...I don't remember eating caribou growing up. I 
have heard stories of our people going into the Twin Sisters area and 
hunting caribou up there and from being involved with our Nation... the 
Twin Sister's area and the Pine Pass, I know there are herds of caribou up 
there. Some of the herds are pretty depleted but we never heard very much 
about caribou after the dams came in. And I just remember my 
Grandmother saying, and my Uncle Max saying the caribou just aren't 
around anymore. I haven't eaten caribou but I know they have. [My son] 
is just getting into hunting now and he really enjoys it. He got his first 
moose last year so he is pretty excited... I wouldn't mind taking him 
hunting caribou, see what the difference is. I have had elk, moose meat, 
and deer meat. I really like it and I would like to try caribou... I want to be 
able to eat caribou before I die. I want my kids to be able to have that 
option. 
Just listening to the stories from my Grandma and my Uncle Max, they 
trapped out all summer to different areas. And they travelled there so they 
could gather winter food. So they could get a variety of it. They knew 
where to go to get the moose, to get the bear that they harvested for the fat. 
They ...said there were herds and herds, thousands of caribou up in the 
mountains. So, they had caribou in their diet, they had elk, they had bear, 
[and] they had marmots, so... Hopefully it will be there still. We can keep 
it. Grow it. Make it better. 
I've never been caribou hunting. When we were younger we used to [go] 
hunting with my Grandma and Grandpa quite a bit. But never caribou and 
I think a lot of it had to do with there not being as many. By the time I was 
old enough the dam had already been in for 15 years. So I've seen pictures 
of caribou and I've heard lots about them from Elders that remember the 
'sea of caribou'. Last year I started learning to do a hide and dry meat... I 
am learning a lot of traditional ways but there is a huge disconnect 
between my generation and my Grandma's generation. But what I am 
finding is my generation want to know. We are starting to come back. We 
want to know who we are. We want to know where we are from. Proud. 
And all these things they are all part of it. It is all a part of our identity. It 
is all connected. If we are coming back and there is not land to come back 
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to, how will we ever know our culture?. 
I think if there was no land left you would see a culture lost. Gone. And it 
is happening slowly. A death by a thousand cuts. I think we are facing a 
lot of different things. We are struggling to save the land, we are 
struggling to save our children, I believe a lot of our children are lost 
because they don't know who they are." (WMFN Initial Submissions, 
2009: pg. 40) 
Throughout their submissions to BC, the community told of a dire future for their 
culture if the current rate of development and the resulting ecological effects continue at 
what they consider an unsustainable level. Their Initial Submissions (2009) recounts the 
possible consequence: 
"What many of our Elders do not understand is why the government is 
allowing this to occur. A common fear the Elders share is this: an inevitable 
end to the current path is the spiritual dismemberment of caribou. This could 
occur two ways: the animal does not comeback before the Elders and others 
are gone, which means the knowledge that has been accumulated since time 
immemorial is likely to be lost forever, or the caribou becomes extinct from 
our homeland" (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 40). 
Caribou in the Mode of Life 
The impetus behind West Moberly's desire to have the species recovered was culturally 
based. The species is of significance in many respects, but not just as a source of food as 
was often the focus of BC (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a): 
"[caribou]...meat and marrow provided a valued source of nutrition. In 
addition, caribou hide, bone, and antler were important for the manufacture of 
items. Hide was used for articles of clothing, as tipi covers, for storage bags, 
and as babiche for tying and lacing objects. Antler bone was used in the 
preparation of hides and as the raw material for arrows, ice chisels, and for 
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the manufacture of other objects" (WMFN Oral Argument, 2010: pg. 15). 
Elements of caribou played an important role in the medicine used by the Mountain 
Dunne-za to cure or assistance in the treatment of various ailments and diseases. For 
instance, a current Elder at West Moberly remembers this: 
I remember one time when a hunting party went out to find a caribou 
because my Grandma Martha was sick. She had cancer of the oesophagus. 
She wanted to use the caribou to make traditional medicine to heal herself. 
So, the hunting party went out [and] killed a caribou and brought her the hide. 
There is a layer of tissue just underneath the hair on a caribou hide. This 
tissue was sometimes scraped off and eaten as a traditional medicine. This is 
probably why Grandma Martha wanted the hunters to bring her a caribou 
hide. (WMFN Oral Arguments, 2010: pg. 16). 
The role of caribou is found in many areas of their mode of life. They were 
believed to be significant in terms of culture and spirituality: 
"...caribou myths and stories taught and reinforced appropriate norms, beliefs 
and codes of conduct. Individual members of the Mountain Dunne-za 
actively sought caribou as a powerful spirit helper, whom, if respected in 
prescribed ways, was believed to aid a hunter throughout his life" (WMFN 
Oral Arguments, 2010: pg. 16). 
Like all animals and components of the environment in the Peace Region, caribou 
formed an important part of the connection between the Mountain Dunne-za and nature. 
In the words of an Elder from West Moberly: 
"Our people are closely connected to the land and animals. We think of 'the 
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bush' as our playground. So are the hills and mountains. We have a special 
relationship with the animals. We protect them. We don't just do this 
because we want to eat them. We see them like people. The moose, the 
grizzly, the caribou: they are all our friends. When a hunter kills an animal, 
they will often say a prayer or give an offering, because that animal gave up 
its life to feed us" (WMFN Oral Arguments, 2010: pg. 16-17). 
Caribou therefore were interwoven into the culture of the Mountain Dunne-
za. The role of the species was multifaceted. While the community members have 
not physically used the species for nearly 40 years due to self-imposed 
conservations measures, it is clear that the species remains important. To some 
degree, BC acknowledged the role of caribou (and perhaps the species' importance) 
to West Moberly. Under a heading "WMFN's Cultural Connection to the Caribou" 
within a document generated by BC, the ABR writes: 
"MEMPR recognizes... [fjhe early accounts of higher populations of caribou; 
[f]he seasonal round as a mixture of activities that took place in a variety of 
locations through the various seasons based on knowledge of animal 
populations, their behaviour and fluctuating abundance and scarcity; the use 
of caribou [by WMFN] for: Sustenance, Clothing, Tents, Bags, Moccasins, 
Gloves, Tunics, Trousers etc., tools; That caribou were mentioned in place 
names, myths and spiritual records..." 
4.3.3 Nature and Extent of Burden 
This section reviews the "nature and extent of the burden" placed onto the shoulders of 
West Moberly by BC Action. To do so, as previously noted, it is useful to provide 
additional information that shows the nature and extent of the burden, along with 
demonstrating that BC's Action (in purpose and/or effect) discriminates against the 
community of West Moberly. 
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Supporting Data 
There are several sources of additional data, both from the social and natural sciences, 
which supports the position of West Moberly. This includes a threats assessment 
conducted by government scientists, advanced notice provided to MEMPR in relation to 
the state of affairs of caribou, and a recovery plan to address the needs of the caribou and 
likely the needs of West Moberly to some extent. These are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Threats to Caribou 
As noted earlier, caribou in the territory of West Moberly are defined under SARA as a 
"Threatened" species, which means if nothing is done to revere the factors that have 
caused the problem there is a likelihood that the species will become "Endangered" and 
then "Extinct". This has resulted in the community refraining from hunting caribou 
within its territory for over 40 years in an attempt to conserve the species for future 
generations. 
Factors that have led to caribou becoming a threatened species are primarily 
anthropogenic. These have been detailed by the government scientists (KT Report, 2010) 
in a "threats assessment", which demonstrated that the greatest threat to caribou herds 
and their habitat in the CRM is industrial development, in particular mining and oil & gas 
activities and to a lesser extent windfarms, forestry, and land uses associated with human 
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settlement. Activities such as these in critical habitat is adverse as "it destroys arboreal 
and terrestrial lichen, may displace caribou from foraging areas, and increase the risk of 
predation by improving habitat for other prey species... or increase access for predators" 
(see, for example: Rettie and Messier, 1988; McLoughlin et al., 2003; and, Courtois et 
al., 2007) (PT Report, 2010: pg. 30). Not only do activities that physically alter the 
habitat cause direct impacts, but they and other non-physically altering activities (e.g. 
hiking, snowmobiling) also result in indirect adverse consequences. The latter may, 
when 'excessive' or in close proximity, "displace caribou" and therefore negate the 
protection of habitat from physically altering activities (PT Report, 2010: pg. 31). 
What is noticeable in the KT approach is the large focus on addressing matters 
relating to wolves and their connection in terms of impacting caribou and in regard to 
their modified behaviour due to the changing ecosystem. This is primarily the result of 
research demonstrating that wolves are likely the most significant threat to caribou (see, 
for example: Farnell and McDonald, 1988; Seip, 1992; Boertje et al., 1996; and, Hayes et 
al., 2003) in comparison to other species such as bears and golden eagles, and in that way 
they are the largest non-anthropogenic obstacle to their recovery (PT Report, 2010: pg. 
32). Problems associated with increased wolf populations and their contact with caribou, 
according to the PT Report (2010), has been linked to the anthropogenic activities and the 
resulting habitat change; early serai habitats increase alternative prey species and, for 
example, linear corridors that increase access of wolves to caribou (see, for example: 
James and Stuart-Smith, 2000; James et al., 2004; and, Kuzyk et al., 2004). 
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Land Use Conflict: Identified Early, but Disregarded 
In BC, the regulatory process in relation to exploring for coal begins with a proponent 
applying for a Coal Licenses from the government. Applications made by a proponent 
are then sent to First Nations in order for the Crown to meet its legal obligations in 
relation to consultation and accommodation (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009). 
During the latter part of 2004, the Titles Branch of MEMPR sent a letter to West 
Moberly regarding the potential issuance of a Coal License to FCC in the critical habitat 
of the Burnt Pine caribou. In response, the First Nation expressed its concern relating to 
wildlife within its territory that is protected by the Species at Risk Act (SARA). 
Specifically, the community asked: "[h]ow has this question been addressed?" Nearly 
one year later, the First Nation responded to a second referral pertaining to the potential 
issuance of another Coal License, which would further increase the area of likely 
development, where it asked a similar question: "are there any issues related to Species at 
Risk Act and '[h]ow has this question been addressed" by MEMPR? Not only did 
MEMPR not answer the community's questions, but the government agency also failed 
to respond to the letters in their entirety. (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 60) 
What appeared to be unknown to West Moberly at the time is that MOE was also 
expressing concerns in relation to other government agencies allowing anthropogenic 
activities, such as mining, in the area. Based on the scientific opinion of MOE, BC 
"established several Wildlife Habitat Areas ("WHA") and Ungulate Winter Ranges 
("UWR") by Ministerial Orders", two of which (i.e. "WHA 9-055 and UWR U-9-002") 
cover significant portions of the area that FCC has and likely wishes to continue to carry 
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out mining activities (WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 60). These Orders were 
passed as a means to protect the critical habitat of the caribou. 
Irrespective of the concerns expressed by West Moberly and the steps MOE has 
taken with respect having the area protected due its sensitivity regarding caribou, 
MEMPR approved the applications made by FCC for Coal Licenses. Based on the lack 
of response from MEMPR, there is no record (including none produced by BC in court; 
see: West Moberly, 2010) of MEMPR making an attempt to incorporate conditions into 
the Coal Licenses with the purpose of taking into account (including, for example, the 
mitigation or avoidance of adverse impacts) the concerns expressed by the First Nation 
and MOE. As such, it seems that MEMPR proceeded to issue the Coal Licenses without 
addressing the concerns or, conversely, did not find it necessary to provide the First 
Nation or MOE with a rationale as to why such concerns did not need to be addressed. 
With approved Coal Licenses in-hand, FCC was then permitted under the Coal Act to 
apply for a Notice of Work (NoW) to carry out mining activities within the tenured area 
and, if required, apply for amendments to the NoW to account for additional works 
required to develop the coal resources within the project area (Ministry of Forests, Mines 
and Lands, 2011). 
Recovery: A Protection and Augmentation Plan 
In order to fulfil the court Order, BC was responsible for developing and implementing a 
plan that protects and augments the Burnt Pine caribou herd so that community members 
of West Moberly are able to harvest caribou within their traditional seasonal round. 
Since the effects of BC's Action (noted above) negatively affects both the caribou and the 
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harvesting ability of West Moberly, the government of BC did not fulfil the Order issued 
by Justice Williamson (WMFN Petition, 2010). A planning approach that would have 
protected and augmented the caribou and thus adhered to the court Order, according to 
West Moberly, was the adoption of the Knowledge Team Report (the "KT Report"), 
which is a planning approach developed by government scientists (PT Report, 2010); this 
approach was referred to as Option 4 in the PT Report (see Appendix Two for a summary 
of the four different options). 
The KT Report, entitled the "Recovery and Augmentation Plan for Woodland 
Caribou {Rangifer tarandus caribou) in the Central Rocky Mountains of British 
Columbia", included the available scientific and traditional knowledge in the possession 
of the parties in relation to the protection and augmentation of the Burnt Pine caribou 
herd by April 30, 2010 (PT Report, 2010: pg. 19). The KT Report was designed to fulfil 
the court Order regarding providing the ecological knowledge to protect and augment the 
caribou so that West Moberly was able to exercise their Treaty right to harvest the 
species in accordance to its traditional seasonal round. The KT structured the report 
around two main objectives, each containing subsections referred to as "Habitat 
Protection" and "Population Management", both of which operationalize the objectives 
(see Appendix Two for a more in-depth review of the Planning Options, objectives, and 
subsections). 
The recovery of caribou, which is the first objective of the KT Report, involves 
increasing "the caribou population in the Burnt Pine range to >50 animals, and maintain 
existing caribou populations in the Graham, Kennedy Siding, Moberly, Narraway, 
Quintette, and Scott herd ranges for a total of approximately 1,000 caribou" (PT Report, 
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2010: pg. 27). To achieve this objective, the KT stated that Habitat Protection is key, 
requiring that "no destruction of core alpine/subalpine habitat for all herds" occur. 
Additionally, the KT pointed out that the following are necessary requirements in order to 
be successful: the impacts from industrial development (rate and patterns) in lower 
evaluations (including, for example, "Matrix Habitats") need to be managed, non-
industrial activities that "displace or disturb" caribou from core habitats need to be 
managed, and access to core habitat is not to be created or improved that significantly 
assists predator access into such areas. For Population Management, it is necessary to 
"manage predation to increase the Burnt Pine herd and to "prevent" the populations of the 
other herds (listed above) from declining. (PT Report, 2010: pg. 27) 
The second objective is augmentation, which requires increasing "the total 
caribou population in the Burnt Pine, Graham, Kennedy Siding, Moberly, Narraway, 
Quintette, and Scott herds ranges over time to approximately 3,000 caribou to provide an 
annual sustainable harvest of 60-90 caribou for First Nations". For this Objective to be 
achieved, according to the KT, there can be "no destruction of high quality 
alpine/subalpine habitat for all of the herds". The 'additional' Habitat Protection 
requirements, which have been noted above, are the same for achieving the 
Augmentation Objective as they are for the Recovery Objective. This Objective also 
requires predator management for all of the herds. (PT Report, 2010: pg. 27). 
In its report, the KT believed that the situation of the Burnt Pine caribou herd was 
in dire straits. Its population has dropped from the "sea of caribou" (Initial Submissions, 
2010) to roughly 165 animals prior to mining activities (PT Report, 2010), with a current 
population level that is between 9 and 19 animals (which translates into an estimated 
177 
population of 11 caribou). As such, according to the KT Report, the Herd is "very 
vulnerable to extirpation" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 28). Further, in the expert opinion of 
BC's caribou expert, the Herd is "critically endangered" (Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 
57). For those reasons, the population of the Herd needs to be increased to a level that is 
not only ecological viable in terms of the size of the range and its potential carrying 
capacity, but a level that is also capable of sustaining pressures from hunting by West 
Moberly and likely other First Nations as well. 
Based on a calculation of caribou densities and the various land-bases of other 
herds, which was compared to the ecological characteristics of the Burnt Pine herd, an 
increase from a population approximately 11 to 50 animals was considered by the KT as 
reasonable population level to have as a goal (PT Report, 2010: pg. 28). It was estimated 
that to reach the population goal of 50 caribou it would take 20-30 years; with such a 
small population, the potential for a harvestable surplus would be analogous from a 
temporally perspective. In that way, a population of 50 caribou may provide a limited 
surplus of 2-3% per year, although this would be heavily dependent "on the sex ratio in 
the harvest" and would be restricted to harvesting bulls (PT Report, 2010: pg. 28). 
After taking into account the fact that caribou of the Central Rocky Mountains 
(CRM) move about the landscape, which means the potential future population of 50 
caribou may travel to join neighbouring herds, for example the Kennedy Siding caribou 
may move to the area used by the Moberly herd, or vice versa, the KT recommended that 
a biological approach be used in that the recovery and augmentation objectives be viewed 
from an ecological perspective (PT Report, 2010: pgs 24-46). This would include 
increasing the population levels of all herds in the CRM (PT Report, 2010: pg. 28), as 
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shown below. 
Table 6: Population Levels of the Caribou Herds in the Central Rocky Mountains 
Name of Caribou Herds 
Narraway* 
Quintette 
Kennedy Siding 
Moberly 
Scott 
Graham 
Burnt Pine** 
Current Total 
Potential Total 
(Note: * includes the Bearhole anc 
Current Population Potential Population 
Level Level 
200 600 
180 540 
100 300 
100 300 
60 180 
300 900 
50 150 
990 
2,970 
Redwillow groups: ** "Current Population" estimate 
is subsequent to recovery efforts at the herd level) 
The KT recommended that "[n]o industrial should occur within core caribou 
habitat in the alpine and subalpine" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 30). Moreover, with the goal 
of increasing the herds from approximately 990 to 2,970 animals, additional habitat 
protection would be required. And since the amount of known core habitat that has been 
mapped would be a limiting factor in an increase in population, the protection of high 
quality habitat is therefore necessary (PT Report, 2010: pg. 30). Similarly, the KT 
recommended that "[n]o industrial activities should occur within high quality habitat in 
the alpine and subalpine".]' In contrast to the requirements for the core and high quality 
habitats, all of which protects caribou and caribou habitat from further development, the 
recommendation from the KT regarding the lower elevation habitat is for the 
With respect to the habitat m the low elevations, such as those relied upon by the Narraway herd 
(including the Bearhole and Redwillow groups), "some level of industrial activity and human activity 
is tolerable so long as it is not excessive" (see Sorenson etal, 2008) (PT Report, 2010 pg 30) 
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development of a management plan "that limits cumulative impacts of all industrial 
activities below a sustainable threshold for caribou persistence" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 
31). 
For Population Management, the KT developed a list of recommendations that 
focus on matters such as predator control (i.e. culling wolves), alternative prey (e.g. 
moose) management, and the management of forest habitat within "the natural range of 
variability" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 33). While there was recognition on the part of the KT 
that the state of affairs for the Herd in particular, and the herds in the CRM in general, is 
serious and thus requires predator control in some fashion or another, its recommendation 
was not put forward without limitations attached. The KT Report qualifies the reliance 
on such a management tool: 
"Use of population management practices such as predator control should be 
used to supplement the benefits of habitat protection, not as a substitute. 
Failure to adequately protect caribou habitat will make efforts to directly 
manage caribou populations more challenging and possibly futile. If habitat 
is adequately protected, the need for direct actions such as predator reduction 
will be reduced in scale, scope and duration. Use of predator management in 
the absence of adequate habitat protection is unacceptable to the West 
Moberly First Nation[s], and would likely also be opposed by various non-
governmental organizations and the public" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 7). 
While the Habitat Protection and Population Management requirements that are 
necessary to recover and augment the CRM caribou herds result in restrictions that apply 
to anthropogenic land uses in the region, which are new and thus may be objectionable to 
such users, they are based on the existing scientific literature. That literature 
demonstrates that the herds in the CRM (which are listed above) are either "stable or 
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declining" (see: Seip and Jones, 2008; and, Culling and Culling, 2009), meaning it is 
possible that they may "regress to a state of imminent extirpation if limiting factors are 
not reversed" (see: Thomas and Gray, 2002) (PT Report, 2010: pg. 29). Key to reversing 
this trend is the protection of their habitat, as the KT points out that "[a]ny further 
destruction of their habitat would be incompatible with caribou recovery". Thus, 
allowing further destruction of critical habitat would "likely lead to additional population 
declines" whereas its protection will achieve the Recovery Objective and stabilize the 
populations (PT Report, 2010: pg. 29). 
Nature of the Burden 
The nature of the burden placed onto the shoulders of West Moberly can be characterized 
by the approach taken by the BC government, both in terms of its underlying purpose and 
the effect arising as a result. These are discussed in more detail below. 
Concerns and Solutions: Minimized and Offloaded 
The concerns of West Moberly with respect to caribou and the recovery of the species 
within its preferred Treaty Territory was, for the most part, minimized and/or offloaded 
by BC onto future processes (without a guarantee of substance) that may or may not have 
occurred. 
While the BC government took the concerns of West Moberly into account, the 
question that remained is whether their concerns were taken seriously by BC; the Crown 
is legally required to take the concerns of First Nations "seriously" and "demonstrably 
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incorporate" them into the decision {Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia 
(Ministry of Forests), 1999). On the surface, as noted above, BC acknowledged the 
cultural role and specific use of caribou. For instance, the ARB also stated the following: 
MEMPR recognizes the time, effort and expense that the WMFN put into 
researching and preparing this comprehensive document. The personal 
accounts of past and current members in Part II are especially informative and 
meaningful. The considerable effort put into the interviews and recording of 
WMFN's relationship to the caribou is acknowledged and appreciated." 
(Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a: pg. 10). 
In addition to recognizing the cultural element of caribou, the ARB also took notice of 
the population levels of the species within the preferred Treaty Territory of West 
Moberly. For instance, the ARB noted that the population of caribou in the nine herds 
within the First Nations' preferred Treaty Territory amounts to roughly 1,599 caribou. 
What BC did subsequent to listening to and commenting on the concerns expressed by 
West Moberly regarding their culture and caribou, however, is more revealing. 
First, and based on the fact that the population of the Burnt Pine herd amounts to 
0.69% of the overall population in the preferred Treaty Territory, the ARB concluded 
that "the opportunity for WMFN to hunt and trap caribou in their traditional territory will 
not be significantly reduced" by the effects of the Statutory Decisions (Aboriginal 
Relations Branch, 2009a). This comment is troubling for at least two reasons as it uses 
percentages (albeit incorrectly) to minimize the impact to West Moberly. For one, not 
only does it seem to acknowledge that the further loss of caribou as a result of industrial 
development is likely, but that such loss is acceptable as well. By accepting such an 
outcome, BC has negated the underlying premise of SARA that it agreed to uphold; that 
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is, improving the situation of species that are "Threatened" so that they do not become 
"Endangered" by reversing the factors, not increasing the overall efficacy of the factors, 
(see: the Species at Risk Act, 2002). Moreover, the ARB states that the Burnt Pine 
caribou herd may inevitably be extirpated irrespective of whether mining activities, such 
as those proposed by FCC, occur in the critical habitat (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 
2009a: pg. 15). The ARB's position that the extirpation of the Burnt Pine herd is 
inevitable, however, is based on an incorrect interpretation of MOE's views. While MOE 
did state that there is a possibility of the herd succumbing to the threats it faces thus 
leading to it becoming extinct, it was based on the assumption that a recovery plan would 
not be developed and implemented by the Crown (Johnstone, 2009). 
Another reason ARB's comment minimized the impact is that it implies that West 
Moberly is able to meaningfully exercise its inherent cultural right to harvest caribou in 
accordance with its traditional season round somewhere else. In doing so, the ARB 
references West Moberly's Initial Submissions (2009): "For our Treaty right to hunt 
caribou to 'have real value and meaning, it must be possible to exercise it somewhere in 
our traditional territory'" (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a: pg. 14). The ARB does 
not mention or discuss whether West Moberly is able to actually hunt the other caribou 
populations which it refers to - all of the caribou herds in the preferred Treaty Territory 
of the First Nation are defined as "Threatened" by SARA (Initial Submissions, 2009). 
BC is aware of the legal designation of caribou, a fact that was made clear by Justice 
Williamson's decision (West Moberly, 2010). Further, even if West Moberly was able to 
harvest caribou other than in the range of the Burnt Pine, the Crown cannot simply tell a 
First Nation (including, West Moberly) to hunt elsewhere (Relentless Energy 
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Corporation v. Davis, 2004), a position upheld by Justice Williamson {West Moberly, 
2010). 
Second, West Moberly also brought up the matter of cumulative impacts to 
caribou over the years, most notably from the construction of the W.A.C. Bennett and 
Peace Canyon hydroelectric dams and the subsequent flooding of the land resulting in the 
creation of the Williston and Dinosaur reservoirs (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a: 
pg. 14). Such anthropogenic activities were said to cause a decline in caribou populations 
and the fragmentation of caribou habitat. MOE also raised similar scientific concerns; in 
its words: "the cumulative effects of any incremental increase to habitat alienation have 
not been analyzed to fully appreciate potential impacts". In response, the ARB stated that 
"it is beyond the scope of the review". Further, the ARB pointed to potential, 
forthcoming processes within the agreements that may be signed by both the Province of 
BC and West Moberly as a more suitable avenue to have the concern of cumulative 
effects addressed (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a) if they were to occur in the 
future. 
As previously discussed, a particular concern of West Moberly was the fact there 
was no recovery plan for not only the Burnt Pine caribou herd, but also the nine herds 
within their territory, which it highlighted in the WMFN Initial Submissions (2009) as a 
significant shortcoming in the protection of Treaty rights. The ARB recognized the lack 
of planning surrounding the recovery of caribou in the Peace Region. In similar fashion, 
the ARB also pointed to the potential processes that have yet to be developed and 
implemented as a means to address WMFN's concern that a recovery plan is required 
(Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a: pgs. 15-16). The ARB did not commit to including 
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a recovery plan as an accommodation, but rather committed to being involved in such 
processes (Aboriginal Relations Branch, 2009a: pg. 16). 
Breach of Government-to-Government Relationship 
Prior to the developing a protection and augmentation plan for the Burnt Pine caribou 
herd, BC and West Moberly agreed to a terms of reference (TOR) for the planning 
process. While the TOR stated that the process would be government-to-government, BC 
entered into discussions with FCC without including or informing West Moberly of its 
decision. When the First Nation was informed that BC was working with the proponent 
behind closed doors, the Nation requested that all communications and information that 
was exchanged between the two parties be provided to the them. In response, ILMB sent 
data and information that included an email that was quite troubling. It read: 
"The impact on caribou is not clear. For clarity, the province is not 
proposing..." Option 3 (and most likely not Option 4, which was added later, 
as it is more restrictive than Option 3), "but seriously examining" Options 1 
and 2. "Until we get more information, we don't know which option best 
addresses the Treaty rights in the area". Since the draft PT Report "hasn't 
been reviewed by West Moberly yet, we want to keep the distribution of this 
limited. I would ask if you could: Give any early feedback on the document; 
anticipated questions, issues, risks." (Kriese, 2010) 
The above email was sent from the Regional Director of the North for the First 
Nations Initiative with the ILMB to FCC's Director of Environment regarding the 
planning process and BC's intentions. It provides a glimpse into the behind the scenes 
intention of BC with respect to working with the First Nation in good faith to 
meaningfully uphold their Treaty rights. That is, not only did it revealed BC had no 
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intention to working with the Nation in good faith, which it was required to do under the 
TOR, but that BC also had no intention of serious considering the impacts from mining 
activities on the culture of West Moberly and protecting their Treaty rights given that the 
province approved the mining activities regardless of such impacts, which was required 
by law. 
Bias Reviews 
Additional information that ILMB sent West Moberly included, among other things, data 
and a letter sent from FCC to BC relating to caribou and letters from non-government 
organizations (NGO) with pro-mining interests, in particular the Mining Association of 
British Columbia (MABC) and the Association for Mineral Exploration British Columbia 
(AMEBC). In the letter FCC sent to the Assistant Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, the 
company states that Option 1 (as it is in the PT Report dated June 8, 2010) is its preferred 
option as it "will balance socio-economic needs with responsible resource development, 
and sound management for caribou protection and recovery". The response from the 
Assistant Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, subsequent to FCC's presentation to BC in 
which the company expressed it views and preferred planning option, was one of 
satisfaction: in the words of the Crown, " it was nice to hear a can do instead of cannot do 
option" (Howe, 2010). Similarly, the letters from MABC and AMEBC were also 
supportive of the wishes of FCC and the continuation of mining in the UWRs and 
WHAs; more specifically, the continuance of mining activities throughout the critical 
habitat of the Burnt Pine caribou herd without the implementation of measures that 
would restrict such activities (MABC, 2010; AMEBC, 2010). 
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With respect to BC seeking third party reviewers for the PT Report and its 
options, there was no indication that environmental NGOs such as the Canadian Parks 
and Wilderness Society or the David Suzuki Foundation were involved in such 
discussions. The one-sided approach used by BC was raised as a concern by West 
Moberly prior to the PT Report being sent to the BC Cabinet. The concern was not, 
however, addressed as BC did not attempt to seek the opinion of any environmental 
NGOs at any time. Notwithstanding the exclusion of environmental NGOs, BC did share 
a draft copy of the PT Report with other Treaty 8 First Nations. Their views were similar 
to one another. None of the First Nations supported Option 1, 2, or 3, but they did 
endorse Option 4 as the plan that best protected their harvesting rights.12 (PT Report, 
2010) 
BC Cabinet Decision 
On June 18, 2010, the BC Cabinet released its decision regarding which option it selected 
with respect to the protection and augmentation plan for the Burnt Pine caribou herd. 
The decision was communicated to West Moberly via a letter from ILMB. In the letter, 
the Crown representative explains the reasons why BC decided on Option 1 over the 
other three options (pg. 1). Option 1, the representative writes, is the basis for the Burnt 
Pine Herd Protection and Augmentation Plan (the "Plan") that fulfills BC's legal 
12
 The BC Cabinet had four options of the recovery and augmentation plan Option 1 and 2 allowed the 
First Coal Corporation to proceed with the development of a coal mine in critical habitat, while mitigation 
measures such as the culling of all wolves in the area and the temporary protection of other, less suitable 
habitat was to be protected Option 3 and 4 were very similar in nature Neither allowed the mining 
activities to continue, as they called for the protection of critical habitat and some predator management to 
dovetail the protection measures The primary difference between these options is that Option 3 applies to 
the range of the Burnt Pine caribou herd and Option 4 applies to all of the herds in the CRM (See 
Appendix Two for a more detailed summary of the four different options) 
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obligations under the court's Order. BC expects that the Plan "will lead to an increase in 
the population size of the Burnt Pine herd", but concedes that the increase will occur as a 
result of predator management and other initiatives (pgs. 1-2). While BC acknowledges 
that Option 1 will not increase the population of the Herd to the levels Option 3 and 4, it 
states that the population will be further increased by the future development and 
implementation of a more comprehensive NCMP for the remaining caribou herds in the 
Peace Region (pgs. 1-4). 
In the letter, BC clearly noted that it recognizes that West Moberly disagreed with 
the option that was selected for the Plan (WMFN's preference was Option 3 or 4), but is 
confident that its decision adequately takes into consideration the views of the First 
Nation and the ecologist and biologist of MOFR and MOE as order by the court. In 
particular, the letter pointed out that the Plan included the First Nation by allowing it to 
participate in the KT and the PT and opportunities to provide comments, resulting in 
some revisions and inclusions of information in both documents, all of which was also 
provided to the BC Cabinet. It also stated that the PT took into account scientific and 
traditional knowledge along with economic factors when it developed the option that now 
is the basis for the Plan. Consequently, as stated in the letter, BC believes "that the Plan 
reasonably balances West Moberly's concerns with the potential impact of the 
exploration permits on its treaty right to hunt, with other societal interests" (pg. 4). 
Selecting one of the First Nation's options, according to BC, would not have resulted in a 
balance since it would have resulted in the tenure holders having to cease their activities. 
"In the Province's view, this Plan strikes an effective balance between accommodating 
West Moberly's Treaty rights as it protects and increases the size of the Burnt Pine 
188 
herd..."(pg. 3). 
In terms of what industrial proponents are permitted to do on the land, the Plan 
allows FCC mining activities to proceed, in addition to allowing other companies in the 
natural resource sector (e.g. windfarms and the oil & gas industry) to 'advance their 
projects' in one area of the herd's range. Further, the Plan commits BC in terms of 
deferring future tenure proposals in the "untenured areas" should they be applied for by a 
proponent, specifically within another area of the herd's range, which starts immediately 
but is only guaranteed to be in place for five years after which the RRAs will be reviewed 
in terms of their effectiveness (pg. 3). 
While the letter states that the Plan is an accommodation of West Moberly's 
rights "as it protects and increases" (pg. 3) the particular herd of caribou, there is no 
mention as to the number of caribou community members are permitted to hunt or 
whether they are permitted to harvest any caribou at all. In short, the letter and thus the 
Plan is silent on the matter of the First Nation's ability to exercise its rights to harvest 
caribou in accordance to its seasonal round, which was the basis for the petition and what 
underscored the Reasons for Judgement rendered by Justice Williamson. 
4.4 Discussion 
This section analyses the conflict between BC and West Moberly regarding BC's Action 
that zoned land for mining activities rather than critical habitat for caribou. Application of 
the framework presented in section 4.2 to the conflict outlined in section 4.3 provides a 
means to determine whether the particulars of the circumstance are tantamount to an 
environmental injustice against West Moberly. 
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4.4.1 West Moberly and the Framework 
The Canadian-based framework for assessing the environmental justice of a decision 
made by a level of government applies to the case of West Moberly; namely, the 
community's move to protect the last 11 caribou of the Burnt Pine herd and their cultural 
right to harvest caribou in accordance to their traditional seasonal round against coal 
mining activities. The First Nation is a Band of Indians that has a distinct (sui generis) 
set of cultural characteristics relating to caribou (including the habitat of the species, as it 
is where medicines from terrestrial lichen are derived) that are immutable from its 
members, making it a protected group in Canada and thus an environmental justice 
community under the framework. The community is confronted by decisions made by 
the BC government (i.e. BC's Action) that worsen their current situation, as the herd of 
caribou will be significantly affected by coal mining activities and cultural rights will be 
further eroded. With the community experiencing burdens (e.g. the loss of cultural 
customs and practices) from the decisions, BC is an appropriate comparator group as it 
experiences benefits (e.g. revenue generation) and removes its burdens (e.g. 
compensation paid to tenure holders) at the expense of the community. 
4.4.2 Respect for Human Dignity 
Similar to Canadian jurisprudence, environmental justice advocates and scholars note that 
the impact to a community needs to be considered from the perspective of the minority 
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group, not the viewpoint of the majority. In this case, albeit not explicitly, West Moberly 
did express many concerns (on numerous occasions) that point to a failure of BC to 
respect their human dignity from the Mountain Dunne-za perspective. 
The first, and likely the most contentious, was BC's disregard (in substantive 
terms) of the role caribou play in the culture of West Moberly. Caribou is clearly one of 
the species that actively maintains the connection between the Nation and their land. The 
species is interwoven throughout the Mountain Dunne-za culture. Although the 
community clearly identified the significance of the species to BC, the government 
disagreed in many respects. Underscoring BC's Action was the view that the rights 
assured to West Moberly under Treaty No. 8 were "global" in nature, rather than culture-
specific. In other words, BC believed that the community had a right to hunt whatever 
they could find within their territory; therefore, if "rats and crows" (WMFN Oral 
Argument, 2010) were the only species remaining the right to hunt would not only exist, 
but would be meaningful as well. The First Nation was clearly upset, mainly because 
such a view degraded their culture and their interconnectedness to the land and the 
animals found throughout their territory as inconsequential. It also dismissed the First 
Nations' perception of their role as stewards of the land, and in addition, the inherent 
right of caribou to fulfil its role in maintaining the balance put in place by the "Creator". 
West Moberly believed their need and capacities, which are grounded in the 
protection and augmentation of caribou in order for the future generations to practice 
traditions and customs that maintain the integrity of the culture, were not valued in the 
same manner as the needs of BC. In particular, the community stated that BC was 
"prioritizing money" through unsustainable development rather than the recovery of 
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caribou and the protection of their cultural rights. The First Nation pointed out that it was 
not opposed to mining done sustainably within their territory, mainly because such 
activities are not necessarily incompatible with the recovery of caribou. But it was 
against unsustainable development, that is, industrial activities that irreparably harm the 
environment which future generations are culturally dependent upon. Accordingly, the 
First Nation made attempts to resolve the matter by suggesting that such activities merely 
need to occur in areas that are not critical to the survival of the species; there was no 
reciprocation by BC. Instead, BC focused on the particular needs of FCC to continue 
with its development plans in its tenured area, an approach that placed a higher value on 
the potential of generating royalties than First Nations' use of the land for cultural 
purposes, including the inherent right of the caribou to survive. With the emphasis on 
using land for industrial purposes to increase provincial revenue, rather than on the 
cultural use of land to maintain a lifestyle, the merits of BC's values have been promoted 
over those of West Moberly. 
4.4.3 Process over Substance 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Treaty No. 8, and subsequent court cases 
confirmed that West Moberly has distinct cultural rights to the environment, including 
both procedural and substantive rights to the land and natural resources within their 
territory. While the First Nation was engaged procedurally (i.e. consultation), albeit 
poorly, BC failed to address the substantive rights of the community. 
In the beginning, the actions of BC were questionable and the bases for the 
decisions were narrowly conceived. Initial letters from both the First Nation and other 
192 
governmental agencies (e.g. MOE) expressing the concerns relating to species at risk, in 
particular caribou, were disregarded by MEMPR. Not only were conditions to mitigate 
the impacts to caribou or the provision of compensation for First Nations not included in 
the early government decisions, but also the dire state of affairs of caribou and the 
adverse impacts to the community were not explicitly contemplated by MEMPR. By the 
time supplementary amendments to the existing permit were submitted, which was the 
centre of BC's Action, both the First Nation and MOE (including MOFR this time) 
voiced serious concerns with the proposed amendments to the permit. In this instance, 
MEMPR provided an opportunity to the parties to voice their concerns; however, this 
opportunity was short in duration. MEMPR ended the discussions once all of the 
positions of the parties were assembled, leaving the parties without an avenue to 
substantively discuss the associated benefits and burdens. BC then informed the First 
Nation of the benefits that the government had created for them in the form of 
accommodation measures; however, none of the measures addressed the impacts to their 
culture. 
BC took the position that no First Nation within its political boundaries, including 
West Moberly, has a right to a specific species. Aside from whether such a line of logic 
is appropriate in other situations, it was not the contention of West Moberly that the 
community had a right to the specific species, but rather had a right to harvest species in 
accordance to their traditional seasonal round, which includes caribou. Grounded in the 
promises of Treaty No. 8, the community believes that it has a right to carry out its 
cultural practices and customs and that no "forced interference" would occur; the court 
agreed. In his findings, Justice Williamson concluded that the Crown had violated the 
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procedural rights of the community (process of consulting meaningfully) and substantive 
rights (outcome of accommodating the rights), and in doing so, ordered the Crown to 
address the matter (West Moberly First Nations vs. British Columbia (Chief Inspector of 
Mines), 2010). BC again failed to do this by not implementing an appropriate protection 
and augmentation plan. 
4.4.4 Inherent Cultural Rights 
With the direction from court to ensure that West Moberly was able to meaningfully 
exercise their traditional practices and customs, BC had an obligation to develop and 
implement a land use plan that would recover the caribou population to a level capable of 
producing a "harvestable surplus" for cultural purposes. Despite such direction, BC 
failed to approve a plan that was designed to address the direction it was provided. 
There were two additional options that, if used as the basis for the plan, would 
have likely produced outcomes in tune with the direction espoused by the court and based 
on the First Nation's Treaty rights as protected by the Canadian Constitution. The main 
difference between the Option 3 and Option 4 (in comparison to Option 1, which was 
selected by BC) is the protection of critical habitat in its entirety from anthropogenic 
activities that physically destroys the land. Option 3 applied specifically to the Burnt 
Pine caribou herd and would, if implemented effectively and if the caribou responded as 
expected, likely increase the population of the herd from 11 to approximately 50 animals. 
This would have resulted in a harvestable surplus of 2-3 animals on an annual basis. 
Option 4 differed only in the scope of application, as it included all seven herds in the 
CRM. If the expected outcome occurred (i.e. a population level of roughly 3,000 and a 
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2%-3% harvest rate), the plan would result in a harvestable surplus of 60-90 animals on 
an annual basis. 
While there is always a risk in land use planning involving species at risk, mostly 
due to the stochastic nature of the environment and the effectiveness of human 
interventions, Option 3 and Option 4 do provide the greatest likelihood of an annual 
opportunity for the First Nation to harvest caribou. The community noted that, although 
the harvest rates would be "modest", the fact that their cultural practices would be able to 
recommence and hopefully continue into the future to some degree would have been a 
more positive outcome. 
4.4.5 Distribution of Benefits and Burdens 
In contrast to the position taken by the BC government, the outcome of the decisions was 
not balanced in terms of the distribution of benefits and burdens. The decisions provided 
benefits to both FCC and BC. The interests of FCC, which is a private company that is 
not afforded protection under the equality provision, were shielded from burdens at the 
same time as it received the benefit of proceeding with its activities as originally 
proposed. BC also protected its interests. By allowing FCC's activities to continue and 
not protecting the critical habitat of the Burnt Pine caribou herd, it did not receive any 
significant burdens. This approach, by BC's own admission, meant that it would 
continue to receive benefits (i.e. revenue) from resource development, and in addition, it 
would not have to compensate tenure holders by having to retract 
exploration/investigatory rights from the various industrial sectors. West Moberly, 
however, did not receive any benefits from the decision. Rather, the community's burden 
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of not being able to harvest caribou for over 40 years in accordance to its traditional 
seasonal round would continue; a burden that could have been avoided. The burden 
borne by West Moberly will likely worsen, mainly because there is a greater likelihood of 
caribou disappearing from their territory and thus their seasonal round, which is a 
violation of their freedoms promised under Treaty No. 8. The distribution of benefits and 
burdens was therefore disproportionate, as the "status quo" approach to land use (PT 
Report, 2010) was maintained by the decisions whereby FCC and BC received the 
benefits and the First Nation was required to shoulder the burdens resulting from such 
decisions. 
4.4.6 Ameliorative Nature of Action 
To "ameliorate the position" of West Moberly, BC's Action should have improved the 
existing disadvantage of the community, which was the community's inability to harvest 
caribou in accordance to its traditional seasonal round for approximately 40 years due to 
low populations numbers caused by Eurocentric values and the corresponding land uses. 
Based on the science and the court, an ameliorative decision would include the following: 
(1) restrictions on industrial development, (2) protection of critical habitat, and (3) an 
increase in the population capable of sustaining a harvestable surplus to facilitate the 
meaningfully exercising of the traditional seasonal round. Depending on the time 
interval between plan implementation and it taking effect, and perhaps the efficacy of the 
plan, the matter of compensation should be at minimum part of the discussion. 
The decision by the BC Cabinet, namely the selection of Option 1 as the basis for 
the recovery plan, fails to be ameliorative. The plan allows the continuation of industrial 
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development in the critical habitat of caribou, in particular within areas that support two-
thirds of the habitat value. Such an approach contradicts the direction provided in SARA 
for the reason that it does not "reverse the factors leading" to caribou soon becoming 
extinct. Allowing the mining activities to continue, in additional to allowing other 
industrial development to occur, means that the critical habitat has not been adequately 
protected; the area that supports two-thirds of the habitat value will be rendered 
ineffective either due to destruction (direct impact) or alienation (indirect impact). 
Without the ability to harvest any caribou in accordance to their traditional seasonal 
round, the situation of West Moberly has not been improved. Additionally, the Crown 
did not offer compensation to West Moberly for the lost of its cultural right to harvest 
caribou, which is promised by Treaty No. 8 and protected by the Constitution Act, 1982. 
4A.1 A Discriminatory Animus 
Establishing that a discriminatory decision was intentional is problematic, as the literature 
on environmental justice notes. Most (and possibly all) laws and regulations that were 
explicitly discriminatory have since been repealed. This is not to say, however, that 
intentional discrimination does not still occur. Government officials may still use 
innocuous pieces of legislation, in addition to the instruments that operationalize them, in 
a discriminatory manner. Such is the case for West Moberly. BC demonstrated a 
particular level of disregard to likely adverse effects caused by its decisions that, in the 
end, bear a considerable resemblance to a discriminatory action against the culture of the 
First Nation that was intentional in nature. 
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After the court informed BC that West Moberly had a cultural right (under Treaty 
No. 8, which was protected by the Constitution Act, 1982) to harvest caribou in 
accordance to its traditional seasonal round, and then ordered the Crown to develop and 
implement a recovery plan that facilitates the meaningful exercising of that cultural 
practice by protecting and augmenting the Burnt Pine caribou herd, the government 
cannot purport to be unaware of its legal obligations to both the species and the culture of 
the First Nation. Also in front of BC was the direction of a federal law, namely SARA 
and the Agreement that it signed along with Canada, to reverse the factors 
(anthropocentric activities) that were adversely impacting caribou and caribou habitat. In 
addition, BC was aware of the likely adverse impacts to the Burnt Pine caribou herd 
(based on the scientific data collected by its own scientists) and the culture of the 
community (WMFN Initial Submissions) if FCC's mining activities were to proceed. 
Irrespective of all of this information and direction, however, BC approved the mining 
activities of FCC. 
While BC's Action suggests a general disregard for the needs of caribou and the 
culture, the underlying objective of BC in particular demonstrated that the government 
had no intention of fulfilling the court order and thus upholding the cultural rights of 
West Moberly. BC's aim was to instead advance industrial development as it was "not 
proposing" planning options that restricted such land uses. This was to occur regardless 
of the negative impacts to caribou and the First Nation. Although BC did note that it is 
unsure of the cultural impacts, it still was only "seriously examining" planning options 
that resulted in significant adverse effects to caribou and, by default, the community. The 
intent of BC was therefore not to ameliorate existing burdens or to address future burdens 
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caused by past industrial developments, but rather was to allow them to exist and most 
likely worsen. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the decisions by BC failed to uphold the principles of environmental justice. 
The decisions, which allowed the development of coal mining activities to continue, 
resulted in significant impacts to caribou as it destroyed the species' critical habitat that it 
needed to survive. Taken together with the cumulative impacts to the species, the 
anthropogenic factors leading to their extinction were worsened by these decisions. 
There were also corresponding impacts to the culture of West Moberly. This placed the 
health and safety of their culture in serious jeopardy, a feeling expressed by community 
members but dismissed by BC. Further, BC approved anthropogenic activities that were 
in contrast to federal law, namely the SARA that requires the government to reserve the 
factors leading to the potential extinction of caribou. Such an approach is quite similar to 
what the people of Shocco Township in North Carolina experienced, which is considered 
to be the seminal event of the environmental justice movement, as environmental 
standards were negated in that case as well. 
In most cases, it is difficult to determine whether discrimination on the part of 
government was unintentional or intentional, as noted in the extant environmental justice 
literature. The data presented in this case, however, reveals a considerable level of 
intolerance on the part of the BC government towards the culture of West Moberly that 
suggests the discrimination was intentional. BC knowingly rejected valid options that 
would have reversed the facts leading to the extinction of caribou and instead opted for a 
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decision that was not based on scientific or traditional knowledge. Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, BC made these decisions behind closed doors with full 
knowledge of the significant impacts to West Moberly's culture. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations 
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5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study has shown that the principles of environmental justice in relation to land and 
natural resources, which was the first question of this thesis, is a multifaceted field that 
includes every aspect of the lives of those at risk, in particular First Nations and their 
reliance on the environment as the basis to their cultures. Under the umbrella of 
environmental justice, as Mitchell (2004) writes, individuals and groups are afforded 
rights that can be separated into two categories. The first is substantive rights, which 
"relates to the right to safe air, water, and soil, and to safety from noxious wastes and 
other pollution as well as access to and use of natural resources and the environment, 
especially with regard to traditional rights" (2004: pgs. 562-563). The second, he notes, 
are procedural rights that relate "to complete and accurate information, fair hearings, and 
meaningful participation in decision and policy making" (2004: pg. 563). 
This study has also shown that environmental justice may be incorporated into a 
Canadian context through an equality-based framework, which was the second question 
of this thesis. Both the principles of environmental justice (American-based) and the 
purposes of equality (Canadian-based) were similar. They included procedural and 
substantive elements that coincided with one another in many respects. This had 
application to the case of an environmental injustice involving a First Nation. It also 
showed that the framework is a constructive tool for a First Nation. Either as a collective 
or as an individual, the tool may be used by a First Nation in order to articulate their 
concerns relating to a land and/or natural resource conflict with another level of 
government in Canada occurring in their territory. 
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Subjecting the decision made by the BC government (to allow a company to 
destroy the critical habitat of a threatened caribou herd) to the equality-based framework 
demonstrated that the process and outcome resulted in an environmental injustice. The 
BC government refused to meaningfully acknowledge the cultural rights of West 
Moberly regarding caribou as well as the inherent rights of the species itself. It allowed 
the existence of an inequality experienced by the community to continue unabated, which 
is a failure of a fundamental component of equality. The government also made the 
situation worse by disproportionately distributing the benefits and burdens; the First 
Nation community was compelled to shoulder the burdens while the coal mining 
company (i.e. FCC) and the BC government received a maximum benefit with no burden. 
Making matters worse is the effort that was exhibited on behalf of the provincial 
government to camouflage the adverse nature of its actions, particularly the fait accompli 
process of decision making, all of which amounts to an egregious case of environmental 
racism. 
In achieving the goal of this thesis, namely the incorporation of environmental 
justice principles into a Canadian context for First Nations to potentially use as a means 
to articulate injustices within their territories, instances of similarities and differences 
between the application of environmental justice in America and Canada emerged. These 
are important to note in order to further the development of environmental justice as a 
field of study in Canada. The differences are discussed separately. 
The first is the rule of law. Unlike in America, where environmental justice is 
part of the federal legal system, there is no statue, regulation, or policy in Canada that 
directly or indirectly incorporates environmental justice (both procedurally and 
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substantively) into environmental decision-making processes. This contradicts the 
position of the former Minister of Environment for the Government of Canada who stated 
in June 2006 that the substance of an international agreement that includes environmental 
justice (i.e. Aarhus Convention: Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters) is addressed through Canada's 
existing laws, making the need for Canada to ratify the agreement unnecessary. Further, 
when asked to clarify whether such matters were to be included under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter") in Canada's Constitution, or elsewhere in Canadian 
law, the former Minister declined to further elucidate her position (Ambrose, 2006). 
The second is scope and approach. As noted above, grounding an environmental 
justice framework in a country's constitution is likely the most appropriate manner by 
which to protect the rights of minorities. This was the approach used during the civil 
rights movement in America and is, according to Canadian scholars, the most likely 
overarching legal mechanism capable of achieving justice for minorities in Canada as it 
applies to all levels of government. Using Canada's Constitution, specifically the 
Charter, as the basis for environmental justice has therefore an important benefit. In 
comparison to the environmental justice approach used in America, which includes in its 
scope the actions that are within the purview of the federal government but excludes the 
actions of the individual state governments, such a framework, grounded in Canada's 
Charter, would apply equally to all levels of government including federal (including the 
Government of Canada and First Nation governments) and provincial governments as 
well as local governments (e.g. municipalities). 
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The underlying approaches are also different in the context of the method used to 
determine whether an inequality exists. In America the approach regarding equality is 
formalistic, that is, it uses abstract and formal rules to analyze equality and discrimination 
in relation to environmental decisions. On the other hand, Canada uses a purposive, 
contextual approach when examining whether the right of an individual or group to 
equality was discriminated against. Perhaps the most significant difference in the 
approaches is the weight given to whether a particular action on the part of a government 
agency is the result of unintentional or intentional discrimination. Under the framework 
in America, an individual or group must demonstrate that the decision was not only 
discriminatory in effect, but that such discrimination was intentional as well. This 
requires substantiation, meaning that an individual or group is required to produce, for 
example, a declaration or documentation that shows the intent of the government. 
Proving intent, as the environmental justice literature notes, is exceedingly problematical 
and a considerable barrier in achieving environmental justice via an equality-based 
framework in America. Such a barrier does not, however, exist in Canada; discrimination 
is unacceptable irrespective of whether it was the result of an intentional or an 
unintentional action by government. While the intent of a government action would 
likely factor into the decision rendered by a court in some fashion, as intentional 
discrimination is more egregious from a moral perspective, an individual or group in 
Canada simply needs to focus in general on demonstrating that the purpose and/or effect 
of the decision amounted to discrimination. 
The third is ideological underpinnings. While not explicitly noted in 
environmental justice research, a melting-pot ideology underscores much (if not all) of 
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such studies done in America. It is premised on people with diverse social and cultural 
backgrounds fusing together to create a new collective. In application, an environmental 
justice community that experiences an injustice will then strive to achieve the level of 
security that non-minority communities have in terms of the benefit due to their social 
and/or income status. Equality in this sense is based on the ideal that all communities 
have the right to, for example, the same type of environmental protection. In Canada, 
however, the ideology that underscores environmental decisions is different, with a focus 
on maintaining a mosaic society that entails a cultural group maintaining its 
distinctiveness while being part of the larger society. This is significant with respect to 
First Nations, as their distinctiveness is explicitly protected by section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Such rights exist to protect their cultures, including the customs 
and traditions in relation to the land and natural resources within their respective 
territories. In application, therefore, a First Nation has a right to an environmental setting 
that is based on their values, not the values held by others. The implications of this are 
significant, as was demonstrated in the land use conflict of between West Moberly and 
BC, which represent two different and opposing views of an environmental outcome. 
Unlike the environmental values of mainstream society, however, the environments of 
First Nations (like West Moberly) are protected due to the interconnection between the 
culture and the surrounding land and natural resources. 
This is not to say, however, that Canada accepts everyone and everyone's culture 
without any problems emerging. While Canada strives (in theory) to be a heterogeneous 
and tolerant society, the fact is that (in implementation) the "social and cultural 
environment [of minorities] is defined as deficient in comparison to mainstream values" 
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(Nelson and Fleras, 1995: pg. 174). The fight by First Nations to protect the land and 
natural resources within their territories and the many court cases that have occurred over 
the years, a trend that is not likely to end soon under the current approach used by the 
Crown (in both its federal and provincial forms) to work with First Nations, demonstrates 
that Canada remains in the process of trying to achieve equality for all its citizens. 
In addition, this study revealed that the theory and practice of using 
environmental justice in a Canadian context must be further developed in order for it to 
effectively identify, assess, and remedy situations tantamount to an injustice for 
minorities in the country. Taking this into consideration, and based upon this study, six 
challenges to incorporating environmental justice into an equality-based framework have 
been identified at this time. 
The first, initial, stages of development, is based on the fact that environmental 
justice (as a distinct field of study in land use planning and natural resource management) 
is beginning to emerge in Canada. While its theoretical underpinnings are similar in 
many respects to the American approach, differences exist in regard to its use in a 
Canadian setting and they have not been adequately studied to date. This is not to say, 
however, that the environmental injustices faced by minorities in Canada have not been 
studied by scholars or have been brought to light activists and supporters. For example, 
the works contained in Haluza-Delay et al. (2009) demonstrate that environmental 
injustices are not only present in Canada, but are also the focus of scholarly endeavours. 
Missing from this work, however, is a focus on those matters of particular importance to 
First Nations. There is little doubt that housing, employment, and healthy water and 
clean air are of concern to such communities, which are similar to non-First Nation 
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communities while at the same time are different in context. The urban/rural injustices 
(conventional EJ) faced by First Nations are centred on the reserve system and the 
administration of their jurisdiction by INAC (an agency of the Government of Canada). 
Less conventional are the problems such communities face with respect to land and 
natural resources. But there is likely a larger focus for First Nations, in particular those in 
remote and/or northern communities, which is access to and allocation of land and natural 
resources. 
The second is the information requirements of the equality framework, which 
places a considerable onus on a First Nation to articulate information that is likely private 
and personal to the individual or Nation as a whole. Their cultural ways of 
communicating may not be able to provide data in the format that the framework requires 
for analysis. For instance, there is a possibility that some cultural values cannot be easily 
(if at all) translated into English terms and/or adequately conveyed substantively. In 
addition, some information may not be suitable for the framework; for example, the 
information may be in oral form and, for cultural reasons, is not to be transferred (i.e. 
recorded and transcribed) into a written form. The development of a more culturally 
suitable framework, which is recommended below, is one possible avenue to address this 
challenge. 
Third, the structure and repetition of the framework is a challenge. This study 
relied significantly on the approach to assess inequality in government decisions that was 
developed in Law (1999) as the basis for the Canadian-based environmental justice 
framework. While it is appropriate for assessing inequality relating to matters such as 
employment and health care, a strict application to an environmental issue involving a 
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First Nation reduces the overall efficacy of the approach. Overlaps surface due to the 
holistic nature of First Nations, an example of which is their knowledge and the manner 
in which a community disseminates their values associated with land and natural 
resources. Also, the structure (in conjunction with the information requirements) is 
problematic as it places an onus onto a First Nation to collect and articulate a rather larger 
amount of data. Seeing as First Nations, as well as other minority groups, have a general 
lack of financial capacity to adequately participate in decision-making processes, the 
additional requirement of satisfying the structure of the framework with information may 
prove to be difficult to overcome. 
The fourth, which is Eurocentric values versus Indigenous values, is of particular 
importance. As some environmental justice research conducted in America has revealed, 
the existing environmental laws are in many ways an extension of "colonial systems" that 
are "perverse" when applied to minorities and their environments. Given the significant 
differences between mainstream society in Canada and the cultures of First Nations, 
caution needs to be taken when applying the principles of environmental justice to First 
Nations. Collecting primary data from First Nation communities to develop a grounded 
theory is suggested in order to build upon, or modify, the current understanding of the 
discipline from a First Nations' perspective. This recommendation is similar to 
suggestions put forward by Reed and George (2011) regarding indigenous methodologies 
and the need to address the fact that much of the discipline is based on the "American 
concept" of environmental justice. 
Fifth, and perhaps most fundamental to need to incorporate environmental justice 
into a Canadian context involving First Nations, is the challenge of identifying and 
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properly taking into account the sui generis nature of First Nations. It is of vital 
important to recognize that all First Nations are sui generis (i.e. unique unto their own). 
It is also important to note that, while it is rather straightforward to recognize this 
variable, understanding it in the context of research design, methods and subject matter 
can prove to be quite challenging for non-members (i.e. those not belonging to the 
Nation). Each culture has its own "cultural area" where their distinct set of traditions, 
customs, and practices have been and continue to be exercised by their relations 
(kinship). The process of researching a phenomenon and its analysis needs to be adopted 
accordingly. That is, an approach used with one First Nation to examine a particular 
situation is not necessarily appropriate to use when working with another First Nation. 
There might be a number of reasons for this to occur: for example, one community may 
not be comfortable with an investigation into environmental racism whereas such a study 
may be acceptable in another community. Further, a case of environmental injustice for 
one First Nation community may not necessarily constitute an injustice in another. Since 
each culture is different, it is safe to assume that the processes and outcomes thereof may 
be different as well. Methods and analysis techniques ought to be developed on a case-
by-case basis in conjunction with a First Nation (i.e. a community-based research 
design). 
Lastly, the section 1 override of Canada's Constitution creates a serious 
challenge. By grounding a Canadian-based environmental justice framework in section 
15(1) of the Constitution, and from a legal perspective, there is a possibility that the 
government may be in the position to justify the discrimination in some cases. 
Unfortunately, for First Nations, it is not possible to rely on section 35(1) of the 
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Constitution, as it does not completely protect them against the government acting in a 
discriminatory fashion; a government may justify an infringement to a First Nation 
culture in some cases. This is regarded as a significant (albeit inherent) limitation of the 
equality framework to achieve environmental justice for minorities; however, it is more 
or less unavoidable under the current legal regime in Canada. 
There is a strong likelihood that the field of environmental justice may be 
incorporated into many avenues within the Canadian system. It most certainly has the 
potential to be of significant assistance to minorities, particularly as a tool in their 
struggle to attain justice. Based on this study, and to address the third question of this 
thesis, the following examples of two potential future applications and two potential 
future frameworks are reviewed and recommendations are made. 
The first application is defining community units. An important element in any 
environmental justice research is establishing the study area. Such an area must be 
representative of the population at the centre of the investigation. As previously 
discussed, establishing analysis units regarding a community is both problematic and 
dependent on the circumstances of the investigation, in addition to the characteristics of 
the particular community (see: Williams, 1999). When taken in a Canadian context with 
a First Nation, the challenge becomes delineating an appropriate study area within which 
to apply an environmental justice framework. Keeping in mind the sui generis nature of 
First Nations, and the fact that First Nations tend not to compartmentalize culture and 
land in the same fashion (if at all) as non-First Nations, the selection of a study area is not 
only culture dependant but also issue dependant. There are likely several perspectives 
that a First Nation must consider in determining a study area: synoptic view (e.g. 
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relations with surrounding Nations, its respective traditional/treaty territory), land-based 
(e.g. family use areas, traplines), resource-based (e.g. plant gathering sites, campsites), 
and sacred/spiritual-based (e.g. wildlife, spiritual site/location). 
The second application is land use plans and planning processes. In most areas 
in Canada, environmental decisions in general relate back to a land use plan in some 
fashion. Such plans, as in the case of British Columbia's Land and Resource 
Management Plans (LRMP), were developed prior to many of the seminal court decisions 
regarding the cultural rights of First Nations; for example, Delgamuukw (1997) validated 
the use of cultural data (e.g. oral histories) and Haida Nation (2004) confirmed that First 
Nations must be meaningfully included in strategic level decisions. In view of this, and 
given that many of the legal challenges to date are based on access to and allocation of 
land and natural resources, much of which is linked to the direction outlined in the 
LRMPs, an environmental justice analysis of land use plans is likely warranted. Such 
investigations are important in the protection of cultural rights held by First Nations. 
First Nations, such as West Moberly, are not restricted to land and natural resources 
within the boarders of the reserves established by the Government of Canada. Their 
rights extend throughout their cultural area (e.g. traditional/treaty territory). Without the 
inclusion (or perhaps meaningful inclusion) of culture in land use plans, there is prima 
facie information that indicates such plans may be the cause of past and ongoing land use 
conflicts that result in environmental injustices to First Nations. 
The first potential framework is this: consultation with First Nations. Unlike 
public participation frameworks, consultation with First Nations is required by the 
common law in Canada. There is a lot of literature surrounding the field of consultation, 
212 
including case law and scholarly works. This framework would require an understanding 
of with whom, when, and how to consult. Capacity is also an issue that would need to be 
addressed, that is, funding required by a First Nation to effectively participate in the 
process. The consultation framework assumes that the government (e.g. federal, 
provincial, local) will consult with a First Nation in a timely manner and that it will be in 
good faith and meaningful, whereby the First Nations' cultural rights are reasonably 
accommodated and the honour of the Crown is upheld. There are many limitations of 
this framework, which is demonstrated by the number of court cases that have occurred. 
Most notable is that the framework is process oriented. More to the point, the outcome of 
process (i.e. whether the accommodation was reasonable in the circumstances) is not the 
focus; rather, the focus is on whether the process is adequate. 
A second potential framework is culture-based. As previously discussed, the 
frameworks developed to date are questionable given their Eurocentric origins. The 
literature on First Nations and the adverse impacts from anthropogenic activities, such as 
mining and other industries harvesting natural resources, has grown substantially in 
recent years. First and foremost, this framework would require the approval of a First 
Nation; such approval may take many forms, ranging from signing consent forms to a 
community partnership and full involvement in the investigation. Through a community-
based approach, researchers would be required identify, collect, analyse, and culturally 
validate findings. The culture-based framework assumes that an environmental justice 
lens is culturally appropriate and that it is capable of articulating the voice of the First 
Nation in a culturally appropriate fashion. A full appreciation of the potential limitations 
of this framework is difficult to discern given the paucity of data on environmental justice 
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in Canada; however, when more data is available, First Nations themselves would be in a 
better position to accurately identify the limitations. From a socio-science research 
perspective, a limitation would likely be the generalizability (external validity) of such 
frameworks; there are hundreds of First Nations in Canada each with their own unique 
culture, making the task of developing a single cultural-based framework difficult. 
In conclusion, if environmental justice (as developed in America) is applied to 
situations in Canada without taking into consideration the unique circumstances of the 
country's polity regarding the protection of minorities, in particular the sui generis nature 
of First Nation cultures, the application will fail to uphold the principles of environmental 
justice. As a society, Canada has a positive legal obligation to protect the cultures of 
First Nations as they have a procedural right in environmental decision-making and 
substantive rights to carry on their cultural practices and traditions in relation to their 
environmental surroundings, including both material and immaterial aspects. Despite the 
limitations that currently existing within the literature, which is largely due to the 
domination of American viewpoints, this thesis takes a step in addressing the 
'disconnect' noted by Reed and George (2011) and Haluza-Delay et al. (2009). The 
study expands the theoretical understanding and applications of environmental justice in 
a Canadian context by generating an equality-based framework and applying to it to the 
situation of West Moberly and determining that an injustice had indeed occurred and is 
continuing to occur. 
"We care for these animals [caribou], not just because we want to eat them" 
(WMFN Initial Submissions, 2009: pg. 38). 
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Postscript 
Prior to the oral defence of my thesis on April 21, 2011 at the University of Northern 
British Columbia, I decided to have several members of West Moberly First Nations 
review my thesis. I felt that this was important given that a key element of the thesis was 
based on their experiences; more importantly, it is reflective of Dane Dunne-za Wehoh 
(follow the Dunne-za Peoples traditional ways) and therefore an ethical step in any 
research that relates to Dane Dunne-za hanane (the land of the Beaver People), including 
but not limited to matters regarding nan (land)y'// nank'ih maat'ah (everything from land 
that the people rely on). Not surprisingly, most community reviewers where not overly 
enthusiastic about reading a document roughly 250 pages in length. Other than one 
individual, most elected to read the illustrative example (Chapter 4) and conclusion and 
recommendations (Chapter 5) as part of their review; in most cases, I provided an oral 
summary (overview) on the remaining chapters. 
All of the comments that I received were very positive and supportive in nature. 
Several discussions ensured, most of which revolved around the concept of 
environmental justice and their community's struggle to protect Dane Dunne-za hanane, 
in particular their most recent battle with the government to protect the last 11 Wah stzee 
i -1 
(caribou) of the Burnt Pine caribou herd. Central to these discussions was my use of 
13
 A few days prior to my defence date, BC's caribou expert notified the community of the results of 
population surveys of three Wah stzee herds in the South Peace. The results were devastating, as all three 
have significantly declined since their last counts: Moberly 191 to 35, Kennedy Siding from 90 to 45, and 
the Burnt Pine from 11 to 5 animals. These new data merely highlight the dire straights of Wah stzee in 
West Moberly's territory and the ongoing environmental injustice. The question is this: will the BC 
government take immediate steps to curtail the downward spiral or will it turn a blind-eye to the situation? 
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the term "environmental racism" as a way to reflect on BC's overall treatment of the 
community. This is not to say that there was disagreement with the conclusion - in fact, 
a few would have chosen more pointed language. Rather, the discussion was on the use 
of the term "environmental racism" instead of the term "cultural genocide". 
While the term "cultural genocide" was not explicitly used in their struggle to 
protect Wah stzee or captured in related documents, such as the "I Want to Eat Caribou 
Before I Die: Initial Submissions for the Proposed Mining Activity at First Coal 
Corporation's Goodrich Property",14 the term has been recorded by other socio-scientific 
research projects with the community in recent years. Most notable is the research 
conducted by my thesis supervisor, Dr. Annie Booth (see: Booth, A. and Skelton, N 
(forthcoming)). Her research pertained to environmental assessments and consultations 
with the following participants: Halfway River First Nation, West Moberly, and BC's 
Environmental Assessment Office. That research documented the feelings of the two 
First Nations (noted above) in relation to the excessive level of development within 
hanane, where the term "cultural genocide" was used by community members. 
With respect to my thesis, the term culture genocide was considered to be more 
"identifiable" than the term environmental racism. Generally speaking, the former term 
more appropriately reflects their historic and current struggles against the Crown over 
land and natural resources. It also encapsulates the full spectrum of the First Nation's 
mode of life (e.g. health, economics, wildlife, songs, trails, spirituality, and generations to 
Perhaps more fundamentally, will the Government of Canada (in the place of BC's likely refusal to act 
honourably) use its statutory power under the Species at Risk Act to issue an emergency order to protect 
these herds of Wah stzeel Either way, the Treaty rights of West Moberly to harvest the species in 
accordance with its traditional seasonal round - as the community had done since time immemorial - needs 
to be ameliorated to reverse the environmental injustice that began over 40 years ago and continues to this 
day 
14
 One of my committee members, Wendy Aasen, played a significant role in the generation of roughly the 
first half of this document with the community; the second half relates to matters of law 
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come) that has been and continues to be part of the community's worldview, whereas the 
term environmental racism is perceived to be, for example, restrictive and thus not 
representative. While this is not a finding per se, as this cultural procedure fall outside of 
my conventional schooling, it does potentially reveal another difference in environmental 
justice developed in America in comparison to Canada. When asked, a descendant of 
Old Man Dokkie had this to say on the matter: 'the western concept15 of documenting the 
concerns of First Nations is viable for non-First Nations people in order for them to better 
understand the unique way we look at the world'. 
15
 By the use of the term "western", the community member was quick to point out that their views (i.e. 
First Nations) are the original western view, because Europeans are from the East (or perhaps centre) in the 
context of the world. 
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Appendix 1: Risk Assessment 
While this debate began approximately fifteen years ago with the release of the EPA 
report, the use of risk assessment has nevertheless a long history in decision making. 
Historically, most environmental decisions relating to anthropogenic hazards from 
industrial development prior to the 1970s were based on the ad hoc processes of 
regulators (Morgan and Henrion, 2007). Often, their decision(s) were then problematic 
to justify when challenged as they did not withstand scientific scrutiny. To some degree, 
this changed when the underpinnings of RA (as an analytical technique in environmental 
decision making) were adopted by many regulators in the human health and 
environmental fields to set various standards (O'Neil, 2000). With public concern 
growing as a result of the nuclear energy industry (Morgan and Henrion, 2007), the U.S. 
National Research Council (NRC) moved towards standardizing the procedure for 
analyzing risk (National Research Council, 1983). By 1983, the NRC developed an 
approach to gauge the dangers to humans associated with anthropogenic hazards 
(National Research Council, 1983). 
RA, as an approach relied upon in environmental decisions making processes, 
was not initially mandated by the U.S. federal government. It was not until the 1990s, 
with the EPA under a significant amount of pressure from environmental justice groups 
that were challenging the reasoning for the siting of LULUs within their neighbourhoods, 
did the government begin to react. Heiman (1996) contends that this 'lack of confidence' 
on the part of such communities, including the general public to a lesser extent, led the 
EPA to request the formal adoption of RA into decision making processes. Because it is 
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an objective technique according to the EPA, its implementation into environmental 
decision making would put an end to the various emotional arguments by those objecting 
to the sitting practices of LULUs, which were (in the view of minorities) scientifically 
unsubstantiated (Heiman, 1996). 
In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866 in relation to Regulatory 
Planning and Review. It requires federal regulations pertaining to the environment and 
human health be assessed for their benefits and costs, which includes the identification of 
the risk through a comparative approach (Executive Order 12866, 1993). Within this 
context, the EPA understands risk assessment to be a procedure that is carried out 
...to provide the best possible scientific characterization of risks 
based on a rigorous analysis of available information and 
knowledge... [pertaining to an] environmental hazard [that] 
might cause harm to exposed persons and ecosystems" (EPA, 
2004: pg. 2-3). 
The intent of RA is to examine the potential hazards associated with various 
LULUs and the dangers they pose to the public. Under the framework outlined by the 
NRC, an assessor is able to systemically identify, collect, and analyze qualitative (Cullen 
and Small, 2000) and quantitative (Freedman, 1998) data. There is a focus on "the 
catastrophic potential associated with the risk event, scientific uncertainty, distribution of 
risk outcomes, and understanding and familiarity of the risk" (Noble, 2006: pg. 37). Of 
the uncertainties that exist, Suter (1983) points to three sources: "stochasticity" (inherent 
randomness of the natural environment), "ignorance" (incomplete knowledge of 
everything that exists in the natural environment), and "error" (human mistakes made by 
the assessor). 
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While the terms 'hazard', 'danger', and 'risk' are frequently used interchangeably 
in the environmental justice literature, they are nevertheless different in the context of RA 
methodology. In general, the hazard is the addition of something unnatural to an 
environment like a toxic chemical (i.e. the cause); the danger is the relationship between 
the chemical and the human (i.e. the effect); and, the risk is the potential for the hazard to 
cause the dangerous results (i.e. the impact) (see, for example: Gremmen and Van Den 
Belt, 2000; Freedman, 1998). These terms, along with the general understanding of the 
RA as a science, make up the four step methodology of risk assessment: (1) hazard 
identification, (2) dose-response, (3) exposure assessment, and (4) risk characterization 
(O'Neil, 2000; Israel, 1995; National Research Council, 1983). 
Step one determines whether human exposure to the chemical substance is 
adverse (National Research Council, 1983). As a general rule, this involves the 
qualitative assessment of a singular chemical substance (Israel, 1995). To identify the 
hazard(s) an assessor: pinpoints the chemical agents that are expected to cause a hazard; 
verifies the level in which they exist within the environment; determines the type of 
toxicity (e.g. neurotoxin, carcinogen, and/or mutagen) an agent produces; and, establishes 
the circumstance(s) that the toxicity will appear (e.g. the "endpoint": humans develop 
cancer) in those that are exposed to the chemical (O'Neil, 2000). A challenge of this step 
is the expense of conducting comprehensive studies and the potential for interaction with 
and/or in combination with another singular or mixture of chemical substances (Israel, 
1995). 
The second is to examine the effects of a human being exposed to a chemical 
substance and its agents, commonly referred to as dose-response. Using the qualitative 
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data of step one, an assessor quantifies the range of adverse effects from various degrees 
of exposure in order to determine the severity (O'Neil, 2000). This is then compared to 
the 'threshold' of an 'endpoint' (Israel, 1995), that is, the level and degree of exposure 
known to result in a human developing, for example, a respiratory illness. In cases where 
a threshold has not been identified, an assessor tries to identify a level of exposure that 
likely results in an adverse effect. An assessment involving a carcinogen, however, does 
not use a 'threshold' approach. 
The third, exposure assessment, establishes how, and the extent to which, a 
chemical is likely to interact with a human. This is accomplished by following the 
movements of both the chemical and humans in the environment. Determining whether a 
chemical contaminates a source (i.e. air, water, and land) and whether a contaminated 
source is able to enter a human pathway (i.e. ingestion, inhalation, and dermal 
absorption) enables an assessor to establish the intensity, frequency, and duration of the 
exposure (O'Neil, 2000). Since chemicals are known to impact humans differently, it is 
important to understand the different movements of humans and their reliance on 
resources in order to accurately determine the interaction. However, as Cullen and Small 
(2000) point out, this step is problematic and is primarily responsible for many of the 
errors due to the uncertainty inherent within the approach. It therefore requires a detailed 
understanding of the specific population that is likely to be exposed; what is adverse for a 
youth may not necessarily be adverse for an adult, or vice versa (O'Neil, 2000). As such, 
an assessor must identify not only the pathway(s) and source(s) that may result in a 
human being exposed, but also the occurrence(s) and degree(s) of acuteness from 
exposure(s). Putting together several possible scenarios in terms of channels that 
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someone may be exposed, the severity, and the possibility of them occurring is also 
beneficial (Cullen and Small, 2000) in overcoming the inherent uncertainty. 
Lastly, the description of the risk(s) associated with the chemical being released 
into the environment refers to the compilation of information from the previous three 
steps. Based on the hazards of releasing the chemical and the dangers of humans being 
exposed, an assessor predicts the probability of adverse effects occurring. This includes 
an assessor "...characteriz[ing] the general state of knowledge about the risk and the 
overall weight of evidence concerning the nature and source of the hazard" by means of a 
qualitative description (Cullen and Small, 2000: pg. 2). The probability is typically 
represented numerically as 1:100,000 or 1:1,000,000; in some cases, it is also written as 
'one-in-a-hundred-thousands' (Heiman, 1996). In the case of a carcinogen being released 
in to the environment, for example, the ration represents the increase in the number of 
human deaths due to cancer (O'Neil, 2000). 
On the surface RA seems anodyne (colourless), mostly because the criteria are 
scientific and thus regarded as neutral, as noted by the EPA in their 1992 report, which 
ought to produce fair and accurate findings. Since the early years, including those that 
followed the NRC's standardization of the methodology and the issuance of Executive 
Order 12866, there has been strong opposition to the methods of this technique from the 
environmental justice community. Insofar as environmental justice analysis is currently 
understood, according to Bryant (1995), the findings of such studies do not reflect the 
circumstances of a particular situation appropriately. He points out that many of the 
studies merely compare exposure rates rather than the burdens one endures as a result of 
toxicological and biological exposure, or conversely, the benefits that one experiences 
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when shielded from being exposed. Further, a survey of environmental groups revealed 
that the disagreement was largely do to the following: "misuse and manipulation of risk 
assessment for political purposes...; poor scientific basis; political disempowerment; 
asking the wrong questions - emphasis on quantifying rather than reducing or eliminating 
risk" (Lui, 2001: pg. 86). 
Accordingly, scholars have pointed out that the technique is often employed in a 
manner that frequently conceals inequitable outcomes, and thus is not conducive to issues 
relating to justice (Shrader-Frechette, 2002). What frequently goes unnoticed is the 
hidden assumption that all segments of society share this risk. Such an assumption is 
incorrect, according to Heiman (1996), who points out that, by basing an environmental 
decision on RA, the accurate impact(s) of the decision are hidden as risks are not borne 
equally across racial and social lines. As such, both environmental organizations and 
advocates have objected to its use by the EPA to determine whether environmental 
burdens are equitably distributed across social groups (Holifield, 2001). They believe it 
is arguable whether particular sections of society bear any risk at all, let alone share it 
with everyone else - an assertion that is supported by the data noted earlier in this 
Chapter (see the GAO and UCC studies). 
Kuehn (1996) suggests that much of this relates to the following generalization in 
which the acceptable limits are based on: a 70 kilogram white male. He refers to this as 
the "reference man" approach to determining risk. This does not take into account 
characteristics unique to an individual or a group of such individuals. Nor does it for that 
matter consider the traits indicative of different cultures; for example, the type and 
frequency of land use activities by American Indians in comparison to non-American 
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Indians living in urban environments. Kuehn has stated that an individual's age, sex, and 
genetic background all result in a significant degree of variability. He further writes that 
understanding the susceptibility of a specific population can prove to be quite 
challenging; for example, human variation in drug metabolism can be as high as 1000-
fold and anywhere from 3 to 150-fold for the metabolism of carcinogenic chemicals 
(Kuehn, 1996). 
What makes the above noted generalization more questionable, according to 
Kuehn, is that it does not acknowledge that people of colour are exposed to higher levels 
of hazards and more frequently because of their living and working conditions. An 
example of this is the amount of poor air quality as a result of pollution while at work and 
in their residences (Robinson, 1991; Bullard and Johnson, 1997; Pellow et al, 2001). 
Having up-to-date demographics is required as many environmental justice communities 
have a higher than average population of children and young women, the level of risk is 
higher as those subpopulations are more susceptible to the adverse effects of chemical 
substances (Kuehn, 1996). 
Rarely, if at all, is the actual nomenclature of a chemical substances' 
hazardousness fully understood. In part this is due to the 'endpoint' strategy. Scientists 
have also long acknowledged that some level of uncertainty already exists within this 
type of assessment (Suter, 1993). Most assessments, allegedly because of economic 
reasons according to proponents, predetermine what the assessor is looking for in terms 
of an adverse effect which, in effect, restricts the focus of the hazard identification step 
(Israel, 1995). As a result, significant data gaps have emerged with respect to synergistic 
effects and the potential for adverse cumulative impacts (Lui, 2001). 
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To handle the uncertainty and to fill in the gaps, as argued by O'Brien (2000), is 
the subjectivity of the company producing the risk, which is unavoidably influenced by 
its economic interests over those of others such as environmental justice communities or 
perhaps even the general public. Thus, the operationalization of a private company's 
self-interest may result in a narrow focus in that the hazard is examined in a vacuum and 
thus is not representative of the interactions within and the stochasticity of the 
environment. Further, as is likely the case for many scientists and other related 
professionals working for industry, there is an underlying fear of not producing the 
desired results to meet a company's plans to construct a proposed project. Relationships 
grounded in power and profit, according to Waiten (1981), are significant factors that 
have a likelihood of influencing an assessment, as there is pressure on the assessor to 
conclude there is a low level of risk associated with a particular activity (O'Brien, 2000). 
Krieg and Faber (2004) have pointed out that environmental justice issues do not 
just have a single indicator or a distinct set of indicators, that is, "what constitutes a risk 
in one community may not constitute a risk in another community" (pg. 671). A limiting 
factor for many of these assessments, according to Kuehn (1996), is that they are 
incapable of taking into consideration multiple pathways and pre-existing hazards with 
respect to aggregation of risk. Kuehn's conclusion is that risk assessments fail to take 
into account not only the complete impact of a potential hazard being added to the 
environment, but it overlooks and underestimates the adverse impacts minority groups 
disproportionately experience as well. 
The acceptable level of risk that society is to bear, which as noted earlier is 
typically represented numerically as being something in to the effect of 1:100,000 or 
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1:1,000,000, is determined at the policy level (Heiman, 1996) by politicians and 
bureaucrats that are removed from the situation. Since 'acceptability' is predetermined, 
an impacted community does not participate in the decision regarding what is an 
acceptable level of risk and what is not (Kuehn, 1996). Those placed at risk are thus 
barred from establishing the parameters of community health. This flaw, according to 
O'Brien (2000), "obscures and removes the fundamental right to say no to unnecessary 
poisoning of one's body and environment". Tal (1997) has therefore suggested that the 
technocratic nature of such analysis processes is visibly "immoral and undemocratic" (pg. 
86). 
To address this situation while at the same time acknowledging that the data 
required for such an assessment is case-specific, the validity of an investigation depends 
largely on the public's participation (Cullen and Small, 2000). In contrast to the process 
being exclusive by design, they suggest that it be structured in such a manner that the 
stakeholders and experts are included in the development of the problem definition, 
carrying out the study, and the analysis of the information. Furthering this approach are 
Sexton et al (1993), who propose a framework that is centred around environmental 
justice principles such as the relationship between people and their environment, 
including their characteristics and the influences that have or might exist in their 
surroundings. Three key questions guide their approach: "How do important exposure -
and susceptibility - related attributes affect environmental health risks? How do class and 
race affect important exposure - and susceptibility - related attributes? How do class and 
race differentially affect environmental health?" (Sexton et al, 1993: pg. 715). 
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Rather than focusing on "how large the risk is", Lui (2001) suggests that the 
assessment address "how the risk is distributed" (pg. 89) across social groups that are 
divided by class or race. In addition, he adds that RAs may be more accurate through the 
inclusion of human behaviours: "[t]his may include an individual's daily activity patterns, 
change of such patterns over the lifetime, change of residence, and the extrapolation of 
individuals to populations using the distributions of these variables" (pg. 90). In this 
way, the focus of the assessment should be on the specific characteristics of the sub-
population that is likely to be exposed to the hazard instead of the general traits of the 
large population which are not likely to come in contact with the hazard and thus not be 
exposed to any danger. 
Although the intricacies of RA can be modified to more appropriately account for 
the environmental burdens placed on minorities, as the literature demonstrates, a criticism 
remains. Some have argued that irrespective of the potential for modifications the 
method is incapable of fulfilling the requirements of environmental justice. In particular, 
scholars and advocates have contended that the methods of RA, upon which 
environmental decisions are made, can be traced to a notion of justice that is utilitarian in 
nature (Lui, 2001: 54). Further, according to Bullard (1993a), the utilitarian perspective 
underpins most (if not all) decisions relating to land use activities regardless of whether 
RA was used a tool in the decision-making process. 
Utilitarianism in general focuses on the aggregate consequences of a decision in 
relation to the populace as opposed to its impacts upon a particular group. In other 
words, a decision relating to environmental planning or management would be based on 
whether the good outweighs the bad in terms of the 'greatest benefit for the greatest 
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number' (Lui, 2001). To best serve society, Soccio (1992) notes that a 'utility' must be 
beneficial in "its usefulness" and "how well it performs its specific function" (pg. 395). 
This approach is regarded as the "principle of utility" (Soccio, 1992) which, as Howe 
(1990: pg. 130) points out, is where "justice" is derived. 
In application, according to Bowie and Simon (1996), problems emerge as 
utilitarianism is flawed with respect to its application in a society that is diverse. They 
argue that the manner in which utilitarianism takes into account the role of a person 
within social processes is insufficient, and point to the critique provided by Rawls (1999) 
in his book "A Theory of Justice": 
It is customary to think of utilitarianism as individualistic, and certainly there 
are good reasons for this. The utilitarians were strong defenders of liberty 
and freedom of thought and the held that the good society is constituted by 
the advantages enjoyed by individuals. Yet utilitarianism is not 
individualistic, at least when arrived at by the more natural course of 
reflection, in that, by conflating all systems of desires, it applies to the society 
the principle which should regulate an association of men are simply an 
extension of the principle of choice of one man. (pg. 26). 
While utilitarianism purports to be an individualist theory, as Rawls' writes, in 
application the perspective is not, as it overlooks personalities of the individual (Bowie 
and Simon, 1996). The issue that Rawls seems to be emphasizing is that utilitarianism 
treats society as a single person, rather than a collection of individuals and groups. As a 
result, the desires (or happiness) that are most prevalent with individuals in the society 
bubble to the surface and thus form the 'utility', whereas those desires that are less 
widespread within society, such as those found within a minority group that is being 
compelled to accept the risk and associated dangers from a LULU being placed in their 
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community, are by and large neglected; essentially, the utility as defined by the majority 
cancels the utility as defined by the minority (Bowie and Simon, 1996). For such 
reasons, as contended in much of the environmental justice literature, the theological 
perspective of utilitarianism contributes to the disproportionate impact shouldered by 
environmental justice communities as it "fail[s] to deal with the issue of equity and 
distributive justice" (Lui, 2001: pg. 20). 
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Appendix 2: Overview of Planning Team Report and Plan Options 
The process for the Planning Team (PT) involved the development of two main 
documents. First, the PT had to develop Terms of Reference that would guided the 
overall process and included in some respects the process that the KT underwent. 
Second, the PT had to develop a final report that was presented to the government of 
West Moberly and the Cabinet of the Provincial Government of British Columbia (BC) 
for them to make a decision prior to June 19, 2010 in order to adhered to the timeframe 
set out by Justice Williamson in his Order. 
Terms of Reference 
The Terms of Reference (TOR) held, as its objective, to "develop and put in place by 
June 18, 2010 an active plan to protect and augment" the Herd, and to result in 
accommodation of WMFN's rights (Planning Team Report, 2010: pg. 19). The 
principles of the TOR included WMFN and BC working on a 'government-to-
government ' basis. In addition, the TOR stated that the PT Report which was submitted 
to the governments "will": provide recommendations in terms of protecting and 
augmenting the Herd, including the means to achieve the objective such as management 
measures, legal mechanisms, and the funding required to implement the Plan; and, in the 
case that the governments (i.e. BC and WMFN) cannot agree on a single plan, then the 
difference of opinion will be documented in the PT Report (PT Report, 2010: pg. 19). 
The TOR further states that, during the development of the PT Report, the PT 
"must take into account the following": (1) WMFN's Treaty rights to harvest caribou 
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within their "traditional seasonal round"; (2) the fact that the "findings" noted in the KT 
Report "are necessary to achieve the Population Targets indentified" in the KT; (3) 
"socioeconomic interests, and the interests of third parties" whereby the "potential 
negative and positive outcomes associated with implementation" are indentified; (4) the 
"ecological factors, including the relationship of the Burnt Pine to neighbouring caribou 
herds, the geographical scope of the Protection and Augmentation Measures"; and, (5) 
the "implementation factors, including the necessary legal instruments, political 
ratifications processes of both Parties, and the financial cost of implementation" (PT 
Report, 2010: pg. 20). 
Planning Team Final Report 
A final report of the PT (the "PT Report), entitled the "Burnt Pine Caribou Planning 
Team Report" and dated June 8, 2010, was submitted to the BC Cabinet in order to fulfil 
the TOR and the court's Order. As the governments could not agree on a single plan, the 
PT Report included multiple options for the BC Cabinet to consider, described as "four 
options for a reasonable and active plan..." (PT Report, 2010: pg. 1). Further, according 
to the PT Report, Option 1 and 2 were developed by Crown representatives as WMFN 
"believed these options will not increase the Burnt Pine herd to a level that will support a 
sustainable harvest" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 1); such a level was required for First Nations 
to exercise their right to hunt caribou in accordance to its seasonal round. 
The options are divided into five sub-sections: Management Intent, Habitat 
Protection Measures, Caribou Population Management Measures, Implementation 
Requirements, and Implications. Each option and their sub-section are summarized 
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below in bullet form16. 
Option One: "No New Development in the Selected Core Habitats " 
• Management Intent: 
This option permits "a greater level of development to occur by both existing and 
potential new tenure holders when compared to the other options", which includes 
"resource development by coal, oil and gas, and wind" in Zone B. Such 
industries would not be allowed in Zone A. During the development of this 
option, BC "considered and attempted to reasonably address": (1) protecting core 
habitat, (2) existing resource development tenure holders, (3) WMFN's 
comments, (4) information from the KT, (5) financial implications for BC, and (6) 
"employment and economic opportunities". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 8) omit 
• Habitat Protection Measures: 
The non-industrial use of Zone A would ensure a "portion of core Burnt Pine 
caribou habitat is not affected by major industrial development for a minimum of 
five years". Zone A will be divided into Resource Review Areas (RRA). These 
will be reassessed with respect to "habitat condition" and the "status and trends of 
the population". Since industrial forestry operations are already banned from the 
UWRs and WHAs, the degree to which the RRAs will further restrict their 
activities is considered minor. (PT Report, 2010: pgs. 8-9) 
BMPs apply to Zone B and Zone C. They "would provide for the conservation of 
caribou habitat while still permitting industrial development to proceed where 
appropriate". The objectives of the BMPs include: "[rjeduce surface disturbance 
where there is suitable forage for caribou (lichens, etc.) For example: [w]here 
practicable, use directional drilling for oil and gas, and limit footprints for 
exploration and production of coal mines; [r] educe removal of timber within core 
habitat; [a]void the development of ploughed or hard packed corridors in winter 
that facilitate predator access to winter habitat; and, [minimize displacement of 
caribou due to industrial development by implementing noise reduction 
techniques, managing timing of operations, etc" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 9). In 
addition, the PT Report states that, because there was no time to discuss the 
BMPs with the various industries, their application will be determined on a case-
by-case basis. 
In similar fashion as Zone A, but not precisely, BC may consider placing a 
16 While the TOR required that the positive and negative effects be identified, BC did not couch the 
"Implications" section of the options in such a manner Instead, BC included the negative effects to the 
wage-based economy and some of the effects to caribou, while neglecting to do so for the effects WMFN's 
culture, including the traditional economy With that in mind, it is important to note that the language used 
in this thesis does not accurately reflect the terminology used (or lack thereof) in the PT Report 
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'deferral' on wind development on Mt. Stephenson. By doing so, and together 
with FCC's attempt at reducing its impact adjacent to the Mt. Stephenson, the 
hope is that the mountain will "provide some viable caribou habitat even if a mine 
proceeds to development" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 10). 
• Caribou Population Management Measures: 
Predator management will continue until the Herd's "population has stabilized", 
which will be accomplished by killing wolves by "trapping or ground hunting, 
sterilization, and aerial hunting". The examination of several opportunities will 
occur, such as the reduction of other sources of prey (e.g. moose, elk, deer) 
through WMFN's youth hunting and trapping initiatives, monitoring habitat use 
and populations of species, and penning and translocation of individual caribou. 
In addition, a management approach to address recreational land use activities 
(e.g. skidoos in the alpine and subalpine areas) will need to be developed and 
implemented. (PT Report, 2010: pg. 10) 
• Implementation Requirements: 
Additionally, more detailed planning is required regarding the Burnt Pine caribou 
herd (e.g. creation of RRAs) and planning for caribou throughout the Peace 
Region, which would include the various 'Caribou Population Management 
Measures' (e.g. penning, recreation management) and include the involvement of 
other Treaty 8 First Nations. The BMPs and there effectiveness will determine 
the "long term value of caribou habitat", which also need the force of legal 
mechanisms to ensure compliance and to allow for enforcement. Because the 
Plan relies largely (if not entirely) on predator management, "aerial hunting of 
wolves will be necessary" for a minimum of "20 years" and more if "habitat 
measures" do not adequately "limit primary prey and population approaches 
forecast maximum". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 10) 
• Implications: 
This Option is the best in terms of economic benefits, according to the PT Report. 
It "has the least impact on tenure holders and economic values" as it does not 
require expropriation, which means the risk to BC having to compensate existing 
tenure holders (e.g. coal, oil and gas, forestry, and wind) is mitigated. Loss of 
revenue is also alleviated. Thus, the loss of potential monies is removed and the 
collection of potential revenue from resource development is assured. The only 
economic burden is that the Plan requires financial capacity to be implemented, 
including the likely development and implementation of the NCMP - a cost that 
applies to all of the Options. 
Ecological burdens, while not expressly stated as such in the PT Report, include 
"additional" destruction of "core habitat" as a result of "development activities", 
which is problematic for the Herd as the "winter range at risk in Zone B contains 
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the wintering area" that it prefers. Consequently, "there is still a risk that the 
Burnt Pine Herd may continue to decline." A less indentified ecological impact, 
and perhaps even overlook at times, is the elimination of wolves from the 
ecosystem, which the Plan relies heavily on well into the future. (PT Report, 
2010: pg. 11) 
Burdens placed onto the shoulders of First Nations, but not expressly stated as 
such in the PT Report, are by and large the reality that this Plan will not alleviate 
the threat of extinction facing the Herd, as "there is still a risk" it "may continue 
to decline". As such, "[tjhere is likely no opportunity for sustainable First 
Nations harvest in the Burnt Pine area". Further, as the PT Report states, 
"[Reduction of prey species such as moose, deer, elk, is of concern to Treaty 8 
First Nations in the area who rely on these species." (PT Report, 2010: pg. 11) 
This Option was not supported by any of the other Treaty 8 First Nations (i.e. 
Doig River First Nation and Saulteau First Nations) that provided comments to 
BC regarding the draft PT Report, with WMFN in particular being "strongly 
opposed" to it (PT Report, 2010: pg. 11). 
ion Two: "No New Development in Selected Core Habitats, with Minimal Surface 
Disturbance in Remaining Core Habitats " 
• Management Intent: 
In terms of intent, this Option is very similar as Option 1 as it has all of the same 
recommendations. It has some additional deferrals for Zone B, which aims to 
"further" mitigate "the impact of multiple resource development in core habitat in 
Zone B. (PT Report, 2010: pg. 11). 
• Habitat Protection: 
In addition, this Option would defer any new proposals for tenures from oil & gas 
and windfarm proponents within Zone B, in that way permitting some 
developments (e.g. directional drilling) to occur while precluding others. 
• Caribou Population Management Measures: 
These are the same as Option 1. 
• Implementation Requirements: 
In comparison to Option 1, the main difference is that in this Option will include 
some (albeit limited) RRAs within Zone B. 
• Implications: 
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In contrast to economic benefits that Option 1 may produce, this Option has a 
"greater risk of potential lost revenue" as it will "restrict certain activities of 
existing tenure holders" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 13). 
With respect to the differences in ecological burdens of Option 1, this Option 
"further mitigates impact of multiple resource development in core habitat in 
Zone B", likely resulting in "less habitat destruction" (PT Report, 2010: pg. 13). 
Burdens to First Nations are the same as noted in Option 1. 
Option Three: "No New Development (Resulting in Surface Disturbance) in Core 
Habitats of the Burnt Pine Herd" 
• Management Intent: 
Largely based on the recommendations from the KT Report, the goal of this 
Option is to increase the population of the Burnt Pine caribou herd from its 
estimated population of 11 animals to 50 animals. 
• Habitat Protection Measures: 
In order to achieve the goal, this Option requires "no further surface disturbance 
from mining, oil and das development, forestry, or wind power" in Zone A and 
Zone B. To achieve this, a series of "protected areas (e.g. park, conservancy)" 
would need to be created. Within Zone C, which is considered the "matrix 
habitat", an additional planning process will determine the level and type of 
development that is possible while at the same time maintaining "caribou and 
cultural values". BMPs would be applied, with the objective of the following: 
"[minimize the creation of forage for alternative prey species for wolves (i.e. 
moose, deer, elk) through management of patch size distribution, vegetation 
management that reduces browse; and [minimize any new road or linear 
development". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 14). 
• Caribou Population Management Measures: 
While the predator management techniques are similar as those for Options 1 and 
2, in this Option the measures would be implemented through WMFN's youth 
trapping and hunting initiative, including the potential reduction of prey. 
Additional measures such as monitoring, penning/translocation, and winter 
recreation management will also occur. 
• Implementation Requirements: 
Further planning would be required to develop BMPs and their legal mechanisms. 
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Additionally, WMFN's initiative in combination with BC's efforts would have to 
be developed and coordinated. 
Management Measures would need to be implemented. In addition, a review of 
the "existing tenures to determine to determine which existing tenures would be 
able to advance their project". To implement the Habitat Measures for Zone A 
and Zone B, the parties will need to determine the "[IJegal designation of 
protective measures". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 14-15). 
• Implications: 
The legal designation of Zone A and Zone B will cause economic burdens, as 
there may be financial implications that apply due to the fact that BC has 
approved resource development tenures thought the area. Some tenures may be 
unaffected like the oil and gas industry as it can directionally drill. Others, such 
as mining and wind, may be impacted as the advancement of their project within 
the area requires surface disturbance. By taking such a sweeping approach, the 
PT Report suggests that it is "[l]ikely to create uncertainty within various industry 
sectors". All of this will potentially result in "lost employment and other 
economic opportunities" and thus will result in a "[significant risk of potential 
lost revenue to [the] crown". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 15) 
As a result of Habitat Protection, the ecological benefit for the Burnt Pine caribou 
herd is that their population "could reach 50 animals in 20-30 years". While there 
is always a theoretical probability that the Herd's population may still decline, the 
"risk is greatly reduced in contrast to Option 1 and 2". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 15) 
A benefit is that "[t]here is likely limited (1-2 bulls) opportunity for sustainable 
caribou harvest for First Nations within the Burnt Pine area." WMFN supported 
this Option, although it was contingent on BC guaranteeing them that the NCMP 
would be government-to-goverament and that the planning process begins prior to 
"the end of 2010". This Option was not, however, supported by either of the 
other Treaty 8 First Nations. (PT Report, 2010: pg. 15) 
Option Four: "No New Development Resulting Surface Disturbance in Core and High 
Quality Habitats of the Caribou Herds in the Central Rocky Mountains " 
• Management Intent: 
Unlike the other options, this Option is the full adoption of the KT Report as the 
means to protect and augment the Burnt Pine caribou herd; therefore, this Option 
is very similar to Option 3 but involves a larger geographic scope. 
The goals of this Option "are to: [ijncrease the population of the Burnt Pine herd 
from 9-19 to >50; [i]ncrease the 7 caribou herds from the present estimate 
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population of 1,000 animals to 3,000 animals; and, [pjrovide a future sustainable 
First Nations harvest of 60-90 caribou". These goals would be achieved through 
the protection of the "core habitat for all of the herds", meaning resource 
development would be moved out of the alpine and subalpine areas to the "matrix 
habitat". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 16). 
• Habitat Protection Measures: 
To protect the core habitats, which are the alpine and subalpine areas, there would 
be a need for the statutory creation "of a protected area (e.g. park, conservancy)". 
Recommendations for such a land designation to protect caribou include: "no 
industry activity", prohibiting vehicles that damage vegetation, "telemetry data 
for the Narraway, Scott, and Graham herds" will be used to map their areas, 
"[ijdentify potential high quality" habitat between the "Burnt Pine and the 
Quintette herds". (PT Report, 2010: pgs. 16) 
Low elevation caribou will be management differently, including the use of 
"telemetry information and local knowledge" to ensure UWRs and/or WHAs are 
accurate. A plan will be created for the caribou in the area that "limits cumulative 
impacts of all industrial activities below a sustainable threshold for caribou 
persistence, which is based on the science developed by Sorensen et al (2008)". 
(PT Report, 2010: pgs. 17) 
As resource development would continue within the matrix habitats, a set of 
BMPs would be used that are specific to the habitats used. That is, different 
BMPs would apply in habitats of the Narraway herd in comparison to the habitats 
of the Burnt Pine herd, which would take into account their individualist use of 
the land. The objective underlying such BMPs would include: "[minimize the 
creation of forage for alternative prey species for wolves (i.e. moose, deer, elk) 
through management of patch size distribution, vegetation management that 
reduces browse; and, [minimize any new road or linear development". (PT 
Report, 2010: pg. 17) 
• Caribou Population Management Measures: 
These would be for the most part the same as Option 3. 
• Implementation Requirements: 
These would be for the most part the same as Option 3. 
• Implications: 
The possible economic burdens are mostly the same as Option 3, but with the 
geographic scoping being larger it is assumed that the potential impacts would be 
larger as well. For instance, if the core habitats were protected for the seven herds 
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thereby requiring the tenures to be expropriated due to the creation of a park or 
conservancy, "compensation would be required in accordance with applicable 
statutory provisions". (PT Report, 2010: pg. 18). 
The ecological benefits of this Option are similar to those of Option 3, but are 
applied to a larger area as the core and matrix habitats of the following herds would be 
protected or managed for cumulative impacts: Burnt Pine, Graham, Kennedy Siding, 
Moberly, Narraway, Quintette, and Scott herds. All of the Treaty 8 First Nations, 
including WMFN, preferred this Option over all of the other options, as it was "most 
consistent" with their views. 
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